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Foreword:  
Optimal Organizational Structure 
and the Search for the Organizational 
Holy Grail
A general notion of what an organization actually is formed in the 
17th and 18th centuries, and the dream of an optimal organizational 
structure existed well before then. Even the Sassanids who dominated 
Persia in the third century CE debated ways to optimize the manu-
facturing of glass and silk. In the late Middle Ages and Early Modern 
Age, at the height of the Venetian city state, counselors discussed how 
to organize shipbuilding most efficiently. The Dutch and British mer-
chants who dispatched their ships to Asia to buy spices in the 16th and 
17th centuries, debated the best way to structure their ventures. And 
today, corporations, public administrations, the military, hospitals, 
universities, schools, and associations spend a great amount of time 
identifying the form of organization that offers them the framework 
best suited for the optimal performance of their work. 
But do such optimal organizational structures really exist? Granted, 
management books, articles in economics journals, and the downpour 
of slides presented in lectures for practitioners suggest that the orga-
nizational Holy Grail has been found—or at least that its discovery 
is near at hand. Yet on closer examination, it becomes obvious how 
much contradiction organizations must contend with as they strive 
for perfection.
On the one side, employees are supposed to compete with one 
another within the organization as “entrepreneurs within the com-
pany,” while on the other they are supposed to cooperate with their 
coworkers. The motto is: we are all pulling together, but only the best 
will prevail. In one sense, there is the demand that employees follow 
their own path, yet at the same time they must not lose sight of the 
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organization’s overall goal. Again, the motto: everybody finds their 
own way of doing things, but we are still in the same boat. On the one 
hand, employees are supposed to break the rules that have been handed 
down from above—if necessary—while on the other they must respect 
the structures the organization has put in place. The motto is: do what 
you like, but don’t break any of the written or unwritten laws. On the 
one hand, there needs to be enough room for flexible, creative lateral 
thinkers to maneuver, while still using the organization’s resources as 
effectively as possible. The motto here is: be unorthodox, just don’t 
interfere with the standardization process which is taking place in the 
name of efficiency. 
Particularly in organizations that decentralize decision-making 
competencies, reduce the levels of their hierarchies, and eliminate strict 
boundaries between departments, fundamental coordination problems 
emerge. How does one arrange coordination between units that are 
independent and primarily self-referencing? How can one organize 
cooperation between partially autonomous groups, process lines, sec-
tors, or profit centers even though they are permitted a high degree of 
autonomy? How does one find a balance between the required and the 
encouraged local rationality of teams as opposed to the organization’s 
overall rationale? The basic problem organizations face is this: the more 
individual units are in a position to gain independence, the more urgent 
but also the more complicated it becomes to integrate them into the 
organization as a whole. As differentiation into self-organized, partially 
autonomous units increases, integration becomes more difficult and 
simultaneously also more necessary.
Under these conditions, the search for an optimal organizational 
structure resembles the efforts of Sisyphus who tries in vain to reach 
the top of the hill with his boulder. Just as the boulder rolls away from 
him time and time again, managers’ hopes of finding the optimal 
organizational structure are repeatedly dashed. Measures intended to 
streamline organizational design produce undesired side effects that 
frequently emerge only after some time. While a central organizational 
problem may be brought under control, it is at the cost of new areas 
that present themselves to management and call for improvement.
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For companies, public administrations, hospitals, universities, 
or the military, this book destroys the hope of being able to find an 
optimal organizational structure. It explains the undesired side effects 
and the paradoxical outcomes that management battles as it strives 
for perfection and quality. Following a basic discussion of the prob-
lems entailed by the search for the optimal organizational structure 
in Chapter 1—which can easily be read at the end—I turn to the 
central questions that management poses when it attempts to optimize 
an organization. Why do employees resist their own “empowerment” 
within the framework of decentralization measures (Chapter 2)? Why 
can organizations be structured like a big internal market (Chapter 3)? 
Why does quality management often result in more bureaucracy 
instead of greater quality (Chapter 4)? Why does systematic decen-
tralization in some cases result in a centralization of decision-making 
(Chapter 5)? Why do group work projects, according to the criteria 
of their promoters, succeed to a limited degree and then ultimately 
turn out to be projects that have “failed successfully” (Chapter 6)? 
How do businesses attempt to orient themselves according to “good 
management” concepts and then try, this best practice orientation 
notwithstanding, to present themselves as “unique” (Chapter 7)? And 
how should they manage the difficulties encountered in searching for 
the optimal organizational structure (Chapter 8)? 
The Three Aspects of an Organization
When analyzing organizations, the important thing is always to bear 
in mind that there are three aspects to an organization: the display side, 
which is to say, the embellished façade that is shown to the outside 
world; the formal side, consisting of the more or less precisely synchro-
nized expectations members must meet if they wish to retain member-
ship; and the informal side, the routines that have crept into day-to-day 
operations and have formed in the shadow of the formal aspect.
It is an unavoidable outcome of the division of labor that the mem-
bers of an organization focus on one particular aspect (Kühl 2013, 89). 
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Middle management is dominated by specialists in the formal pro-
gramming of organizations. This is where targets are conceived, and 
new rules formulated which the employees must observe. The for-
mal targets must then be implemented in the organization’s operative 
areas, although construing, reinterpreting, and dodging the formal-
ized requirements often takes a good amount of playful creativity. 
Understandably, those who specialize in the informal side of things 
are not flagged on the organizational chart, for example, as a “Chief 
Informality Officer.” Often it is the employees in human resources 
development or the training and education department who assume 
the role of contacts for everything that isn’t readily subsumed under 
the organization’s formal structure. One of the major responsibilities 
of those who hold the top positions is to dress up the organization’s 
display side—with assistance from their communications, press, and 
marketing departments.
It may be considered good style for members of an organization to 
emphasize that they always keep an eye on all three aspects; depending 
on their position they tend to see one of the three in terms of an abso-
lute. The experts in formal structure frequently view the organization’s 
widely diverse forms of informality and the everyday infractions of 
the rules from one perspective only: this has to be “fixed.” They call 
in quality management consultants who are charged with identifying 
the frequent deviations from the rules and eliminating them. Compre-
hensive organizational management software is purchased as a means 
of making technical provisions against deviations from standards. Or, 
specific departments are set up to control processes or ensure confor-
mity—currently known as “compliance”—thereby keeping deviations 
from the rules to a minimum. Finally, there are the organizational 
culture experts who often view the informal work processes as both a 
bastion of humaneness in an alienated work environment and the key 
to increased profitability. Improving the organization’s “chemistry” is 
seen as a launching point for creating happier employees as well as 
increasing the bottom line. Meanwhile, at the highest management 
echelons, one can observe a preference for viewing an organization’s 
internal processes from the perspective of its display side. As early as 
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1938, Chester Barnard (Barnard 1938, 120), who was a senior exec-
utive at telecommunications company AT&T for a time, noted that 
high level managers frequently cannot keep track of their own organi-
zation’s rules and regulations and are to no small degree clueless as to 
the factors, attitudes, and behaviors that shape the organization from 
day to day.
Specializing and focusing on one particular aspect of an organi-
zation makes sense in terms of the division of labor. Just as it makes 
sense for companies to employ specialists in the fields of purchasing, 
production, and sales, or for a hospital to employ separate experts to 
provide medical care, handle the accounting for services performed, 
and to clean the halls, it also appears to make functional sense that 
organizations keep people with different kinds of expertise on hand to 
manage their formal sides, informal sides, and display sides. A cabinet 
minister would be demanding too much of herself, not to mention 
her ministry, if—in addition to functioning as a display window for 
political decisions—she aspired as well to understanding the relevant 
formal rules and regulations that applied to the organization and to 
keeping track of the various informal coordination processes within 
the ministry. For production line workers in an automotive supply 
factory, it is enough if they are taught which formal demands apply 
to them and learn how to circumvent the demands informally if the 
need should arise. They do not need to feel responsible for building 
the company’s external image. 
Nevertheless, if the goal is to gain a comprehensive understanding 
of the way an organization works, one must be able not only to grasp all 
three aspects and their respective rationales, but also to understand how 
those three aspects mesh. As a point of departure for my analysis in this 
book, I take the display side of an organization that has been spruced up 
with trendy management topics. I show that organizations do not in any 
way function according to the principles propagated via their display side. 
Drawing on a large number of pioneering organizations, I demonstrate 
how processes function in the shadow of the display side and point out 
the very significant degree to which their functioning contradicts what 
is presented to the outside world. Yet this is not intended to challenge 
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the functionality of the display side. On the contrary, if an organization 
presented itself to the world the way it actually works, its authenticity 
would presumably quickly lead to its demise. 
In my two other books about new forms of organizations—When 
the Monkeys Run the Zoo: The Pitfalls of Flat Hierarchies and The Rain-
maker Effect: Contradictions of the Learning Organization—I concen-
trated on showing what would happen if the principles communicated 
through an organization’s display side were implemented on a one-
to-one basis. In the present book, I employ an in-depth analysis of 
pioneering organizations to systematically look behind their display 
side and show what effects the decentralization and dehierarchization 
measures undertaken on the formal side have on an organization’s 
informal side.
From the perspective of organizational science, the contradictions, 
dilemmas, and paradoxes that can be observed when one peers behind 
the display side do not represent pathology in any sense. Systems-the-
oretical organizational research contends that there is no way organi-
zations can avoid grappling with contradictory expectations because 
they are thrust on organizations from the outside. Such contradictory 
expectations can be cushioned by delegating them to various depart-
ments or hierarchical levels, but the inescapable result is that they lead 
to differences between those departments and hierarchical levels.
Opposing the Urge to Have “the Very Latest Thing”
In management literature, there is a regrettable sense of urgency to 
be totally up-to-date and have the very latest approach. Perhaps this 
need for something new is understandable at first glance. Who will be 
able to introduce the next best practice model is the subject of bitter 
competition among organizational consultants. In the publishing mar-
ket, the only way an author of management books can still position a 
bestseller is to proclaim nothing short of a revolution.
As a rule, the new concepts are merely an attempt to sell old wine in 
new bottles. The post-bureaucratic forms of organization once referred 
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to as “flexible firms,” “modular organizations,” or “adhocracies” are now 
advertised as “agile systems,” “fractal organizations” or “holacracy.” 
Considerations on popular networking concepts that were being prop-
agated several years ago as “virtual organizations” or “network organi-
zations” are now being re-marketed under labels such as “communities 
of practice” or “crowds of wisdom.” 
Yet this penchant for “the latest and the greatest”—as pointed out 
by Henry Mintzberg, Bruce Ahlstrand, and Joseph Lampel (Mintzberg/
Ahlstrand/Lampel 2009, 11ff.)—not only does injustice to the classical 
works of organizational research which described decades ago many of 
the developments that are being peddled as novel approaches today. In 
particular, it creates the problem that readers are often presented with 
something which is new but banal, instead of something old which 
is significant.
The invention of ever new organizational concepts must not be 
allowed to obscure the fact that the problems have by and larg remained 
the same. I draw on the verbal excitement in management literature 
only because, as I discuss the supposedly novel organizational princi-
ples, it will enable me to elaborate new insights into the functioning of 
post-bureaucratic organizations in such a way that they can be linked 
to discussions among practitioners.
Concerning the Tension between Organizational Theory  
and Organizational Practice 
One could make it easy for oneself and assume that the scientific 
insights that have been gained into the contradictions, dilemmas, and 
paradoxes would somehow seep into managerial thinking. This is the 
hope concealed behind Kurt Lewin’s saying, which scientifically ori-
ented consultants enjoy quoting, namely, that there is nothing more 
practical than a good theory.
At first glance, this seems plausible. Publications by managers 
and consultants often adorn themselves with the insignia of science. 
The studies that consulting firms design for marketing purposes are 
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upgraded through a methodology that comes across as scientific. Con-
sultants and managers embellish their articles in professional journals 
for practitioners with references to scientific literature. And in the 
meantime, it has simply become part of the job for politicians and 
corporate executives in some countries to acquire doctoral degrees so 
they can additionally shine with an emblem of scientific competence. 
It is only after the doctorates have been revoked on grounds of pla-
giarism that the executives or politicians explain that the respective 
ex-PhD was hired as a minister of state or CEO, and not as a scientific 
research fellow.
In spite of the linkage between scientific theory and extra-scientific 
practice which is maintained within the display side of organizations, 
one must not fail to recognize that science, consulting, and manage-
ment function according to entirely different rationales, and that as 
a result communication barriers almost inevitably arise. Scientists are 
oriented toward the production of “pure knowledge”; they do not need 
to give thought to the way the knowledge is applied. While it is true 
that consultants profit when they can flag their concepts as scientific, 
their ultimate concern is whether their concepts match the problems 
of their clients. For managers, it is basically irrelevant whether the 
approaches taken also appear convincing in the eyes of organizational 
scientists. The main thing is that they achieve the desired results in 
practical terms.
This book is unusual in that it makes a conscious attempt to build 
a bridge between organizational science and organizational practice 
without intending to fundamentally remove the tension between the 
two areas. I am thereby placing expectations on organizational sciences 
as well as organizational practitioners. Organizational scientists will be 
confronted with a somewhat unusual form of presentation. This book is 
based on articles, all of which were first published in scholarly journals 
and, with their detailed theoretical discussions, methodological explica-
tions, and case studies were geared to scientific publication standards. 
Yet in order to improve the book’s readability, the scientific aspects were 
significantly reduced. I seriously shortened the bibliography, omitted 
impressive statistics, and dispensed with detailed reproductions of oral 
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citations. In scientific circles, these factors alone represent an obstacle 
to reception. Yet I can guarantee that if organizational scientists will 
engage with the uncustomary form of presentation they will find one 
or another interesting consideration. The expectations I place on orga-
nizational practitioners is that they will be confronted with a somewhat 
unusual view of organizations. My emphasis on paradoxes, dilemmas, 
and undesired side effects does not fit into the organizational picture 
normally drawn for practitioners. It is my hope, however, that the 
descriptions presented here will ultimately align more closely with 
practitioners’ perception of reality than the usual management books 
that have been trimmed to be streamlined and catchy. 
Despite its emphasis on undesired side effects and contradictions, 
this book also demonstrates why the dream of an optimal organi-
zational structure will persist and that it even has a function. It is 
only because the boulder always rolls down the mountain just before 
Sisyphus reaches the peak that he continues to exert his efforts. In his 
myth about Sisyphus, Albert Camus noted that even though human 
beings may have been deserted by God, and helplessly and hopelessly 
thrown back on their own resources, they are happy in spite of the 
contradictions of human existence. The same applies to executives. 
They cannot use the undesired side effects, paradoxes, and contradic-
tion along the road to optimal organizational structure as a reason to 
abandon the search. Rather, it is only by continuing the futile search 
for optimal organizational structure that the meaning of all the dis-
crepancy emerges.
1. 
Introduction: Dealing with the  
Paradoxes and Dilemmas of  
New Organizational Forms
“Organizing is when one person writes down the work  
that other people are doing.”
Kurt Tucholsky 
The discussion of new organizational structures for businesses, public 
administrations, universities, hospitals, churches, colleges, and associ-
ations or clubs can only be understood against the background of the 
bureaucratic organization with rigid hierarchical structure, a view that 
was substantially influenced by the work of Max Weber, Frederick Taylor 
und Henri Fayol. Even though Weber’s considerations about the ideal 
type of bureaucracy were not intended as a description of the best way 
for an organization to structure itself, as was the case with Taylor and 
Fayol, but rather as an analytical method to verify empirical phenomena, 
all three cases resulted in very convincing descriptions of organizations. 
Weber’s methodologically conceived ideal type and the normative ideal 
models of Taylor and Fayol are similar in their unmistakable respect for 
the incisiveness and logical consistency of organizations.
In the work of Weber, and that of Taylor and Fayol as well, one 
discerns the idea that organizations consist of a rational arrangement 
of ends and means. According to Max Weber (Weber 1976, 13), 
instrumental-rational action entails weighing different ends against 
one another, selecting the most appropriate means for achieving the 
defined end, and taking into account the possible undesirable side 
effects that the process of selecting ends and means may entail. In order 
to reach an instrumental-rational decision in Weber’s sense, it is nec-
essary for decision makers to gain clarity about their interests, wishes, 
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and values, gather the most exhaustive information possible about all 
of the alternative actions, and carefully weigh the consequences of the 
various choices.
Instrumental rationality does not refer to the fact that players’ actions 
are goal-oriented, but denotes instead that the organization is run from 
A to Z according to an overarching goal. Using the concept of instru-
mental rationality, it is possible to construct an entire organization in the 
form of end-means chains. The leadership of the organization defines a 
general goal that is to be accomplished. For example, “We want to be 
number one worldwide in the CD music business.” Next, the means 
are identified through which this top-level goal can be best achieved. 
For example, “We want to sign a contract with Madonna.” The means 
that have been determined for achieving the top-level goal are, in turn, 
defined as subgoals, and means are identified to achieve the subgoals. For 
example, “First, we will sign a contract with Madonna’s husband. That 
will allow us to approach her as well.” In this manner, a hierarchical chain 
develops consisting of superior and subordinate goals with which all 
activity in the organization can be structured (March/Simon 1958, 191).
1.1 The Linkage between Instrumental-Rational  
Decision Making and the Bureaucratic Model
It is striking that in Weber’s understanding of organizations, but also 
in Taylor’s concept of scientific management and Fayol’s administrative 
management theory, there is a close linkage between instrumental-ra-
tional decision making and a bureaucratic or Taylorist ideal type. They 
held the conviction that there was no form of organization that could 
compete in terms of rationality (and ultimately performance) with a 
hierarchically structured and bureaucratically organized enterprise or 
administration. Much like Taylor and Fayol, Weber (Weber 1976, 128ff.) 
assumed that the top of the hierarchy identified with the goals of the 
organization and divided them into many small tasks. A deep, multi-
tiered hierarchy organizes the division into precisely defined tasks. The 
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tasks are assigned to people who are most likely to be qualified to fulfill 
them. Since providing instructions to the lower levels in every individ-
ual case would overwhelm the top level of the hierarchy, it establishes 
programs that inform recipients of the instructions on how they are to 
behave under normal circumstances. Formalized operating procedures 
then anchor the programs in organizational memory. Work processes 
that have been performed are then documented in written files (or later 
on computers). The leadership level of the hierarchy can concentrate on 
monitoring compliance and the management of special cases. 
Organizational science has repeatedly noted that the bureaucratic 
ideal type bears a strong resemblance to the functioning of a machine. 
Much like a machine, a bureaucracy consists of precisely defined indi-
vidual components acting in clearly determined relationships with the 
others. All of the individual parts relate to the purpose of the machine 
and only become meaningful through their integration with the other 
elements. A v-belt is useless unless it is attached to the rest of the 
machine, just as a personnel department is only meaningful if it is 
connected with other departments, say, in a municipal administration. 
A bureaucracy may consist of a great many individual parts, like a 
machine, but ultimately its complexity is manageable through precise 
descriptions of processes. The operating manual for the machine—
or the organization’s handbook—simply becomes that much thicker. 
Through external interventions, individual components and their 
relationships can be changed, thereby adjusting the bureaucracy or 
machine to meet new requirements. 
1.2 A New Idea about the Way  
an Organizational Structure Looks
In the 1920s and 30s, a critical examination of the bureaucratic Tay-
lorist type of organization began. As a result, a decentralized type 
gradually appeared on the horizon of possibilities as an optimal orga-
nizational structure (Udy 1959). 
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It seemed to promise greater success if organizations abandoned cen-
tralized areas of responsibility and shifted decision making to the lowest 
possible levels. In strategic questions, decision-making competencies 
were transferred from the top level to profit centers, sectors, or divi-
sions, which functioned as “organizations within the organization” 
through a high degree of integration of all functions. In terms of oper-
ative orientation, rationalization measures were no longer undertaken 
only by a specialized staff. Instead, the object was to increase and utilize 
employee expertise through measures such as continuous improvement 
processes and quality circles. The hierarchy was flattened by eliminating 
individual positions and gathering employees into groups and teams.1
No later than the 1990s, a decentralized model formed that enjoyed 
the broad support of various groups in the organization. Managers and 
heads of works councils, functionaries of the employee and employer 
associations, experts from such diverse disciplines as business admin-
istration, engineering, and work science, and, not least, the business 
media declared that a decentralized organizational model based on 
a flat hierarchy, group work, and project work was superior to the 
bureaucratic ideal model. Surely, never before had such diverse groups 
endorsed an organizational type so unanimously. 
There was talk of a transition from a traditional to a new regula-
tory framework. People were convinced that the cost advantages of 
decentralized structures, the growth in professional training of the 
working population, the development of new technologies, and the 
demand for emancipation had led to a new regulatory structure which 
managements could now only elude with difficulty. As a result, the 
notion of “right action” in management was so compressed in a new 
regulatory framework that in businesses, public administrations, hos-
pitals, or schools it was self-evident to assume that innovations such as 
employee empowerment, group work, outsourcing, management by 
objectives, continuous improvement processes, or profit center struc-
turing were beneficial to the enterprise.
1 For early versions, see (Womack/Jones/Ross 1990) or (Hammer/Champy 1993), for later 
versions of the same, see (Laloux 2014) or (Robertson 2015).
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Nevertheless, the notions of a new optimal organizational structure 
did not lead to an abandonment of the narrow, instrumental-rational 
understanding of organizations. Even the promoters of decentralized 
structures generally adhered to an instrumental-rational perspective, 
except that they simply varied what was viewed as instrumental-rational 
according to environmental conditions. In a turbulent environment, it 
was simply more rational to be acting with a decentralized, flat, adho-
cratic, agile form of organization, whereas in a stable environment, it 
could very well make sense to revert to something more similar to the 
bureaucratic ideal type discussed by Weber, Taylor, or Fayol.
We must not overlook the merit of the instrumental-rational inter-
pretation of organizational processes. Research in industrial sociology, 
work science, organizational psychology, and business administration 
has had the effect that rationalization processes are being subjected 
to precise observation, and in scientific circles an intensive debate is 
underway about how to evaluate the rationalization strategies that 
have been observed. 
The problem with this instrumental-rational approach, however, 
is that discussion of new forms of organizations has been constrained. 
In the final analysis, debate on the subject in large sectors of business 
administration, industrial sociology, economics, and organizational 
psychology can be pressed into a four-field model. In one respect, the 
debate revolves around the question of which strategy—one with a 
centralized or a decentralized orientation—is most likely to contribute 
to the achievement of an organization’s goal. Yet in another respect it is 
a question of how the centralized or decentralized strategies depicted 
as rational for the organization present themselves in the eyes of the 
employees. Do bureaucratic or post-bureaucratic strategies contribute 
to employee satisfaction, fulfillment, and liberation from alienation, or 
not? How close is the connection between employee satisfaction and 
the economic success of their employers?
Within this four-field model there are many opportunities to differ-
entiate. There is debate over whether quality circles belong more to the 
bureaucratic-Taylorist or the post-bureaucratic model. An argument 
has arisen over whether discrepancy between the much ballyhooed 
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changes in organizational structure and the actual organizational pro-
cess results in a pronounced disillusionment effect. One can describe 
the paradoxical demands that result from decentralized structures and 
point to the problematical aspects of these new forms of work. One 
can debate on how the “best way” to reorganize looks in Europe or 
the US—beyond the scope of Asian rationalization strategies. One can 
discuss whether extensive partial autonomy or a more restrictive form 
of group work has a greater effect on increasing employee satisfaction.
Much like the instrumental-rational approach to organizations in 
general, this debate could be tied into concrete organizational struggles 
in which managers, employees, employee representatives, and con-
sultants grapple over the way the organization is supposed to look in 
concrete terms. Since this debate is often conducted with reference to 
a goal that is viewed as defined (profit, efficient administration, good 
working conditions, environmental protection), it is easy to link the 
instrumental-rationally formulated considerations stemming from sci-
entific research to the problems, thoughts, and ideas of practitioners. 
1.3 Paradoxes and Dilemmas: A New Focus
The challenge for managers and consultants, but also for researchers, 
lies in explaining the multitude of paradoxical effects and dilemmas 
that arise during reorganization processes. Particularly in the late 20th 
century, the decentralized, dehierarchicalized structure became so dom-
inant (at least in the display side of organizations) that even in scien-
tific research doubting and critical voices were heard only in isolated 
cases. Currently, however, a deeper understanding of the paradoxes and 
dilemmas of decentralized, dehierarchicalized organizations is increas-
ing, developing not only in organizations themselves, but especially in 
the fields of consulting and research.
The concepts of a paradox and a dilemma respectively mark off differ-
ent problem areas. The concept of a paradox indicates a situation in which 
a statement contains contradictory elements and yet the statement itself 
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claims to be correct. Paradoxical formulations such as “try to be sponta-
neous” direct one’s attention to a special type of truth that has its roots 
in the obvious contradiction between the two elements of the statement.
The concept of a dilemma also points to the difficulties entailed by 
two opposing alternatives, when there are equally good reasons in favor 
of both. In contrast to a paradox, which in principle cannot be resolved, 
the concept of a dilemma places greater emphasis on the pressure an 
organization experiences to decide in favor of one of the alternatives, 
even though a recommendation to choose the diametrical opposite 
appears similarly attractive. Based on demands for consistency and the 
pressure to act, the contradiction in the perception of decision makers 
cannot simply be retained, but must be resolved in one direction or the 
other. The opinion is that a decision favoring one side of the dilemma 
has to be reached.
It would be an error to conclude that paradoxes and dilemmas 
arise only in decentralized forms of organizations. Many paradoxical 
situations have been described in bureaucratic-Taylorist organizations 
as well. Nevertheless, in “classical” forms of organizations, paradoxes 
and dilemmas appear to be somewhat controllable through various 
strategies anchored in factual, time, and social dimensions.
An initial strategy that targeted the factual dimension consisted of 
allowing the formation of local rationalities by creating clearly separated 
departments and mitigating the resulting conflicts by allocating finan-
cial reserves as additional resources. Early on, Richard M. Cyert and 
James G. March (Cyert/March 1963) pointed out that in hierarchical 
organizations where the structure is heavily based on the division of 
labor, goal conflicts can be reduced by assigning the respective com-
peting goals to different units of the organization. The conflicts that 
exist in the organization itself are transformed into conflicts between 
departments where they can be reduced by providing sufficient “orga-
nizational slack.” In this manner, financial reserves can contribute to 
competing departments not having to arrive at mutual decisions. Inter-
mediate storage facilities reduce quarreling between the production 
and sales departments because every disturbance does not immediately 
have an impact on the upstream or downstream department. Since 
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large, bureaucratically structured organizations are especially good at 
assigning goal conflicts to different units and have the resources to 
tone down goal conflicts between various units, William H. Starbuck 
(Starbuck 1988, 67f.) considers these bureaucratic organizations par-
ticularly paradox tolerant. 
To avoid organizational dilemmas, a second strategy targets the time 
dimension and consists of emphasizing only one side of the dilemma 
respectively, but also keeping the option open to place the other side 
at the center the action at a different time. From this perspective, the 
history of many businesses in the 20th century appears as a permanent, 
wave-like back and forth movement between two opposing poles. A 
phase of diversification is followed by a concentration on core compe-
tencies. After this, the focus returns to diversification, and subsequently 
to only a small number of core competencies once again. This dilemma 
avoidance strategy is based on the assumption that demands from the 
environment are so predictable and calculable that an organization can 
concentrate on one side of the dilemma in a given situation (Brunsson/
Olsen 1993, 35ff.).
A third strategy aims at the social dimension. It consists of reformu-
lating paradoxes, dilemmas, and contradictory demands as problems 
of the members of the organization. Particularly through the forma-
tion of manager roles, fundamental organizational contradictions are 
translated into personal dilemmas. Branch managers have to reconcile 
the contradictory demands of higher level management for short-term 
profitability in their areas of the business on the one hand, and for 
long-term investment that actually reduces short-term profitability on 
the other. The master craftsman in the production department has to 
reconcile the need to maintain an uninterrupted manufacturing process 
in the face of rapid market changes, and the innovation wishes of stra-
tegic management. To a certain degree, the existence of management 
can be ensured by its adopting paradoxes, dilemmas, and organizational 
contradictions as its own problem. If conditions in an organization’s 
environment were unambiguous, the CEO could be replaced through 
a mainframe and middle management through PCs that were linked 
to it (Luhmann 1964, 214).
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Particularly because paradoxes and dilemmas are embedded in orga-
nizations, it can sometimes occur in classically structured organizations 
that these phenomena escalate in more or less channeled form. Argu-
ments and conflicts between departments, heated debate over a shift 
in strategy, or a manager’s eruption, “I can’t take this circus anymore” 
have the effect that paradoxes and contradictions become obvious in 
just a few moments.
What we notice, however, is that as decentralization and dehier-
archization is discussed, paradoxes and dilemmas also acquire central 
significance in organizations’ self-descriptions. Increasingly, the task of 
management in business enterprises, but also in public administrations, 
hospitals, churches, and universities is seen as heightening the organiza-
tion’s perception of complexity by contributing to the development of 
dilemmas, paradoxes, and contradictions. The thinking runs that it is 
no longer a question, in the sense of James D. Thompson (Thompson 
1967, 10ff.), of understanding management as a unit that absorbs 
uncertainty and enables a value-adding, technical core to function 
according to unequivocal principles, but rather of viewing management 
as an entity that develops paradoxes.
For this reason, it is only logical that in recent years managers and 
consultants have distanced themselves from viewing paradoxes and 
dilemmas as organizational pathologies. In management literature, 
approaches are increasingly prevalent which concede that paradoxes 
and dilemmas are justified.2 
2 See early (Quinn/Cameron 1988), (Quinn 1988), (Smith/Berg 1997) or (Farson 1997). 
2. 
The Treachery of One’s Own  
Organizational History
“Perfection of planned layout is achieved only by  
institutions on the point of collapse.”
Cyril Northcote Parkinson
The introduction of decentralization and dehierarchization poses a 
paradox. The decentralization and dehierarchization that is supposed 
to give employees greater influence is not accepted by the respective 
employees; they receive management’s announcements with great mis-
trust. At first glance, this is an interesting situation. Management grants 
employees previously unprecedented options. Instead of instructions, 
there are now mutually agreed-upon targets. Employees can arrange 
their own working hours and reach decisions independently as to the 
way they perform their tasks. Methods and procedures can be changed 
without consulting management. So, from an executive’s perspective, it 
then appears paradoxical that many of the measures which are intended 
to give employees additional competencies, influence, and power to 
make decisions encounter such reluctance and in part even resistance 
in the workforce. The concept of decentralization, which in the mean-
time is readily touted by organizational leaders and consultants—at 
least in its systematic form—and is intended to empower employees 
and provide them with greater decision-making authority, appears to 
be subverted in many organizations by those very workers.
What causes that? Why is it that many employees are so reluctant 
to embrace the authority they are offered to organize their work and 
make their own decisions?
Such resistance is typically explained through technical errors made 
during the transition process. Examples of reasons cited for the failure 
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of change processes include “a lack of consistency in implementing 
results,” “insufficient information and communication,” “deficient ana-
lytical and methodical procedure,” “inconsistent, halfhearted methods,” 
“incorrect time allowances and target setting,” “inadequate profession-
alism among the participants,” “a lack of modeling by top manage-
ment,” too little inclusion of “the people involved,” a lack of “courage 
and endurance,” and “rigid adherence to procedure.”
These personalizing explanations fall short, however. This chapter 
will show that the reasons for the objections and resistance in the work-
force lie deeper. Using the example of a company in the metalworking 
industry with a structure generally found in a midsized enterprise, call 
it Tristan, Inc., we will show why a great deal of friction arose despite 
the existence of conditions which, in the estimation of executives and 
consultants, were virtually ideal.
The company was under huge pressure to change because of a 
decline in orders from its traditional domestic markets, increasing 
internationalization, falling prices for its standard goods, and aggressive 
marketing by competitors. The goal of the executive team in charge was 
to conduct a decentralization process in accordance with cutting-edge 
change management. It therefore initiated the transition to decentral-
ized structures as part of a design project, supported by consultants 
and academics.
The change project was conducted under the maxim of very early 
inclusion of the workforce in the process. It was hoped that this would 
allow the greatest number of aspects requiring consideration to be 
integrated, thereby improving the quality of the solutions developed. 
Furthermore, the idea was to promote insight in to the necessity of 
change, address conflicts as early as possible, and utilize them for the 
process. Supporting the project were an internal and also an external 
consultant who had reached agreement on several basic principles: “never 
rule against the interests of those involved,” because otherwise “conflicts 
would be preprogrammed”; “the purpose of the method used must be 
recognizable” because “a lack of transparency leads to resistance”; and, 
finally, “providing feedback on the results” would be necessary because 
“otherwise there was a danger of disappointment and frustration.”
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Even though every effort was made to avoid “technical error,” and the 
process was “perfectly designed” in the eyes of the consultants, the mas-
sive resistance observed among employees was striking. The main accusa-
tion leveled against management was that its actions were different than 
originally announced. A number of employees took a defensive stance 
toward the changes by adopting a “if it’s working, leave it alone” attitude, 
assuming that certain plans would “peter out anyway after a couple of 
months,” or by referring to a previous, similar project that had “gone 
down the drain.” From the perspective of Tristan’s head of personnel and 
organizational development, the workforce had a pronounced culture 
of “ducking.” Employees were simply waiting for the wave of change 
to wash over them, standing by from a safe position until the process 
exhausted itself. They were simply holding out until the storm passed.
Based on this company’s example, we can elucidate three paradoxes in 
the transition to decentralized structures which explain employee mistrust 
of management. Actions or statements are paradoxical when they claim to 
be correct or logical on the one hand, while containing internal contra-
dictions on the other. Whether consciously or unconsciously, a paradox 
advances two opposing and contradictory concepts or ideas, yet, unlike 
a dilemma, it does not allow one to decide in favor of one of two poles.
Using the three paradoxes, we intend to examine the reasons behind 
the often observed claim of logical consistency in decentralization pro-
cesses. The object will be to show that the discrepancy between words 
and deeds in decentralization processes cannot be traced to technical 
management errors and that socialization in hierarchical structures 
cannot be held responsible for employee resistance. Instead, the very 
history of the organization leads to paradoxical situations that can no 
longer be resolved by increasing communication or participation. 
The following part (2.1) discusses the tendency of organizations to 
introduce decentralized structures in a centralized fashion. When the 
directive to “Be independent!” comes from above, it strikes employees 
as paradoxical. In the second part (2.2), we elaborate that although 
employees do acquire new decision-making authority over the course of 
decentralization processes, the leadership of the organization continues 
to have the authority to recentralize decisions that have been reached 
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in a decentralized fashion. The paradox of “decide-for-yourself-but-on-
ly-if ” arises when a hierarchy (albeit flattened) persists in decentralized 
organizations. The third part (2.3) analyzes the phenomenon that over 
the course of decentralization processes employees’ self-organization 
is introduced as something new, which implies that the previously 
existing informal and often illegal adaptations to regulations are not 
recognized as a form of self-organization. Finally, the fourth part (2.4) 
addresses the topic of how managers and employees pass demands for 
paradoxical behavior back and forth to one another. Yet this game must 
not be viewed as a case of collective schizophrenia. Rather, it can be 
viewed as a process of permanent collective self-understanding.
2.1 The “Be Independent” Paradox: The Centralistic 
Introduction of Decentralized Structures
It is striking that as a rule the initiative to implement decentralized 
structures comes from business owners, the CEO, or top-level exec-
utives. There are hardly any reports in the literature of cases where 
decentralization measures were set in motion by “ordinary employees.”
Centralistic initiation and so-called “process forcing” as a concept of 
decentralization have often been criticized. Michael Hammer, one of the 
founders of business process reengineering, declared it paradoxical how 
autocratically, undemocratically, and from the top down the introduction 
of the reengineering process often occurs (Hammer cited in Vansina/
Taillieu 1996, 32). The pioneering thinkers of the group work discus-
sion, Wolfgang Kötter and Gerd Kullmann, lament that the changes to 
structures and processes that tend to be based on decentralized self-reg-
ulation are decided and initiated in the existing centralistic manner. The 
definition of the task and the determination of the goal take place in the 
framework of the old, hierarchical organizational structures that are based 
on the division of labor, which results in the transition from a hierar-
chical-centralistic organization, to one that is capable of learning, being 
planned out in detail well beforehand (Kötter/Kullmann 1996, 42).
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In enterprises organized along Taylorist lines, management, not the 
workforce, was the driving power behind change processes, and this 
did not create any paradoxes. A manager could “hand down” desired 
changes, say, the introduction of a new assembly line or the installa-
tion of new software, and have the modifications performed “on-site.” 
The innovation that was initiated from above was operationalized by 
employees in project groups and then, following consultation with the 
executive, implemented in the form desired.
Nevertheless, a paradox arises the moment it is no longer a ques-
tion of introducing new software, a new machine, or product, but of 
implementing decentralized forms of organization. Employees perceive 
decentralization processes that are initiated and imposed from above 
as ambiguous. On one hand, they hear the message that employees 
will now have substantially more influence and authority, while on the 
other the message is being announced through the customary chain of 
command, over which employees have no influence.
The contradiction that employees perceive resembles demanding 
that someone who is tense “be spontaneous,” telling a child “I want you 
to be independent,” or encouraging employees in a major corporation 
to “be entrepreneurial,” or “take responsibility.” Such instructions are 
paradoxical because if you comply with the demand to be independent 
or spontaneous and assume responsibility for yourself, then you are 
not acting independently or spontaneously or assuming responsibility. 
Yet on the other hand, one also cannot oppose the demands without 
experiencing conflict. Remaining in a state of dependence as opposition 
to the order would be illogical because such resistance would represent a 
form of autonomy and self-reliant entrepreneurial behavior. Employees 
who are confronted in this manner find themselves in the situation the 
ancient Greeks called “aporia,” that is, a logical impasse.
The paradox lies in the contradiction between what the communi-
cation demands, and the fact that the communication is demanding 
it. All communication, as portrayed by Niklas Luhmann (Luhmann 
2000, 123ff.) in somewhat older communication scientific literature, 
consists of a report aspect and a command aspect. On the one hand it 
communicates content (the report), and on the other it conveys the 
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expectation that the statement is accepted as correct and purposeful 
(the command). In organizational practice, the report and command 
aspects cannot be differentiated easily.
Since report and command aspects cannot be separated, popular 
prescriptions such as “the participation of those affected” or “more com-
munication” seem to be somewhat helpless reactions to the paradox. 
At Tristan, an attempt was made to avoid a centralistic introduction of 
decentralized structures by requiring that the employees be included 
intensively and at an early stage. This requirement conforms with the 
bulk of the professional literature, where the claim is advanced that 
early inclusion of employees reduces resistance to change, leads to 
more practically oriented solutions, boosts motivation, and increases 
identification with the company.
This argumentation suggests that the centralistic introduction of 
decentralized structures does not pose a paradox, but is simply the result 
of not involving employees sufficiently beforehand. Yet this fails to see 
that requiring participation merely restructures the paradox. Stating 
that “I am including you in the process I have initiated” is ultimately 
only a diluted variation on “be independent.” The “participation of 
someone in something” continues to connote a specified measure that 
has been dictated from above and in which one has been ordered to 
take part.
My proposal, therefore, is that the centralistic approach to carrying 
out change processes cannot be traced to failure on the part of man-
agement, but is instead a logical consequence of the way the change 
process has been planned. The “practice” of initiating, planning, and 
forcing through a change process from above is not “bad practice,” but 
can be understood as the way hierarchically led businesses function. 
Why is that?
At Tristan, Inc., managers reported that impulses for change always 
had to come from them. The employees didn’t even notice that a sec-
tor, department, or the company itself needed to advance in order to 
survive in the market. This complaint by managers is understandable, 
but ultimately it does not come as a complete surprise. The “classical” 
corporation is structured in such a way that production, the technical 
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core of the enterprise, is protected against undue agitation by turbu-
lent changes in the market or problems on the supply side. The task 
of middle management (which also justifies its existence) is to cushion 
as adeptly as possible the effect of market turbulence on production 
and to allow changes to filter into the productive core only in amounts 
that are easy to process.
Even if many companies attempt to simulate the pressure of the 
market on the technical core by homing in on certain product groups, 
process lines, and group work, the technical core by and large remains 
insulated from the market. The very existence of mid-level managers 
or sales and purchasing departments as primary contacts with the envi-
ronment leads to an insulation of the technical core against external 
pressures. From this perspective, it is not surprising that pressure from 
the market is registered primarily by management. Consequently, it is 
also managers who, for the most part, realize that change has become 
necessary.
Due to their location, employees working in the protected technical 
core are not able to recognize that a transition to more flexible and 
innovation-friendly structures could be necessary. Naturally, they allow 
themselves to become involved in specific instances when they receive 
instructions from their manager. But in light of their protected status, it 
is not surprising that they are the retarding element in change processes.
There is some evidence that the “be independent” paradox is exac-
erbated in organizations that were at one time organized along strict 
centralistic and hierarchical lines. In these organizations it is to be 
expected that the paradoxical appeal-like character of management is 
especially pronounced. Due to middle management’s strong special-
ization on market perception, the sensitivity of the technical core to 
changes in the environment is particularly low, and the dictation of 
decentralized structures presumably represents the sole reorganization 
strategy possible.
Thus, the traditional instruments are the only means available to 
push through a transition to innovative, flexible, adaptive structures 
and direct, open flows of information. The flexibility- and innova-
tion-oriented structures that are intended to constitute decentralized 
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self-regulation must therefore be established through the use of the 
current centralistic approach. An expression of the situation can be seen 
in the tendency of many organizations to “plan out in detail” their tran-
sition from a hierarchical-centralistic organization to a flexible, adaptive 
structure. Putting it bluntly, under these circumstances the directive to 
“be independent” must amount to ordering a new flexibility-oriented 
and self-determined organizational culture from the top down.
2.2 The “Decide-On-Your-Own-But-Only-If” Paradox: 
Management Lets Them Decide
Management literature is propagating a new image of executives. Using 
buzzwords such as “competence and responsibility,” “trust-based collab-
oration,” and “waiving power” it is being proclaimed that empowering 
employees leads to “independent, self-organized, and productive work.” 
Executives are supposed to “focus on accomplishing new and important 
tasks” for which they “do not have time under other circumstances.” In 
light of “imponderable and complex factors,” managers ultimately have 
to stand back from managing, that is, refrain from wanting to be in 
charge. Executives are no longer “movers and shakers” who plan and con-
trol everything, but now become facilitators, teammates, or expeditors.
From this vantage point, the ideal modern manager is a person who 
merely supports self-organization and decision making by an organi-
zation’s employees. Executives remain in the background, moderate 
processes, provide advice on difficult questions, and help coordinate 
self-organization. Ideal change managers then no longer appear as 
superiors who are cut from classical cloth, but as action facilitators. In 
the final analysis, they are evaluated only in terms of how successfully 
they supported transition and according to how well their employees 
succeed in working more productively and innovatively in self-orga-
nized processes. 
Until now, management literature has ignored that the systematic 
implementation of this leadership concept would entail substantial 
The Treachery of One’s Own Organizational History    35 
consequences. Executives who successfully introduced self-organization 
into their areas of responsibility would ultimately render themselves 
superfluous. Those who truly delivered total quality by enabling the 
complete self-organization and self-responsibility of their employees, 
would immediately become redundant. After all, the key to self-or-
ganization and self-responsibility is that there is no longer any “med-
dle-management.” Managers who are cut from modern cloth therefore 
increasingly suffer from the basic dilemma of all physicians, therapists, 
and development helpers: what ultimately justifies their existence is 
their own inability to meet certain high demands. If these professions 
were genuinely 100% successful, they would become superfluous, or 
at least have to completely redefine themselves.
Nevertheless, particularly managers who are engaged in comprehen-
sive change processes do not complain about having too little work, 
but rather too much. The specific factor involved in the transition 
from hierarchical-centralized to self-organized decentralized structures 
appears to be that executives are responsible not merely for facilitat-
ing the process, but for making decisions as experts, too. In the final 
analysis, managers are hybrids during this transitional phase, granting 
their employees greater decision-making authority, while also rendering 
decisions of their own.
At Tristan, Inc., the main accusation leveled at the executives in 
charge was that their actions were contradictory. Employees com-
plained that while managers were proclaiming their aspiration to 
empower employees, they were also calling the shots. In questions 
such as the introduction of a process line organization or the reloca-
tion of the custom-made product division, it was unclear whether the 
decision would be made in the executive suite, or whether it was a joint 
decision that would be reached by employees and executives together.
During a project steering committee meeting, one of the foremen 
compared the decisions the employees were facing with two people 
riding in a canoe. Yes, both of them were paddling, but only the one 
in the back was actually navigating. If the person sitting in the back 
were to tell the person in front, “OK, now you start steering, too,” the 
person in front would justifiably feel that he was being “taken for a ride” 
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and would answer, “Look, you’re the one who’s steering, just tell me 
when you want me to paddle harder.” When the consultant countered 
that the employees didn’t even notice when it was their turn to be in 
the back and “automatically sat down in the front,” the employees 
objected that time after time management reserved the prerogative to 
grab the wheel.
The situation the employees were experiencing bears a resemblance 
to the paradox of the simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of employ-
ees during rationalization processes, which was pointed out by Cor-
nelius Castoriadis (Castoriadis 1998). Castoriadis argues that there 
is a fundamental contradiction in capitalist societies: employees are 
treated as both objects of bureaucratic manipulation and as autono-
mous subjects. In order to retain control, management has no choice 
but to prevent employees from influencing the production process. 
At the same time it must also permit staff participation because only 
the workplace-specific knowledge of employees can ensure that the 
production process has the necessary flexibility.
At Tristan, the consultants tried to force management into speci-
fying who was to make decisions. Managers were supposed to mark 
their position on a slide showing a scale of decision-making situations. 
The scale ranged from “I have not made a decision. You are invited 
to discuss with me whether something should be done” or “I have 
decided that we will do something. You are invited to discuss with me 
what we will do” or “I have decided what we will do. You are invited to 
discuss the details of the implementation with me” to “I have reached a 
decision on all aspects, there is nothing to discuss.” The slide suggested 
that the framework of a decision could be defined unambiguously. The 
hybrid position of the executives was to be resolved by management 
determining which decisions would continue to be made by executives 
and which by the employees themselves.
Defining a decision-making situation is more complicated than the 
slides suggest, however. First, the context of organizational decisions 
is in constant flux. Organizations themselves assert that when envi-
ronmental conditions are changing rapidly, it becomes increasingly 
important to react in a flexible way and if necessary to plot a logical new 
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course. Under these circumstances, the central task of management is 
to improvise. Although management tasks have always required impro-
visation, conditions of uncertainty, according to the tenor of manage-
ment literature, give rise to a new understanding of managerial action.
Second, the transition to an organization characterized by self-orga-
nization and self-responsibility is a dynamic process. Perhaps something 
that is currently still a matter for the boss is at a later point supposed to 
become a decision that will be reached by employees and management 
jointly. In the foreseeable future, questions that today are still decided 
by employees together with the master craftsmen will be decided by the 
group itself. The transition to self-organization and self-responsibility is 
a process in which it is difficult to define the framework of a decision 
in precise terms. For example, in the process under examination, the 
problem was that the executive aspired to allowing employees increas-
ingly to make their own decisions, while at the same time also having 
an interest in establishing the model she favored.
Third, there are certain decisions management can only make by 
itself because, due to the constellation in the organization, other-
wise the decisions could not be reached at all. This is the case when a 
given step toward greater self-organization and self-responsibility runs 
counter to the individual, short-term interests of a large number of 
employees. As an example, for many employees it initially represents a 
loss of status when specialty departments are dismantled and reassigned 
to other production areas. To illustrate, consolidating installers and 
component producers in the same group threatens the specific identity 
of the component producers as highly skilled craftsmen. If decisions 
of that kind were made subject to self- organization as a matter of 
principle, they would presumably not be made at all.
These three aspects point to a central reason for repeated manage-
ment interventions, namely, they are associated with the integration 
of the decentralization process in a hierarchy that has indeed been 
flattened, but continues to exist nevertheless. It is specific to an orga-
nizational hierarchy that every subject can be taken up to a higher 
level if necessary. While it is correct that hierarchies only take the step 
of appropriating decentralized responsibility under exceptional cir-
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cumstances, they always retain the formal right and, in principle, the 
option to escalate any decision situated at a lower level and declare a 
problem to be “a matter for the boss.” Even when decisions are ceded 
to decentralized units, the leadership of the organization can resort to 
its enforceable managerial authority and revoke participation in the 
decision-making process.
This option of being able to “take decisions up to a higher level” 
in principle entails consequences for the assignment of responsibility 
in hierarchies. Nils Brunsson (Brunsson 1989, 182) pointed out var-
ious strategies that players use to reduce responsibility. For example, 
decision-makers can act as if their decisions were, so to speak, based 
on automatic causal relationships that are supported by common 
goals and values. A further means of rendering one’s role invisible as 
a decision-maker consists of foregoing the formal rituals of reaching a 
decision. Further, one can reduce one’s own responsibility through the 
size of the group of decision-makers: referring to a majority decision 
made by a large group enables one to portray one’s own responsibility as 
minor. In critical situations, decision-makers can also feign ignorance, 
because then no responsibility can be attributed to them. 
Interestingly, although such strategies of deflecting responsibility 
function in horizontal relationships, they are significantly reduced 
through hierarchical structures. Since every topic can be relegated to a 
higher level in a hierarchical organization, it is impossible for executives 
to extricate themselves by referring to the responsibility of the units 
that are subordinate to them. Such executives would immediately face 
the question (and the accusation) of why they did not draw on their 
hierarchical authority to intervene in a crisis situation. Shifting the 
responsibility for the decision from themselves to their “self-organized 
employees” would never stand as an acceptable excuse. Claiming igno-
rance would likewise be unacceptable as long as the decision was made 
in the area under their purview.
Contrary to the postulates of management literature, there are good 
reasons to assert that decentralization does not reduce the responsibil-
ity of hierarchically superior executives. Even in organizations with 
decentralized structures, managers ultimately continue to be answer-
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able for decisions that are made by self-organized teams, autonomous 
profit centers, or even geographically distant and legally independent 
networked companies. This is the basis for the right and also the temp-
tation for executives to intervene in the work of self-organized teams.
From a management perspective, decentralization gives rise to 
increasingly frequent discrepancy between their assigned responsibili-
ties and their actual options. A manager’s employees gradually begin to 
make certain decisions on their own, but the executive no longer has 
access to all of the information. As the employees become progressively 
powerful in certain processes, managers find it ever more difficult to 
assert their ideas. Yet at the same time, their own superiors continue 
to act as if the managers themselves were responsible for the (good or 
bad) decisions their employees have made.
Fritz B. Simon (Simon 1997, 140) observed behaviors in managers 
that were similar to parents. Just as parents have little control over what 
their children do, managers seem to have little control over the deci-
sions that are made in a business, profit center, or an autonomous team. 
There is a tendency for managers as well as parents to find themselves 
in situations where they are held responsible for something they are in 
fact unable to control, and then react with severe interventions in the 
decision-making authority of those who bear the actual responsibility.
Such behavior has to be perceived as highly contradictory by 
employees (and children). “Are we doing it on our own now, or is the 
shop foreman still in on the decision?” “Is that an order, or are you 
still open to discussion?” “Do we have a say in this change process, 
or are we just being included in a decision that’s already been made?” 
Employees receive the impression that they are permitted to make their 
own decisions, but always with reservations. Their own decisions seem 
to be OK only as long as they do not fundamentally contradict the 
vision of management.
As we observed at Tristan, Inc., this can result in proactive com-
pliance on the part of employees. They attempt to guess their execu-
tives’ objectives. At Tristan, this was referred to as the “loyalty trap.” 
Since the executive continues to have the ultimate say, it is difficult 
for employees to make their own decisions with any self-confidence 
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at all. They know that the executive has both the information and the 
authority to reach a decision independently, and they must therefore 
always fear that the executive will compare their decisions with the one 
she herself has reached. One frequently observed employee reaction is 
to guess which decision an executive would make if she were in their 
situation. The department manager reports that he often encounters 
the attitude, “I’ll self-organize to do anything you want, just tell me 
what you want me to do.”
One executive at Tristan characterized the situation as “leadership 
in a dilemma.” Executives who make a case for their own position find 
themselves in a Catch-22. If, in the course of a discussion, a majority 
forms for an opposing opinion, one can enter the fray and attempt to 
hold one’s ground: “All you want to do is assert your own objective, 
so now you’re trying to have it confirmed through a supposed discus-
sion—but that isn’t going to happen.” By contrast, if one engages with 
the ideas and concepts developed in the discussion, one can easily hear 
the accusation that, “You have no idea what you want—and that’s 
certainly not what ‘leadership’ implies.”
This process can result in each side, managers and employees, 
making the other insecure. Drawing on phenomena such as bureau-
cratization (Crozier 1964) and surveillance (Gouldner 1954), early 
organizational sociologists pointed out the vicious circles that arise in 
organizations through the so-called double contingency of players. In 
an interaction, A makes his behavior contingent on B, who, in turn, 
makes his behavior contingent on A. Mutual insinuations, expecta-
tions, and observations play a central role here. The basic idea is that 
these factors can escalate into vicious circles in various directions.
The introduction of decentralized decision-making structures can 
fail if management and employees become involved in a vicious circle 
of making each other insecure. Due to pressure from their own supe-
riors, executives resort to just-in-case management. They utilize what 
remains of the hierarchy to “shoot from the hip,” legitimizing their 
actions with claims that you can’t make allowances for self-organiza-
tion when the house is on fire. This creates further insecurity among 
employees about their decision-making options, and they become less 
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self-confident about using what latitude they have. This, in turn, leads 
to stronger intervention by management, which initiates a vicious circle 
of mutual insecurity.
2.3 The “Organize-Yourselves-But-Not-Like-That” 
Paradox: Jeopardizing Existing Self-Organization
The self-organization rhetoric that has been playing a central role since 
the 1990s, not only in businesses, but also in public administrations, 
hospitals, and schools is based on a surprising fundamental assumption: 
self-organization is propagated as something that must first be intro-
duced into an enterprise. It is something from which employees have 
been unable to profit from until now. The assumption is that employ-
ees must be freed from “foreign rule” and general powerlessness and, 
depending on the organization, be admitted, invited, accompanied, 
led, or forced into the realm of self-determination and self-responsi-
bility. Until now, the rhetoric runs, employees have been patronized, 
their potential has remained unutilized, and their ability to design 
processes on their own has been neglected. Self-organization represents 
an opportunity to put such potential to greater use.
The rhetoric of self-organization suggests that there are simple and 
elegant solutions for problems that have proven virtually intractable 
until now. We can speak of a kind of “conversion experience” which has 
“cast a spell over management.” Coordination processes that previously 
had to be planned in a centralized manner and long beforehand can 
now be handled independently with little effort by those affected. The 
energy that “went up in smoke in the form of resistance to external 
determination” now appears to “benefit common interests of its own 
accord in the form of self-organization.” This attribution of significance 
is derived from analogies with the phenomenon of the spontaneous 
formation of order that has been researched in the natural sciences. Not 
infrequently, it contributes to the “mystification of self-organization” 
as an “invisible ordering mechanism.”
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This position overlooks countless self-organized processes that are 
already operating in every organization, no matter how classic and hierar-
chical. Even the early organizational theory of Chester Barnard (Barnard 
1938), which in certain areas remains unsurpassed to this day, distanced 
itself from the normative organizational theories of, say, Frederick Tay-
lor or Henri Fayol, to the extent that it did not focus exclusively on 
formalized processes, but took an interest in actions that reproduced an 
organization on a daily basis. The formal organizational structure was of 
interest only to the extent that it directs the everyday “production and 
reproduction of action into certain channels,” “discourages certain com-
munications while encouraging others,” and makes “certain communica-
tions subject to accountability, and others not” (Baecker 1999, 330ff.).
From this perspective, official hierarchical decision-making chan-
nels and rules are not rigid organizational structures that automatically 
put deviations in the wrong, but rather rules governing distribution of 
the burden of proof. An action that conforms to the program contains 
within itself the assumption of correctness and does not require further 
proof or documentation. Members of the organization do not need to 
further legitimize an action by arguing that it makes sense. Rather, it 
is enough to point out that the action complied with the program. A 
burden of proof is imposed only when members deviate from the rules. 
Then, the individuals have to hope that their superiors will consider 
the action reasonable in an organizational sense, and either silently let 
them get away with it or even officially approve it.
Such “irregular” self-organization processes that occur outside of 
formalized structures are characterized by the fact that they are not set 
down in writing, cannot be measured or openly discussed, and above 
all cannot be the subject of official approval. Even when a company’s 
external presentation communicates that every production detail has 
been planned in advance, that decision-making channels are clearly 
defined, that there is a system in place to track every piece of mate-
rial, and an official corporate culture has been set down in the form 
of corporate guidelines, life on the inside looks very different. The 
machinery in the production area is inconspicuously manipulated; 
failure to comply with certain compulsory communication channels 
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is a regular feature. An internal pecking order, a type of informal hier-
archy, develops among skilled workers who are all equal in a formal 
sense and should only listen to their foremen. In defiance of a virtually 
perfect tracking system, components and tools are circulating that do 
not appear on any list. Employees form their own collective identities 
based on their assignments, personal relationships, and local origins.
The copious research conducted on informality in organizations is 
to be credited with pointing out the functionality of deviations from 
the rules. Pointedly formulating the insights of organizational research 
on informality, Erhard Friedberg (Friedberg 1993, 147f.) argued that 
a hierarchy that made a program of rigorously enforcing regulations 
would paralyze an organization. Rules can only be meaningful for 
an organization, he believed, if the hierarchy adopts a selective toler-
ance for infractions. The prerequisite for the effectiveness of formal 
organization is having the option to break formal rules. According to 
Friedberg, Taylorist organization can prevail for the sole reason that 
it is repeatedly circumvented in operational practice. If workers and 
employees geared the performance of their daily tasks to the official 
system, the results would be chaotic.
At Tristan, Inc., it was also clear that the old Taylorist structure 
could only function because employees self-organized to repeatedly 
deviate from the official rules. For example, the company struggled 
with the typical problems of program- controlled production. It was 
always producing exactly the wrong thing; the production process was 
constantly being rearranged; the warehouses were full but the parts 
required at any given moment were never on hand. Important tools 
were not always immediately available because of complicated ordering 
procedures. The employees reacted to these problems with “illegal” 
self-organization. In order to maintain the production process in spite 
of the dysfunctionality, there was an officially forbidden hunt for miss-
ing parts, “gray” inventories were maintained to ensure the availability 
of important components, and hidden tool reserves were created.
As an example, the business had developed a kanban system that 
was intended to ensure continual availability of frequently required 
components with as little friction as possible. Employees in production 
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and assembly had four crates of components. When three of the crates 
were empty, a signal was automatically sent to the supplier indicating 
that new components were required. Yet since this did not always 
function smoothly, the employees squeezed the components from the 
various crates together into just one so that the three empty crates 
would trigger a re-supply order as early as possible. 
When management announces the introduction of self-organi-
zation in a company using slides, videos, and brochures, the firm’s 
current informal self-organization processes are not taken seriously 
enough. In fact, it can become even more difficult to recognize infor-
mal self-organization as such. The fact is ignored that by introducing 
self-organization, management is not designing a new organization, 
but that the self-organization management is propagating represents 
an attempt to disrupt existing forms.
All of this still does not constitute a fundamental paradox or 
dilemma. Initially, it is primarily a question of language and observa-
tion: management could speak of “new forms of self-organization” and 
would thereby acknowledge, at least verbally, current forms of self-or-
ganization for what they are. The fundamental paradox arises because 
many of the measures management requires pose threats to long-stand-
ing forms of self-organization and, in principle, even challenge their 
very existence. Measures such as the decentralization of decision-mak-
ing authority and the creation of self-governing teams generally target 
the structural problems of a business that is hierarchically organized 
and based on the division of labor—in other words, precisely those 
areas where illegal forms of self-organization have previously arisen.
At Tristan, this emerged clearly in several areas. The new organiza-
tional orientation toward processes and products, which was intended 
to make certain forms of self-organization possible, posed a challenge 
to the internal pecking order, that is, the informal working relation-
ships that had been created through self-organization. The incorpo-
ration of task allocators into various process lines abolished forms of 
internal cooperation which had been laboriously developed through 
the employees’ own initiative. The introduction of an expanded and 
improved kanban system was intended to provide greater freedom of 
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access to materials. Yet this posed a challenge to the system employees 
had already developed for themselves: the use of “gray” components 
for which there was no record whatsoever. The identity encouraged at 
the top level, namely, viewing oneself as part of a customer-oriented 
department that performed its work through a significant degree of 
self-organization, threatened all of the identities which had arisen of 
their own accord over an extended period of time. It jeopardized the 
pronounced identity of the component producers in the production 
department and robbed the “artisans” in custom manufacturing of 
their special role in the company.
Since the measures that management promotes as new forms of 
self-organization intrude into processes that have arisen independently, 
it becomes almost unavoidable that employees perceive the actions of 
management as contradictory. Suddenly, an executive is telling employ-
ees to design the process themselves, but is thereby actually throwing 
into question the very processes the employees have put in place on 
their own initiative. In the final analysis, management—which to date 
has shown no particular interest in employees’ organizational abilities—
is now encouraging them to organize themselves, but not in the way 
they have until now, if you please. The message employees receive is 
therefore tantamount to: organize yourselves, just not like that, OK?
2.4 Paradoxes: Escalation or Resolution
The three fundamental problems discussed above are deliberately meant 
to contrast with the general trend in management literature where 
simple explanations and solutions, rather than paradoxes, are worked 
out. It may be a frustrating experience for managers that the three 
paradoxes are unavoidable in change processes. A large amount of 
internal communication, a certain measure of security for employees in 
the form of time-limited employment guarantees, and a high degree of 
personal integrity in executives are all factors that can indeed cushion, 
but never entirely resolve the paradoxes.
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In view of these paradoxes, there is a danger that fundamental 
change processes in organizations are repeatedly aborted without those 
who are involved becoming aware of the deeper, underlying reasons. 
This can create an atmosphere in which managements is on the verge of 
despair over employee resistance, while employees perceive the actions 
of management as consistently contradictory. Taking the perspective 
of individual psychology, one can then point out that people have a 
limited ability to process paradoxes, and the escalation of paradoxes 
into schizophrenia can be presented as a menacing scenario.
Although describing the consequences of paradoxes may be justified 
from a psychological perspective, a dramatization is only of limited help 
in a discussion that focuses on organizations. From an organizationally 
oriented perspective, the explosiveness of the three paradoxes can be 
explained by the fact that if it were not for the attempt to transition 
to decentralized, adaptive, flexible forms of organization, employees 
would not have the power to block certain fundamental processes in 
the first place. The big risk could be that employees will reject respon-
sibility for a certain process that management suggests they assume, 
while at the same time exploiting their new influence to brush off 
certain technical inputs from an executive. The manager is then in 
limbo: on the one hand, the employees do not yet feel responsible 
for the process, while on the other they are using their new power to 
obstruct the executive’s technical suggestions, which previously could 
have been pushed through hierarchically.
Nevertheless, one can also see a positive side to these problems. 
There is some evidence suggesting that employees hand back the 
paradoxes described above to the executives. References to “manage-
rial inconsistency” or the creation of “loyalty traps” can be viewed 
as evidence that employees are “staying cool” about confronting the 
paradoxes. An increasing number of situations arise where employees 
and management mutually confront one another with demands for 
paradoxical behavior without its having an incapacitating effect on 
their ability to work.
3.  
The Myths Surrounding  
“Entrepreneurial” Employees
“There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified 
that a concern for one’s own safety in the face of dangers that were 
real and immediate was the process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy 
and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he 
did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more mis-
sions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn’t, 
but if he was sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was crazy 
and didn’t have to; but if he didn’t want to he was sane and had to.”
An excerpt from Joseph Heller’s Catch-22, a book about a fighter pilot 
who was unable to have himself grounded from further sorties, even 
though he was “crazy.” 
In neo-liberal economic theory, markets are viewed as a particu-
larly rational form of exchange relationship. Whereas concepts such as 
hierarchy, bureaucracy, or management have negative connotations of 
inefficiency and arbitrariness, markets are seen as a particularly effective 
and just form of distributing goods. The insinuation is that self-regu-
lating markets are particularly good at the division of labor in society, 
and that central agencies should keep out of market processes to the 
greatest extent possible.
For a number of years, markets have also increasingly been popularized 
as a pivotal tool for internally structuring not only businesses, but also 
public administrations, hospitals, and even universities. Catchwords such 
as “organizational networks,” “marketization,” “market-driven decentral-
ization,” the “internalization of the market,” and “strategic decentraliza-
tion” are being used to cast competition between organizational units of 
various sizes as a tool for internal organizational coordination. Manage-
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ment simulates a kind of capital market in the relationship between orga-
nizational leadership and decentralized units, and promotes the formation 
of internal employment-, executive-, resource-, and product-markets.
The principle of marketization was initially applied almost exclu-
sively to the relationship between the central office and the company’s 
subunits such as manufacturing facilities, profit centers, or partially 
autonomous groups. In the meantime, the concept is increasingly being 
promoted as a model for the relationship between organizations and 
their employees as well as employees among themselves. Concepts such 
as that of the “intrapreneur,” a “one-man business,” or a “Self, Inc.” are 
being used to indicate that members of an organization are no longer 
acting as employees—organizational or company people—but as quasi 
“entrepreneurs within a business.”
In management literature, these ideas are used to proclaim that 
entrepreneurial behavior is expected of every employee. After all, so the 
logic runs, the purpose of a business is to venture, not to underperform. 
It has been too long that supervisors, vassals of the crown, and bean 
counters have occupied themselves with ensuring that employees do 
no more than what their job descriptions permit.
Given the often euphoric sound of management literature when it 
speaks of intrapreneurs, independent agents, or a “Self, Inc.,” the obvious 
reaction would be to dismiss the propagation of an “entrepreneur within 
the business” as a colorful new text bubble in the management field, 
declare it to be nothing more than a demand for fashionably re-costumed 
employees, and thereby also explain the lack of research on the idea of the 
intrapreneur. In contrast to profit centers, which in the meantime have 
been used in many companies as an internal structuring principle, we have 
to date seen few examples of companies—there is also a dearth of scientific 
research—whose appearance has been shaped by intrapreneurs, indepen-
dent agents, or the concept of a Self, Inc. It is only slowly beginning to 
emerge how a “conglomerate of internal entrepreneurs” can function and 
the degree to which it differs from a company with employees.
The limited prevalence of the concept notwithstanding, the model 
of the intrapreneur has in the meantime influenced a significant num-
ber of reorganization projects, and effects can already be observed. For 
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example, the concepts of empowerment and also of target agreements 
are geared to the intrapreneurship model.
In this chapter, I take the concepts of the intrapreneur, the inde-
pendent agent, or a Self, Inc. at their word, which allows me to eluci-
date structural problem areas that can form when they are introduced 
even selectively. Three myths of management literature will serve as a 
starting point for my argumentation: in the first part “Entrepreneurial 
behavior can be introduced at all levels of an organization simultane-
ously”; in the second part “Employees as the new holders of power in 
businesses” (3.2): and in the third part “the concept of intrapreneurship 
promotes the integration of employees within the organization” (3.3). 
In the fourth part, I describe the paradoxical behavioral demands that 
confront employees in marketized businesses (3.4). 
3.1 Myth: Entrepreneurial Behavior Can Be  
Introduced at All Levels of an Organization  
Simultaneously
In management literature we encounter the idea that marketization 
should begin in equal measure on all levels of a company, the profit 
centers, the groups and teams, and individual employees. The natural 
scientific analogy used for the establishment of market-like principles on 
all levels of an organization is based on self-similar and self-organizing 
fractals. The idea behind fractal-oriented management theory is that the 
decentralized units should adjust to constantly changing circumstances 
through self-organization. The assumption is that in these self-organiza-
tion processes profit centers, groups and teams, and individual employees 
will become self-similar in the way they function. Every fractal, and 
therefore in the final analysis, every position, is supposed to function 
like the entire company. Performance is to be as complete and com-
prehensive as possible; a task is to be accomplished as independently as 
possible. Coordination between individual fractals occurs through service 
relationships that are organized in a market-like manner.
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Not Everyone Can Be an Entrepreneur: Contradictions  
in the Concept of “A Business within a Business”
In management literature, the concepts of the intrapreneur, the inde-
pendent agent, and a Self, Inc. are constructed as win-win situations. 
The assumption is that all members of an organization can profit from 
the introduction of entrepreneurial elements into the company, as long 
as they willingly adhere to entrepreneurial principles. Yet this overlooks 
that the different intrapreneur constructions in an organization are 
generally so intertwined with one another that they mutually curtail 
each other’s freedoms. According to an old insight in the social sci-
ences, one person’s freedom is another person’s insecurity. Even Erich 
Gutenberg (Gutenberg 1983, 273ff.), one of the founders of business 
economics in Germany, noted that gaining freedom to act—which 
ultimately amounts to entrepreneurialism—can only be purchased by 
waiving such freedom in other areas of an organization.
It becomes especially clear that the intrapreneur concept cannot be 
implemented smoothly for all of a firm’s employees when the situation 
involves players at different levels of the organization. The freedom 
to act on one level, does not by any means produce corresponding 
autonomy at a different level. On the contrary, self-regulation on one 
level can spell external control on the other. Below, I will elucidate 
this idea by drawing on the interrelationships between three levels of 
decentralized companies, namely, profit centers, teams, and individual 
employees.
First, the reciprocity between profit centers and employees. Being 
appointed the leader of a profit center entails an increase in power, 
as compared to a classical middle management position. Whereas a 
department head in production must still come to agreements with his 
colleagues in quality assurance, purchasing, or construction, the head 
of a profit center generally controls of all the important functions. It 
is only because profit center leaders have assumed responsibility for 
quality, inventory, scheduling, employees, costs, and throughput time, 
and partially for purchasing and sales as well, that they can be held 
responsible for the resulting profits or losses.
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Nevertheless, the creation of such minor entrepreneurs at the man-
agement level of profit centers does not have to result in their employees 
becoming intrapreneurs as well. In some cases, the very opposite occurs. 
Profit centers can develop patriarchal leadership structures, particularly 
through recourse to the concept of the intrapreneur. Profit centers can 
develop into little fiefdoms with very strong leaders. Pressure from the 
company’s central office on profit center leaders can have the effect that 
they feel compelled to intervene directly in the work of their employees 
and trim their autonomy.
The second point entails the reciprocity between profit center leaders 
and their teams. In the literature, a distinction is made between strate-
gic, market-oriented decentralization and operative decentralization, 
which addresses concrete work processes. The interrelationship between 
operative and strategic decentralization is less straightforward than is 
often suggested.
The leadership of a profit center is given to a manager who is sup-
posed to act like an entrepreneur within the business. This also extends 
to the ability to make decisions about the profit center’s internal struc-
ture. If the holding company issues instructions that partially auton-
omous group work is to be introduced for all profit center employees 
as a means of encouraging them to think entrepreneurially, leaders of 
profit centers can perceive this as a limitation of their own autonomy. 
They might point out that they can only act entrepreneurially if they 
themselves determine how their profit centers are organized. It can 
then happen that general managers deploy or disband teams almost 
arbitrarily and justify such actions by citing their own entrepreneurial 
autonomy.
In conclusion, we will take a look at the third interrelationship, 
namely, between teams and employees. For many years, it was assumed 
in the literature that working in groups and teams also increased the 
scope of action for individual employees. Group work, in particular, 
was viewed as a logical extension of job enlargement concepts. Yet 
even in the early 1980s, the criticism was raised that working in 
partially autonomous groups did not actually amount to freedom 
from control for their members. It was argued that the autonomy of 
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a group of individuals could not be equated with the autonomy of 
each individual because the members of the group could suppress 
one another as well.
In the meantime, a number of empirical studies have shown that 
pressure on individual employees in partially autonomous groups tends 
to increase rather than decrease in comparison to classical Taylorist 
organization. Teams often develop a dynamic that does not exactly 
result in self-development and social recognition for individual mem-
bers. Instead, group work is often perceived as a source of aggression, 
disregard, and bullying. The pressure on members of the group is per-
ceived as even stronger because deviations from group norms can be 
subject to severe sanctions. Whereas managers in general must adhere 
to the company’s formal catalog of sanctions (warning letters, salary 
retention, termination) groups can impose informal albeit far more 
comprehensive sanctions when members step out of line. Since the 
distribution of power in groups is very diffuse, the sanctioned member 
has only limited options for complaining to a superior. As well, carrying 
group conflicts to external sources is often viewed as an un-collegial 
deviation from the unwritten laws of the group and also entails the 
threat of sanctions.
Internal Conflicts and Informal Mitigation Processes
What happens when a company tries to use the concept of an “inde-
pendent operator within the business” to generate autonomy in indi-
vidual employees at all levels? In my observation, this causes new lines 
of conflict to form, for which the organization must first laboriously 
develop mitigation mechanisms.
During the second half of the 20th century, the situation seemed 
clear: as soon as you had been hired and assumed your duties, you 
belonged to the company family. You were an “IBM person,” an 
“Amtrak person,” a “GM person.” All internal career struggles and 
conflicts during day-to-day work activities notwithstanding, employees 
could work with stable concepts of friend or foe. Other companies 
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that operated in the same market were seen as competitors. Internal 
competition was suppressed and a common company identity upheld: 
“It’s us against the rest of the world.”
In companies that use concepts such as intrapreneurism in an 
attempt to steer internal processes through market and competitive 
mechanisms, the unequivocal friend/foe stereotypes become blurred. 
Even the early studies of decentralized organizations generally note 
that a social Darwinist climate arises in such organizations. As a rule, 
the social Darwinist character expresses itself through conflicts that 
occur at the same organizational level. Business units and profit centers 
compete for scarce resources. Various manufacturing facilities owned by 
the same company find themselves in competition with one another. 
In part, the internal competition is stronger than competition with 
external rivals. On the employee level, “I’ll-buy-the-world” types face 
off and conditions among employees become tougher.
Nevertheless, in decentralized organizations the outcome is gener-
ally not open, dog-eat-dog warfare. This has less to do with manage-
ment efforts to (re-)integrate employees (keyword: corporate identity) 
than with the emergence of informal conflict resolution mechanisms. 
For example, one can observe that the concept of the intrapreneur 
undermines notions of partially autonomous group work that have 
been popular in management circles in recent years. More uncon-
sciously than consciously, an orientation toward “entrepreneurializa-
tion of the workplace” amounts to a decision against collaboration in 
fixed-membership groups. Rather than set teams with clear objectives 
and permanent members, it appears that the propagation of this con-
cept produces teams that are in permanent flux.
Establishing entrepreneurial behavior on all levels of an organization 
appears to be an illusion. Even when the entrepreneur is propagated 
as the central structural feature, informal processes arise that reduce 
the threat of competition among members of the organization. The 
demand for entrepreneurial behavior on all levels can therefore be 
maintained as part of managerial discussions, but in everyday orga-
nizational activities it is replaced by more realistic, conflict-diffusing 
forms of organizing work. 
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3.2 Myth: Employees as the New  
Holders of Power in Businesses
For market theoreticians, it may seem paradoxical at first glance that 
managers call for internal markets, because in the final analysis this 
would lead to the elimination of their profession. If one subscribes to 
the logic of liberal market theory, then a market no longer requires 
a central authority to control it. Hierarchies would erode. The many 
minor “entrepreneurs within the enterprise” would become the new 
power holders in businesses and force the bureaucratically oriented 
managers out of their jobs.
Nevertheless, the managerial profession does not appear to be com-
mitting cheerful, unhesitating public suicide. For all their enthusiasm 
over internal markets, managers are obviously not disappearing from 
the business landscape. Instead, what the strengthening of market prin-
ciples appears to be causing is a complex shift in the distribution of 
power among the players. 
The Fiction of Pure Markets
Neoclassical market theories are based on the assumption that markets 
are places where various providers offer goods and services for sale, 
and interested, financially sound individuals compare the quality and 
price of the goods and services presented. According to this view, the 
coordination of markets takes place solely on the basis of price, which 
represents all relevant information pertaining to quality, delivery date, 
and delivery capacity. The outcome is a contract between vendor and 
buyer which completely specifies performance and consideration. 
Such ideal markets appear to be just because the market transactions 
do not entail entering long-term cooperative relationships. During 
the transaction, the vendor is interested only in the buyers’ solvency 
(or insolvency), and not in their political views, gender, nationality, 
or religious affiliation. From this perspective, markets appear to be 
quasi-democratic models that are based on the motto of “one dollar 
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equals one vote” and dispense with considerations of status and class, 
religion and morality, and family and friendships.
Reflections on dynamizing organizations through internal marketi-
zation and competitive principles tie in with this way of thinking. It 
is argued that in companies that have been reconfigured along these 
lines, the ability, commitment, and creativity of employees is no longer 
hampered by managers who earned their positions through accom-
plishments in the distant past and are now simply exploiting their old 
boy networks to mutually advance their careers. Instead, it is claimed 
that an environment has now been created in which every individual, 
irrespective of gender, national origin, or skin color can compete in an 
internal market based on performance alone.
In practical terms, however, markets have relatively little to do with 
the ideal described above. Even Émile Durkheim, the grand seigneur of 
sociology, worked out that the “non-contractual parts of a contract,” 
such as trust, are what enables something like a free market to form. 
From this perspective, markets do not represent natural phenomena 
that occur when social processes are given free reign, but are always 
the results of social construction.
Viewing society as a whole, Karl Polanyi (Polanyi 1957) worked 
out that the realization of market principles is always accompanied by 
organized measures to regulate them. Seen in this light, markets do not 
arise by freeing the economy from governmental interference. Instead, 
it is the state itself as a central authority that makes it possible for 
markets to exist. Generally accepted regulatory instruments such as the 
right of ownership, freedom of contract, and legal certainty restrain free 
market activity, thereby enabling markets to function in the first place.
In the meantime, various empirical studies have shown the form 
in which market transactions are embedded in a large number of 
non-market processes. Even for supposed prototypes of markets such 
as options exchanges or agricultural auction markets, it has been shown 
that the personal relationships of the traders exert a strong influence 
on transactions (as examples, see Moullet 1983; Baker 1990). Indeed, 
on stock exchanges the existence of money as a means of exchange has 
not made direct negotiation dispensable or led to a de-politicization 
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of the act of exchanging itself.
In light of this embedding of markets, researchers speak of the fic-
tion or the myth of pure markets and call for observing markets in their 
actual, concrete form (as prominent proponents of this view, see White/
Eccles 1986, 135; Friedberg 1993, 128). It therefore seems obvious to 
ask how the internal markets are structured in which intrapreneurs, 
independent agents, and the Self, Inc.s are operating. 
The Differences between Internal and External Markets
Particularly since markets are socially embedded, it is necessary to 
elaborate the differences between external and internal markets. The 
boundaries of a business have the effect that relationships in the internal 
markets are organized entirely differently than market relationships 
with suppliers, customers, or partner companies. The theory of the 
social construction of markets must be understood more as a call for 
differentiation rather than a blurring of boundaries. Drawing on three 
characteristics, namely, goals, memberships, and hierarchies, allows 
us to demonstrate that it makes a fundamental difference whether 
a market exists in the social subsystem of the economy or within an 
organization. 
First, we will examine the importance of goals. In contrast to the 
societies of the ancient world and the Middle Ages, modern societies 
refrain from committing themselves to superordinate goals such as 
the happiness of the population, racial purity, or fulfilling the will of 
God. Accordingly, markets, as an important tool for coordinating the 
economic subsystem of society, are also not subordinate to a higher 
purpose. Complaints about “economic terror” are prime indications 
that markets develop a life of their own and elude all forms of higher 
human purpose. 
In organizations, the situation is very different. Regardless of 
whether it involves a government agency, a high-tech company, or a 
labor union, goals such as a more or less courteous response to applica-
tions for identification cards, penetrating a market with a new, super-
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light cell phone, or signing a labor agreement with steep pay increases 
play a central role in orienting an organization (Luhmann 1973, 87ff.).
This pivotal connection between organizations and purposes 
explains why internal markets are far more goal driven than external 
ones. In the case of internal markets, business units, profit centers, 
or manufacturing facilities cannot assume that staying in the black 
will guarantee that they will continue to be part of the company and 
therewith remain on the internal markets. Exceptional performance 
likewise does not guarantee that a business will keep an intrapreneur 
or an independent operator. Driven onward by strategy consultants, 
companies are continuously changing their core competencies and 
redefining their goals. If internal market participants no longer fit the 
goal that has currently been negotiated, they are removed from internal 
market processes, irrespective of their performance. After all, the motto 
in companies is not, “Do whatever you like, just generate profit,” but 
rather “Do whatever you like, just generate profit—and keep in step 
with the company’s (changing) goals.”
Nevertheless, the opposite process can also be observed. A profit 
center can continue to exist in a company even if it generates losses 
over a number of years. Whereas such loss-generating “companies” 
would soon be bankrupt in a free market, under circumstances they 
may live on in an internal market, for example, when cross-financing 
from successful profit centers is ordered. The underlying reason for 
this development is that business owners do not gear their activities 
exclusively to the goal of profitability. Instead, motives such as personal 
fulfillment or a Christian mission can also play a role.
In addition to purposes, memberships are important factors in orga-
nizations; this, too, in contrast to society overall. A complete exclusion 
from modern society takes place only in exceptional cases. Most modern 
nations abstain from deprivation of citizenship. Capital punishment, as 
the most radical form of exclusion, is practiced in very few “civilized” 
countries (or could we perhaps say, practiced only in “less civilized” coun-
tries) (Luhmann 1995, 16). Initially, “free” markets also abstain from 
blanket exclusions of individuals as vendors or buyers. A machine builder 
would be hard pressed for an explanation if he did not sell his machinery 
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to the buyer who offered the highest price. Initially, the potential buyer of 
a telephone system would in principle not exclude any vendor from the 
market process. In an official sense, all players can participate in external 
markets, provided they offer appropriate goods or services.
The situation is entirely different in organizations, where managing 
membership is a central characteristic. Membership draws a distinct 
line between those who belong to an organization and those who do 
not, and that has an effect on internal markets. While management lit-
erature suggests that marketability is the only factor that determines the 
fate of “entrepreneurs within an enterprise,” decisions about whether 
specific elements of a company are retained or not, are made internally. 
A profit center does not go bankrupt but is shut down or sold. Likewise, 
an intrapreneur does not file for bankruptcy, but is simply terminated 
in the classical manner.
It is only the difference between internal and external that makes 
it possible to prevent the market processes from penetrating unfiltered 
into various business units, and allows organizations to work with 
simulated markets instead. Internal markets are constructed in such 
a way that the performance of a profit center or an intrapreneur can 
indeed be compared with prices in free markets. But as a rule, the 
members of an organization are given the opportunity to match the 
lowest price of external vendors. Intercompany billing prices among 
individual entrepreneurs in the enterprise do not result from the free 
play of forces; they are determined by the central office.
Finally, hierarchies also play a central role in organizations which, 
in terms of this characteristic as well, also differ notably from society 
overall (Luhmann 1997, 834). The times when society was organized 
according to a strict hierarchy are over. We no longer have a king, 
emperor, or pope who can project his rule via chains of command or 
directives into the various areas of the population’s life. No one today 
would accept the President as the highest member of a hierarchy—with 
the exception of the White House staff.
In contrast to modern societies, however, hierarchies are an essential 
characteristic of organizations. All dehierarchization and decentral-
ization notwithstanding, we cannot imagine organizations of a more 
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complex type without a hierarchy. It is only their hierarchical structure 
that enables associations, public administrations, and businesses to 
act as predictable collective players; it enables external commitments 
made by leadership to be carried out within the organization through 
hierarchical instructions.
For internal markets, this means that they do not run counter to 
hierarchical coordination within the business but are instead an inte-
gral part of its hierarchical structure. Hierarchical decisions provide 
significant structure for internal market mechanisms. The recruitment 
of employees, their assignment to positions, their termination or pro-
motion, and their salaries are all based on organizationally determined 
criteria that are essentially defined at the top, and not dictated through 
any kind of anonymous market mechanisms.
Nevertheless, differentiating between internal and external markets 
based on goals, memberships, and hierarchies does not allow us to 
conclude that there is a major bureaucratic conspiracy in the execu-
tive suite, lurking behind the marketization of internal processes. It is 
often overlooked that these decisions are not centralized at the top of 
the organization. Organizational goals can change without the highest 
echelons making any strategic decisions. An employee can resign mem-
bership if an offer from another firm is more attractive. Even hierarchies 
can erode without active involvement of company leadership. But one 
thing is already becoming clear: the concept of the intrapreneur, the 
independent operator, or a Self, Inc. does not turn employees into the 
new power holders in an organization.
3.3 Myth: The Concept of Intrapreneurship  
Promotes the Integration of Employees  
within the Organization
In management literature, it has been lamented that employees were 
previously never perceived as important “human capital” and suffered 
an almost complete lack of recognition as individuals. It was only in 
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the 1970s and 80s that business rhetoric assigned employees a central 
role. People, it was claimed, were a company’s most important resource 
(Deal/Kennedy 1982). Companies of excellence, the opinion runs, 
view their employees as the real source of quality and productivity 
increases (Peters/Waterman 1982).
Management concepts such as the intrapreneur, independent oper-
ator, or a Self, Inc. were said to be the only way to integrate employees 
with all their creativity, productivity, and commitment. Additional 
room to maneuver would allow employees to achieve greater job sat-
isfaction and thereby stronger identification with the company.
Even if organizational consultants such as Terence E. Deal and 
Allan A. Kennedy, Thomas J. Peters, and Robert H. Waterman, or their 
many emulators, dramatically announce the idea that “employees are 
the most important resource” as an innovation, all they are ultimately 
doing is recycling a venerable concept from the field of political econ-
omy. Even in the writings of Karl Marx, we already encounter the root 
idea that capitalists can ultimately generate profit only by utilizing the 
productivity of others. 
For this reason, the idea of achieving greater integration of employ-
ees through the intrapreneurship concept can be surprising at first 
glance: what one would expect from entrepreneurs would be auton-
omization, rather than willing integration into an organized context. 
After all, an entrepreneur is not an “organization man” or a “corporate 
man” anymore, but is declared an agent who acts on his or her own 
behalf. How does it stand then with the integration of intrapreneurs? 
The Dilemma of the Simultaneous Integration  
and Exclusion of Employees
In the past, the example of classical bureaucratic organizations was 
used to elaborate that the management of companies, public admin-
istrations, or hospitals faces a dilemma: it must integrate employees 
into the organization, while at the same time retaining the option 
of excluding them. Businesses must deal with the contradictory 
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demands of integrating employees in order to utilize their creativity 
and commitment, while at the same time also ensuring that they 
continue to be replaceable so that the business does not become 
reliant on them.
Systems theory argues that organizations, in contrast to families, 
are based on the principle that people are replaceable. Organizations 
consist of members who are indeed integrated, but only with part of 
their selves. In modern society, one does not become a member of an 
organization lock, stock, and barrel. On the one hand, the only partial 
integration of employees relieves pressure on them: being terminated 
by one organization does not entail simultaneous exclusion from others 
such as a sports club or even society itself. On the other hand, it also 
takes pressure off the organization which does not need to feel respon-
sible for the employee as a person. The unscrupulousness with which 
employees are sometimes removed from companies is only possible 
because human resources managers can be sure that being terminated 
is not generally tantamount to being shut out of society itself.
The manner in which the integration of employees in businesses, 
public administration, hospitals, universities, or schools can be arranged 
without the organization and its employees becoming entangled as 
companions of fate is the result of day-to-day negotiation processes. 
Organizations are built in such a way that they can replace employees 
up to the highest-ranking member without causing the organization 
itself to fail. The behavioral expectations imposed on employees are 
determined through their position in the hierarchy and through pro-
grams. These factors determine who is supposed to talk with whom, 
in which manner, and about what. This prevents the organization 
from becoming dependent on particular individuals. Because of these 
structures, it is always possible to have a number of people who will 
deliver a specific behavior. Nevertheless, at the same time organizational 
processes can never be programmed so precisely that an organization 
could run like a machine. Organizations depend on the willingness 
and ability of individual employees to make adjustments, if necessary, 
to organizational structures in keeping with the achievement of its 
overall goal. 
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For the problem of the relationship between the inclusion and 
exclusion of employees, there is no solution that lasts forever. Instead, 
the relationship is repeatedly renegotiated. In classical terms, what 
determines the relationship between the inclusion and exclusion 
of employees? How does the relationship change when a company 
attempts to turn its employees into entrepreneurs within the enterprise 
by introducing concepts such as that of the intrapreneur, the indepen-
dent operator, or a Self, Inc.? 
The Paradox Of “Entrepreneurs within the Enterprise”
Classically speaking, the inclusion and exclusion of employees 
was tied to the employment contract. Although employers like to 
complain about the obligations, tribulations, and problems that 
employment contracts bring on, one cannot overlook that organiza-
tions achieve a high degree of flexibility only through employment 
contracts. Whereas a sales contract involving, say, the purchase of a 
rare stamp or a package of training seminars, precisely spells out per-
formance and consideration, the terms remain very abstract when 
employers purchase work through an employment contract. As noted 
early on by John R. Commons (Commons 1924, 284), employees 
who sign an employment contract are issuing a kind of blank check 
and declaring a willingness to put their services, abilities, and cre-
ativity to work in keeping with the tasks that are assigned. They 
waive a detailed, specific stipulation of what their performance is to 
entail.
The deal between employers and employees is structured in such a 
way that the employees subordinate themselves to the organization’s 
goals and promise to obey hierarchical instructions. In return, they are 
compensated by the employer through a salary, stock options, and/or 
the prospect of career advancement. According to Chester Barnard 
(Barnard 1938, 167ff.), this creates a “zone of indifference” in employ-
ees, a framework in which they cannot say no to instructions, demands, 
and assignments from their superiors.
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The advantage for management is obvious. The employees pledge 
a kind of across-the-board obedience to as yet unspecified orders and 
instructions. This allows management to adapt to changing demands 
very quickly and without cumbersome internal negotiation processes. 
If every member were granted the ongoing right to contribute their 
ideas on designing the structure of the organization, flexible, complex 
structures would never come about.3
Nevertheless, management pays a price for the advantage of flex-
ibility—this was elaborated particularly in the so-called labor pro-
cess debate—in the form of a control and integration problem. Since 
employment contracts do not specify precisely which tasks an employee 
is to perform, the employee can attempt to avoid performing them to 
the greatest extent possible. In contrast to a service contract, where 
the services to be performed are set forth in detail and the contractor 
has an interest in performing them in the shortest time possible, it 
is insinuated that employees attempt to stint on performance. Man-
agement reacts to the threat that performance will be withheld by 
monitoring employees. From this perspective, the entire history of 
businesses in modern industrial society can be viewed as a struggle to 
control performance.4
When organizations experiment with concepts such as intrapre-
neurship or a Self, Inc., something important has happened in the 
relationship between inclusion and exclusion, at least in terms of the 
organization’s display side. Yet what manifestly does not happen in 
the organization is the replacement of employees through an array of 
independent business owners or a shift from employment contracts 
to a multitude of contracts for specific services. Work models such as 
“independent subcontractors,” “pseudo self-employed workers,” and 
“franchisees” are on the rise, but organizations do not appear to be 
3 There is an entire branch of organizational theory based on the idea of tracing the efficiency 
of organizations to the fact that using employment contracts as a tool allows them to act 
without engaging in time-consuming communication processes. As a point of departure, see 
(Coase 1937).
4 For prominent contributions to the labor process debate, see (Braverman 1974), (Burawoy 
1979), and (Edwards 1979).
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relying on these models exclusively. A development based entirely on 
independent subcontractors would result in a loss of flexibility and effi-
ciency potentials. Organizations would lose the flexibility advantages 
they gain through the instrument of the employment contract. The 
services to be performed would have to be spelled out in every service 
contract signed, and it would be extremely laborious for businesses 
to place a monetary value on each operation and compare it to offers 
made by other providers.
In contrast to “true” entrepreneurs—and this is an important dis-
tinction—“entrepreneurs within an enterprise” are not owners of the 
relevant means of production for the value they create. The union of 
“having” (the means of production) and “doing” (performing the ser-
vices) as it exists in the classical model of self-employment, does not 
exist for the intrapreneurs or independent operators of the new mar-
ketization wave. That explains why the formulation “an entrepreneur 
within an enterprise” always sounds paradoxical.
In the case of employees as “entrepreneurs within an enterprise,” the 
employment contract as an instrument is augmented through elements 
of a contract for services. A key form that combines the employment 
contract with elements of a service contract is the target agreement. 
This model has existed in organizations for more than 100 years, for 
example, in the contracts of sales representatives during the first half 
of the 20th century. Today, however, there is a tendency to apply it to 
all of an organization’s employees.
The Internalization of the Inclusion/Exclusion Dilemma 
There is every indication that the dilemma of inclusion and exclusion 
will not be resolved through the new forms of work, but that the con-
flict between the two poles is simply shifting to a different area. Stating 
it bluntly and in simplified terms, in firms that were organized along 
classical-Taylorist lines, the fronts in the conflict between inclusion 
and exclusion were clear. On one side, there was management. It was 
attempting to utilize to the greatest degree possible the employee labor 
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power it had purchased at an all-inclusive rate, yet without becoming 
involved in a relationship that would make it all too dependent. On 
the other side, there were the employees. Their interests lay in not 
expending their manpower entirely, while at the same time making 
themselves as indispensable as possible to the firm and thereby driving 
up their own market value.
Again, putting it bluntly, the concepts of an intrapreneur, an inde-
pendent operator, and a Self, Inc. have a tendency to shift this conflict 
onto the person of the individual employee. To argue with Michel 
Foucault, it is no longer necessary to establish control through an 
omnipresent lord. Instead, the market is elevated to the status of a 
universal lord who misses nothing, impartially rewards success, and 
unforbearingly punishes misconduct. For employees, this creates the 
impression that their failures as intrapreneurs are not being punished 
by their superiors but by the allegedly “objective consequences” of their 
own actions. When employees are terminated and parts of a corpora-
tion are shut down, it is no longer perceived as an arbitrary decision 
based on a business owner’s profit maximization orientation, but rather 
as a logical consequence of the internal market. 
The introduction of entrepreneurial elements into a company 
confronts the employees themselves with the problem of inclusion or 
exclusion. The concept of intrapreneurship combines two opposing 
interests—the employees, who would actually like to go home, and 
the boss, who would like to keep them working against their will. In 
the bureaucratic-Taylorist system the two were neatly split between 
two different people. While intrapreneurs still don’t want to work any 
longer than necessary, in spite of that, they want to return to their 
desks after all.
Questions that once represented the classical concerns of top man-
agement, suddenly become the concerns of the intrapreneur. Do my 
activities still fall under the core competencies of the business, or must 
I develop other abilities? Can the company still afford my activities, or 
do I have to offer more? Does my labor power still have a value in the 
current market, or am I simply a burden for the firm?
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3.4 Paradoxical Behavioral Requirements  
in Marketized Organizations 
It would be an oversimplification to characterize the concept of an 
intrapreneur, independent operator, or a Self, Inc. as nothing more 
than the latest gimmick for managing employees. Certainly, these 
management concepts are not implemented in businesses on a one-
to-one basis. They suggest a logical consistency that cannot be found in 
practice. Yet these concepts radicalize a development that was already 
hinted at in the decentralization wave of the 1990s: the contradictory 
environmental demands that organizations confront are now absorbed 
only to a limited degree by organizational structures, but are instead 
passed on to individual employees who perceive them as contradictory 
behavioral demands that they are required to master.
Organizational sociologist James D. Thompson (Thompson 1967) 
pointed out that for many years a central organizational strategy con-
sisted of insulating the value-adding core from disturbances or contra-
dictory demands from the external world. Special departments existed 
which absorbed insecurity, such as operations planning, the personnel 
office, purchasing, and sales. Consequently, workers on the assembly 
lines of an automotive supplier, warehouse employees in the mail-or-
der department of a wholesale business, or the staff of a processing 
department in a government agency could be largely insulated from 
the imponderables of the environment and supplied with information 
that for the most part remained constant. 
Separation between the departments that absorbed insecurity on 
one hand, and on the other, a value-adding core that was for the most 
part kept stable, often resulted in monotonous, dull working conditions 
for the employees on the assembly line, in the mail-order department, 
or the processing unit. But it also offered an advantage: they could 
expect their instructions to be formulated in such a way that they 
could also be carried out. In principle, exertion of power makes sense 
only if instructions and orders can be followed. Severity and cruelty are 
by no means ruled out, and obeying instructions or orders can cause 
serious damage. In an extreme case, it is actually conceivable that an 
The Myths Surrounding “Entrepreneurial” Employees    67 
order can only be carried out if the person who receives it loses his 
life. Yet even then, it still holds true that the order must be fulfillable. 
Unfulfillable orders jeopardize the legitimacy of the person who issues 
them, as well as the entire order-based system. Superiors who issue 
unfulfillable orders are no longer taken seriously by their employees.
The concepts of intrapreneurship, the independent operator, and 
the Self, Inc. remove employees’ protection against unfulfillable behav-
ioral requirements. There is a tendency to suspend the function of 
secure roles, which Luhmann in particular pointed out. People no 
longer know what to expect, what they are allowed to do, and what 
they are not. There is no longer any protection from the whims of those 
who wield power in the organization, and no longer any relief from 
the burden of unlimited responsibility.
4.  
Quality: The Paradoxical Effects and 
Undesired Ancillary Consequences  
of Quality Management
“When solving our problems, we must make sure  
that we do not create ones that are even worse.” 
Indira Gandhi
Reports from the “quality front” read, in part, as if companies, public 
administrations, and associations had finally found the magic bullet 
that will win the battle for better products, more effective processes, 
and greater employee satisfaction. There are reports of workshop con-
cepts that achieve productivity increases of over 40% and processing 
time reductions of more than 50% in a matter of days. Continu-
ous improvement processes are presented that urge every employee 
to make a substantial number of suggestions for improvement every 
year, thereby enabling a company to save millions.5
Based on these remarkable successes, the claim is made that the various 
quality management tools have led to the discovery of a way to access 
not only the “gold in the minds of employees” but also the “platinum of 
the Japanese-inspired rationalization experts.” Well organized continu-
ous improvement processes (CIPs) can mobilize the employees’ experi-
enced-based knowledge which would otherwise not be brought to bear 
because of hierarchical organization and the pronounced division of labor. 
Kaizen campaigns open up the possibility that employees, inspired by the 
experiences of pioneering businesses, willingly scour their own company 
in search of problems and weak spots. A well-designed employee sugges-
5 An early text that captures the euphoria of quality management measures is the study by 
(Womack/Jones/Ross 1990). 
Quality    69 
tion system, it is claimed, brings flaws and waste to light that employees 
have always been aware of but until now had no way of pointing out. 
The current boom in employee- and participation-oriented quality 
management is closely linked to the decentralization wave that has 
sloshed through businesses and public administrations during recent 
decades. It involves more than simply transferring quality competencies 
to partially autonomous units according to the motto “produce quality 
through decentralization instead of controlling it through centraliza-
tion.” The humanistic prose often encountered in the literature not-
withstanding, from my perspective it would be incorrect to view quality 
management merely as a step that equips “simple” employees with 
increasingly decentralized quality competencies and responsibilities.
Rather, quality management has to be understood in the specific 
context of centralization and decentralization. For central functions, 
quality management offers the opportunity to gain access to decentral-
ized units “in accordance with the rules.” The transfer of competencies 
to teams, groups, and profit centers in decentralized locations raises a 
difficulty for their superiors: they can no longer influence the value-cre-
ation processes in the same way they could in a Taylorist organization. 
If one adheres to the decentralization ideology, then superiors make 
decisions only as to the “what”—that is, the result to be achieved. The 
“how” is primarily left to the competence of the decentralized units.
In this situation, quality management tools give central positions 
an opportunity to exert influence on the “how.” Granted, continuous 
improvement processes, kaizen workshops, and quality norm certifi-
cations do not allow one to prescribe in precise detail the way a value 
creation process should look, yet they do create a framework for the 
organizing of the value creation process. The framework for optimiza-
tion measures in decentralized locations can be constructed with vari-
ous degrees of restriction. Quality norm certifications do not prescribe 
how a process is supposed to be organized, but only that it should be 
executed in accordance with a precisely defined standard, that clear 
competencies and responsibilities are defined, and that the process is 
replicable at any time. Quality circles and continuous improvement 
processes initiate the elaboration of a certain spectrum of topics, but 
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the nature of the solutions is transferred to the competency of the 
groups. Kaizen campaigns, meanwhile, specify with significantly greater 
precision the principles according to which the employees themselves 
are to implement optimizations. 
This chapter will focus on a closer examination of the effects of the 
various quality management tools. The first part (4.1) shows that trans-
forming informal processes into formalized workflows within the context 
of a quality management program can be counterproductive. For that 
reason, quality measures that build on informality, such as an employee 
suggestion policy, kaizen, and CIP are limited in their effectiveness. In 
the second part (4.2), I show that the use of several quality management 
tools does not necessarily lead to integrated quality management, but 
can instead result in competition between the various tools. The third 
part (4.3) points out the paradoxical effects caused by referencing the 
Japan myth. In Europe, referring to Japan served as legitimation for 
quality management strategies for as long as the Japanese economy was 
booming. When it collapsed, the close alignment with Japanese practices 
increasingly had a counterproductive effect on the implementation of 
quality management measures in businesses. This section presents illus-
trative examples of the way management concepts are first propagated 
by referring to successful national economies of the day—first the USA, 
then Germany, followed by Japan, then China and in the future, per-
haps, India, Brazil, or some other country—but immediately become 
less attractive when such economies begin to show signs of weakness. In 
the fourth part (4.4), I argue that quality management methods tend 
to be shaped by the requirements of the consulting firms operating in 
the market, rather than the needs of the organizations requesting their 
services. This consideration applies not only to quality management 
methods, but can also be applied to many of the methods consultants 
promote for developing strategies or restructuring organizations. The 
fifth part (4.5) sets forth the functionality of “quality façades.” It argues 
that there can be constellations under which none of the players has an 
interest in eliminating the façade character of quality management. In 
part six (4.6), I show what the contours of quality management look like 
beyond the dream of perfect organizational structures.
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4.1 Coming to Terms with Implicit Game Rules:  
Informality as a Reaction to Paradoxical  
Behavioral Requirements
Most of the reform projects facilitated by consultants begin with an 
organization’s manifest, visible structures. It is unsurprising that change 
projects would orient themselves on such structures because they are 
generally known within the organization and can therefore be read-
ily discussed. This understandable tendency to gear change projects to 
structures that are clearly evident arises even during a project’s initial 
development phase. Top management needs to have an idea of how many 
resources the project will involve. The line managers affected by the proj-
ect would like to know what is supposed to change in their organization. 
The consultants are interested in having a clearly formulated assignment, 
so they can calculate their own costs and plan how to deploy their staff.
Quality management projects often use a different point of depar-
ture, however. Hidden behind the use of tools such as quality circles, 
kaizen, and CIP lies the hope of being able to overcome the strict sep-
aration of manual work and brain work. The tools used in the 1980s 
and 1990s, first in the automobile industry and subsequently in almost 
all sectors, aimed at mobilizing the experience-based knowledge of 
employees and stood in clear competition to classical rationalization 
through experts. Instead of shifting the responsibility for quality and 
rationalization merely to a handful of experts, the idea was to utilize all 
of the resources that could be mobilized in the company for continuous 
production improvement, irrespective of their status and function.
Eliminating the strict separation between manual and brain work 
was intended to address one of the fundamental problems of Taylorist 
organizations, namely, the discrepancy between the plans devised by 
experts and the reality of the production process, which functions 
according to its own specific principles. For that reason, quality circles, 
kaizen, and CIP as approaches were always directed at restoring the 
feedback of applied experience gained in the production area to the 
planning department, and ensuring that hands-on knowledge once 
again cycled into planning.
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The Problems Associated with Converting  
Informal Knowledge into Standards
In concrete terms, this involves converting the informal utilization of 
employees’ hands-on experience into formalized standards. The hope 
is that the solutions individual employees have found through decen-
tralization can be anchored in organizational memory in the form of 
structure, regulations, or a process. In the view of Masaaki Imai (Imai 
1986), the moment a solution has proved itself it becomes one of 
management’s central tasks to disseminate the advantages throughout 
the entire organization by issuing clear instructions that make the 
improvement binding.
Nevertheless, this is exactly the point where experience shows that 
quality management initiatives run into problems. In the framework 
of a quality campaign, why should employees be enthusiastic about 
revealing their informal behavior on the job, their hidden room to 
maneuver, and their performance related reserves? Experience-based 
knowledge, secret leeway, familiarity with the organization’s informal 
processes, and performance reserves that are kept under wraps, are 
the trump cards employees play in organizational power struggles. 
Formalization and standardization pose a threat to employees because 
the practical experience they have gained becomes common property, 
and they no longer have a trump to play.
The how and why of resistance against quality management ini-
tiatives made its presence felt during a kaizen campaign in a French 
property management company that we will call Sommet. The central 
office at Sommet launched a wide-scale kaizen initiative to improve 
the work quality of their craftsmen teams and increase customer sat-
isfaction. The hope was that the kaizen campaign would enable the 
central office to push through its specified quality, production, billing, 
and authorization standards. Thus, the external consultants engaged 
in various areas received what might be called a dual assignment. On 
the one hand, they were supposed to mobilize local know-how. On the 
other, their kaizen workshops were supposed to assist in converting the 
practical knowledge into standards and thereby establishing it.
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As the project unfolded, the internal and external consultants 
repeatedly encountered considerable resistance from team members 
against measures that clearly made their work easier. For those who 
were conducting the kaizen initiative, this came as a surprise. They had 
assumed that the employees—who enjoyed termination protection—
would be interested in optimizing work processes. Yet they overlooked 
that the rationalization reserves which appeared so obviously unutilized 
fulfilled critical functions in the individual rationales of the employees. 
For example, in one workshop the situation arose that a mainte-
nance team fought tooth and nail against cleaning up a small parts 
depot. This seemed irrational to the kaizen trainers, because a well-or-
dered storehouse would have made it easier for all employees to find 
material. It was only in marginal talks that consultants learned that out-
side firms also had access to this storehouse if they offered their repair 
services at a more favorable price than Sommet’s team of craftsmen. 
Since the small parts were officially owned by the client, one could not 
deny outside firms’ access. Thus, the strategy of the in-house team was 
to permit such a degree of chaos in the storehouse that no one but the 
storehouse “experts” on their own team could locate the required parts. 
To a great extent, this prevented the outside providers from retrieving 
parts, whereas an orderly storehouse in accordance with kaizen notions 
would have facilitated access for the outside firms, thereby increasing 
customers’ tendency to place orders with them. 
In a different workshop, optimizing the physical space situation was 
on the agenda because all of the employees were complaining about 
long distances, coordination difficulties, and poor working conditions. 
The consultants began with the optimization of the “officially” avail-
able spaces. Over the course of the workshop, however, the employees 
showed the consultants—under the pledge of secrecy—that in addition 
to the six officially rented rooms there were additional 20-30 spaces 
in the catacombs of the huge property that were being used “illegally.” 
Over the past decades, the maintenance team had repeatedly “appropri-
ated” ventilation rooms, storage space under escalators, former vehicle 
maintenance areas, and forgotten storage rooms. As the years went by, 
these spaces had been turned into comfortable individual work areas, 
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some of which had been wallpapered and furnished with rugs and 
microwave ovens, and allowed the employees to do their work without 
being disturbed by management or the customer. Neither leaders nor 
team members were interested in dismantling the illegal spaces because 
they provided storage and work areas throughout the entire complex. 
The consultants were given to understand that the spaces they had been 
shown in confidence did not exist as far as the workshop was concerned, 
but that the teams would actively participate in the optimization of 
the official spaces.
In the dominant line of quality management, the existence of such 
informal behaviors, hidden leeway, and performance relevant reserves 
would be viewed as a point to begin quality improvement measures. 
One would address precisely such informal aspects of the organization 
in order to convert them into formalized (and thereby collectively 
optimizable) working conditions. Yet this would be to overlook that 
informality fulfills an important function. 
The Functionality of Deviations from the Rules
The struggle against informality which is conducted implicitly in kai-
zen initiatives and continuous improvement processes, is based on 
an instrumental-rational understanding of organizations. Supposedly, 
organizations have an unequivocal purpose and that alignment with it 
is enforced through hierarchies from the top down. Yet if one assumes 
instead that organizations are characterized by inconsistency of pur-
pose and brittle hierarchies, then their attempts to contain informality 
become reminiscent of the quests of Don Quixote. For the most part, 
organizational scientists agree that formal and informal structures rep-
resent two important complementary aspects of organizations. Infor-
mality cushions contradictory demands on organizations and thereby 
compensates for the imperfections in their regulations.
The effect was seen in the case of Sommet described above. When 
teams were confronted with contradictory demands, informal struc-
tures evolved allowing them to solve the dilemmas in which they found 
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themselves. They were required to adhere strictly to comprehensive 
corporate guidelines, and yet they were expected to fulfill customer 
requests faster, more flexibly, and at a better price than the small busi-
nesses the company was competing with as a building management 
firm. 
An example of a further topic was the company guideline that 
required obtaining three offers before subcontracting jobs in excess 
of €500. It became clear relatively quickly that the teams interpreted 
this regulation very liberally. Sometimes, rather than having several 
contractors compete for the job, a previously determined provider 
was instructed—parallel to immediately performing the work—to 
solicit two additional bids from “cooperating competitors.” This prac-
tice made it possible to adhere to company guidelines with respect to 
awarding contracts, at least officially, while at the same time providing 
the end customer with fast service. Naturally, processing this informal-
ity in the workshops was out of the question because it was impossible 
to formalize the practice of bypassing company guidelines, thereby 
making it generally visible to one’s superiors.
A similar process was noted in stock keeping. Instructions from the 
central office were that stock should be reduced to a minimum. The 
reason for the instructions was that there should be no stockpiling in 
the maintenance department because it entailed high inventory carrying 
costs and tied up capital. Yet these instructions from the central office 
conflicted with the interests of the end customers. When a problem arose, 
customers were unwilling to wait for the delivery of replacement parts 
and insisted that the local teams have important replacements in stock. 
This led to the existence of official “white inventory” and informal “black 
inventory.” Since the “black inventory” didn’t officially exist, it could be 
discussed in part but not completely in the presence of employees from 
the central office. As a result, optimization efforts initially focused on the 
“white inventory,” which was insignificant in terms of figures, whereas 
the hidden “black inventory” was screened out.
Addressing such informal procedures within the framework of 
decentralized quality circles, continuous improvement processes, and 
kaizen workshops is possible only to a limited degree. An attempt to 
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reduce informal behavior, concealed leeway, and performance relevant 
reserves would have resulted in the teams no longer having a cushion 
that enabled them to fulfill conflicting demands. If the teams had 
unwaveringly adhered to the regulations, simultaneously having to 
fulfill both the conflicting demands of their customers and their own 
management would have caused them to fail.
Classical quality management ideology purports to have a solution 
for such conflicting requirements, namely, that one must understand 
the paradoxical demands as a task for higher positions. All problems 
that are insoluble at a decentralized level, the thinking runs, must be 
solved by the person in charge in the central office.
Yet this notion is naïve for two reasons. First, the chairman of 
a corporation with several hundred thousand employees cannot be 
confronted with all of the paradox demands they face, simply because 
one team in a certain unit of a business sector requests a change in 
company guidelines. Second, and more importantly, it is completely 
impossible to accommodate every demand in a company without cre-
ating contradiction because an organization is always geared to very 
different environments. 
4.2 The Paradoxical Effect of  
Integrated Quality Management
Following the Second World War, the only quality management tool 
used in most organizations was the employee suggestion system. In 
the meantime, many organizations are using an entire palette of var-
ious tools: quality circles, CIP, CIP2, kaizen, the Japan Diet, the Bal-
anced Scorecard, Genesis, quality management certification under ISO 
9000ff.—or the standards of the European Foundation for Quality 
Management—it has become almost impossible to list them all.
It is not always clear whether a new tool truly represents a method-
ological innovation, whether it is something that has been said before 
and simply received a new label, or whether a consulting company is 
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trying to position a re-mix of different tools in the market as a product 
of its own. In some companies, for example, we have observed that 
the quality circle concept that was much criticized in the 1980s was 
revitalized, first under the heading of CIP groups, and subsequently, 
when that idea seemed to run out of steam, under the name of kaizen. 
The methodological innovations that CIP as well as kaizen offered 
in comparison to quality circles were often lost. Surveying quality 
management methods becomes even more difficult because concepts 
that pertained to CIP groups and kaizen workshops, and originated 
in Japan, were promulgated by consulting firms under trademarked 
concepts such as VIT, CEDAC, or Genesis.
There are two reasons for using several different quality management 
tools in parallel: one is manifest and unproblematic to communicate, 
while the other is latent and less easy to bring up in the organization. 
The manifest reason is that each tool addresses only one segment of 
the quality problem. Take CIP groups, for example. While they try to 
access the “gold in the employees’ minds,” they generally do not utilize 
external rationalization know-how. Kaizen workshops on the other 
hand, address problem areas that have been precisely defined with the 
help of rationalization experts, but they do not utilize all of the ideas 
that individual employees develop in their work process. This explains 
why various quality management tools are often used in combination. 
The second reason is less easily communicated in an organization: 
quality management tools gradually wear out. The CIP groups lose 
their enthusiasm, the quality of the input received through employee 
suggestion programs declines, and, once the consulting contracts run 
out, the kaizen workshops are continued only on a modest scale. As 
their success is no longer measured by monitoring product quality 
alone, but also according to the degree they are able to sustain perma-
nent process improvements by using newly developed tools, quality 
management departments show a great willingness to repeatedly try 
out such new approaches.
The boom in the quality management market has led many organiza-
tions to adapt an attitude of “the more the better.” The assumption is that 
quality is like profit or love: you can never have enough of it, and for that 
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reason taking a wide range of quality measures makes sense. Yet quality 
management tools can conflict with one another, and this is overlooked.
The Competition between an Internal Employee Suggestion 
System, CIP, and Kaizen: The Case of a Midsize Company
A midsize company—call it Veletto—was working with a number of 
different quality management tools such as kaizen, CIP, an employee 
suggestion system, the Japan Diet, and ISO certification. In addition, 
the company participated in various quality competitions. The employee 
suggestion system was established early in the days of the company’s 
founder but then fell into a deep sleep, only to be revitalized 20 years 
later by a new CEO. Word was put out that the number of suggestions 
for improvement was to be increased by 30% every year. The continuous 
improvement process was introduced after it came to the company’s 
attention that a “factory of the year” had positive experiences with CIP. 
In principle, the CIP was conducted like a quality circle under the lead-
ership of internal moderators, and was intended to work on day-to-day 
operating problems in groups of three to six individuals. Two years after 
the CIP, the company launched a kaizen initiative. In contrast to the very 
open processes of the employee suggestion system and CIP, the kaizen 
was clearly underpinned by a production and assembly ideology. Then, 
on top of the employee suggestion system, CIP, and kaizen, the Japan 
Diet was introduced. It consisted of 20 “keys” that were supposed to 
optimize work in various sectors. Parallel to these processes, the com-
pany began to think about gaining ISO certification.
The question is, how did the various quality management measures 
interact with one another? The basic tenor of many discussion partners at 
Veletto was that quality management “isn’t a bad thing,” but that unfortu-
nately it was being “taken too far.” One department head remarked, “Do 
we need all this? Do we need all the hoopla?” On the employee side, mean-
while, it became clear that they were suffering from improvement over-
load. A different department head commented, “Sometimes they overdo 
the quality management at the expense of the production process … 
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Maybe we’re doing too much of it—spending too much on consultants 
and not enough on the ongoing development of our machinery.”
The cause of these complaints was the growing competition that had 
formed between the various improvement measures. As an example, in 
the CIP workshops employees deliberately did not suggest a number of 
obvious solutions because they hoped to receive bonuses for submitting 
them as part of the company suggestion program. When they contributed 
suggestions that were actually suitable for the company suggestion system, 
their colleagues let them know that it would be better to hold back.
Conflict also arose between kaizen and the CIP. The kaizen consul-
tant demanded that his initiative should be the basis for resetting the 
company standards, while CIP would merely be used to fine tune them. 
Kaizen, he said, was like felling a tree; CIP was what you used to turn it 
into toothpicks. The propagation of kaizen’s hegemony over the organi-
zation of production was not accepted, particularly by the department 
heads. Kaizen was perceived as “coming from the outside,” whereas 
CIP was viewed as an internal project and was especially promoted 
by the department heads. Conflicts between the different production 
and reorganization concepts, favored respectively by kaizen and CIP, 
were always especially pronounced when kaizen and CIP workshops 
arrived at different solutions for the same problem. 
Approaches to Integrating Quality Management:  
The Escalation of Conflict 
In the main thread of the discussion, conflicts that emerge through 
the application of different quality management tools are not viewed 
as an understandable result of functional differentiation in organiza-
tions. Rather, they are understood as a call for “optimal coordination 
of goals and methods, i.e., processes.” Concepts such as total quality 
management, integrative or integrated quality management claim to 
merge the various quality enhancement tools.6
6 As an example of this type of thinking, see (Bendell 2006).
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Management at midsized Veletto also recognized competition 
between the various improvement initiatives as a problem and pro-
moted the idea of integrated quality management. “Yes, we’re trying. 
There are a couple of holistic systems that network everything.” Each 
new quality measure was therefore expected to integrate the various 
other ones. For example, it was hoped that kaizen word be able to inte-
grate initiatives from the CIP and the employee suggestion program. 
The CEO declared, “The kaizen consultant is the first person we have 
who’s a pro in all of these methods. Up until now, it was all piecemeal, 
but now Smith is suddenly pulling it all together.” The Japan Diet was 
also associated with the hope that it would lead to a unified approach. 
Dr. Jones, the diet consultant, would “merge everything into one com-
prehensive concept,” the CEO explained.
Contrary to the CEO’s assessment, however, the development 
observed was that the introduction of new measures, which were 
actually supposed to promote integration, instead triggered additional 
conflict and contradictions. Holistic concepts such as kaizen and the 
Japan Diet brought additional players into the game, and that resulted 
in new constellations of interest. There was a tendency for new lines 
of conflict to develop, instead of an integrated concept resulting in 
fewer conflicts. The attempt to use integrated management concepts 
to counter the effects of functional differentiation and the local ratio-
nalities it produces, appears to be a Sisyphean task—exacerbated by 
the condition that the stone becomes somewhat heavier with every 
attempt to move it. 
4.3 The Recoil Effect, the Japanese Myth  
in Quality Management
The andon error notification system, the baka-yoke mistake proofing 
system, gemba, the kaizen quality philosophy, the heijunka tool for 
production smoothing, the ishikawa diagram, jidoka, an aid for locat-
ing problems, the kanban logistics concept, the kaishain personnel 
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management philosophy, the big three Ms of “muda, mura, muri” 
as the basis for a philosophy of loss, the five organization principles 
of “seiri, seiton, seiso, seiketsu und shitsuke,” warusa kagen—more 
Japanese concepts have entered into quality management than hardly 
any other area of organizations. 
For many years, adopting Japanese quality tools was seen in Europe 
and America as a guarantee for success. Consequently, in a particularly 
large number of companies reorganization projects were promoted by 
referring to the Japanese origins of their strategies. As a result, however, 
many quality measures were linked with a “Japan myth” that became 
counterproductive as the Japanese economy ran into increasing diffi-
culties.
Myth: Effective and Efficient Quality Management  
Was Responsible for Japan’s Economic Success
How do we explain the popularity of Japanese concepts in European 
and American quality management? The spread of these concepts is 
closely related to the success of Japanese businesses in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. In important areas of the economy such as the automotive, 
shipbuilding, computer, and electronics industries, Japanese businesses 
penetrated European and American markets with quality products at 
comparatively favorable prices. In key sectors such as machine con-
struction, Japanese products at times achieved a market share in excess 
of 50 percent.
Particularly in the 1980s, a prevalent explanation alleged that the 
strength of Japanese businesses could be traced to their more industri-
ous, less demanding mentality. It was emphasized that virtues such as 
punctuality, discipline, diligence, commitment, mutual considerate-
ness, modesty, and politeness played a central role in the Japanese work-
place. According to this explanatory approach, the Japanese workplace 
was characterized by a striving for perfection, harmony, and consensus. 
Much like Japanese society overall, working life in Japan was permeated 
by group awareness and a sense of community: group interests ranked 
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higher than the interests of an individual. Furthermore, it was said that 
the loyalty of Japanese employees toward their employers played a key 
role; businesses rewarded this with a job for life. 
In European and American management circles, this cultural expla-
nation strengthened the attitude that “there wasn’t a lot you could do.” 
The key to Japan’s success lay in a cultural mentality specific to the 
nation itself and could not simply be copied by a business in a different 
country. If one attempted to bring Western work organization more 
closely into line with the Japanese “company clan model,” one had to 
reckon with a discrepancy between the organizational structure and 
an individualistic cultural environment.
During the 1980s, the cultural position met with increasing oppo-
sition by those who argued that the Japanese organization type could 
function independently of the special characteristics of Japanese men-
tality and culture. Reference was made to factories operated by Japanese 
corporations in America and Europe, and it was maintained that the 
features of the Japanese organizational model such as group work, 
kanban, just-in-time relationships, and continuous improvement pro-
cesses could also be implemented successfully in industrialized Western 
countries.
In light of this controversy, it is understandable that American 
and European executives readily embraced any explanation that did 
not attribute the rise of the Japanese to a specific mentality but rather 
a particular form of work organization. Their belief that the rise of 
Japanese corporations was based on a management strategy allowed 
them to conclude that they could copy, adopt, and further develop 
these recipes for success, and they hoped to achieve similar outcomes 
by simply adopting the strategies. Much as was the case with the cut-
back strategies à la lean management, the impressive achievements of 
Japanese businesses had the effect that in the field of quality manage-
ment as well, Japanese approaches were quickly viewed as a potential 
key to success for European and American businesses. 
The notion that the use of Japanese quality and production man-
agement methods would lead to success increasingly became a vir-
tually unquestioned hypothesis. A tight cause-and-effect chain was 
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postulated between Japanese quality management and the country’s 
economic success. Other explanations for Japan’s boom were screened 
out of the rationality focus during this phase, for example, Japanese 
savings behavior, membership in corporate networks, low tax rates, 
the special characteristics of Japanese unions, and the principles of 
lifelong employment or working overtime in Japanese factories. Instead 
of explaining the supposed superiority of Japanese businesses along the 
lines of “long working hours versus short working hours” or “Japanese 
versus Western organizational culture,” the cross-section of the world 
was undertaken along the axis of effective Japanese production and 
quality management versus traditional Taylorist production and quality 
management in Europe (Ortmann 1994, 144).
Japan’s economic success was reduced to concrete aspects of Japa-
nese production and quality management. Soon, the concept of the 
“Japan myth” began circulating in the business press. Now, the special 
feature of myths is that they are not entirely fictitious. There can be 
no doubt that the production model at Toyota contributed its share to 
the success of the Japanese automobile industry. While myths are only 
partially based on verifiable facts, they are considered to be true overall.
In many organizations, the “Japanese myth” was used as a “trans-
mission belt” for quality measures. Two “kinds of indirect Japanization” 
could be differentiated. The first kind aimed at adopting individual 
forms of Japanese management practices and enriching them with one’s 
own strategies. The second strategy consisted of merely exploiting the 
appearance of Japanese efficiency as legitimation for one’s own change 
strategy (Ackroyd/Burrell/Hughes/Whitaker 1988).
In the major facilities management corporation, for example, 
quality management workshops were initially promoted under the 
concept of kaizen as a way of deliberately referencing Japanese suc-
cess and thereby generating pressure to change. In the workshops, the 
consultants bandied Japanese terms such as muri or seiri in order to 
lend authority to their reorganization measures. At Veletto, a midsized 
business, an entire quality initiative was run under the heading of the 
Japan Diet to demonstrate clearly that it was geared to the success 
recipes used in Japanese industries.
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There are inarguable advantages to drawing on simplistic, unex-
amined cause-and-effect chains and using fiction and dogma. They 
provide orientation, save time, and allow the accumulation of power. 
Referencing proven Japanese practice established the framework for 
the quality measures and shortened the time-consuming discussions of 
how to proceed. Players who availed themselves of the “Japanese myth” 
initially built leverage because other players were forced to recognize 
the superiority, transferability, and potential of the cause-and-effect 
chains that were being assumed.
The Recoil Effect: Problems in the Japanese Economy
The standard criticism of myths is directed at their excessive distance 
from reality. 
A reemergence of doubt, unexpected events in an organization’s envi-
ronment, or the addition of new players causes a myth to become 
apparent for what it is, and thereby destroy it. The myth loses its ability 
to create ignorance and thereby increase the organization’s ability to act. 
In the case of Japanese quality management, however, a differ-
ent problem emerges in terms of working with myths. By referencing 
myths, players commit themselves to cause-and-effect chains which 
they later cannot readily divest. The quality managers, consultants, 
and trainers who pointed to Japan to legitimize their measures ran 
into problems when their assumptions were no longer based on a 
successful model.
The difficulties in the Japanese economy beginning in the second 
half of the 1990s can probably no more be traced monocausally to the 
superiority of European, American, or Chinese production and quality 
management models, than Japanese success could be explained ten 
years before solely through the Toyota production model. Observers 
are justified in pointing out that the paralyzing interwovenness of the 
major Japanese concerns, an ailing banking system, undesirable polit-
ical developments, and a value shift in Japanese society are important 
factors for explaining Japan’s economic woes.
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For the current discussion of quality management, we are not inter-
ested in the causes responsible for Japan’s economic problems, but 
rather in the effect of Japan’s poor economy on the use of the “Japan 
myth” in quality management projects in other countries.
The worse the economic situation became in Japan, the more fre-
quently players in Western firms such as Sommet or Veletto, where 
there were doubts about the Japanese methods propagated in the com-
panies, began to question the “Japanese myth” in their critical remarks. 
At Sommet a tradesman raised the question of why they were working 
with a Japanese quality method like kaizen in the first place. “I mean, 
the Japanese aren’t doing so well.” During a discussion about kaizen at 
Veletto, a rhetorical question was asked: “Can’t you just say that in plain 
German.” After all, the argument ran, we have a successful tradition 
of German craftsmanship, too. If you wanted to revive the “German 
virtues of orderliness and neatness” there wasn’t really any reason to 
draw on a dubious Japanese success model.
Thus, the promoters of quality management were confronted with 
the “Japanese myth” in the sense of a cautionary example. In one 
company, growing resistance to a Japanese project name, which addi-
tionally referenced a dubious success model, resulted in a renaming of 
the project while it was still underway: it was no longer called a “kai-
zen initiative” but now referred to as a “CIP process.” To support the 
process, one no longer invoked the “Japanese myth” to such a degree, 
but instead pointed to the alleged successes achieved with the program 
in other areas of the company.
4.4 Adjusting to the Interests of Consulting Firms’ 
Quality Assurance Departments
A paradoxical situation developed when various tools of Japanese origin 
were operationalized in European and American corporations. Even 
though there was always talk of quality circles, kaizen, or the Japan Diet 
as an expression of a comprehensive idea of quality, the main tools the 
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consulting firms used were one-hour sessions or intensive multi-day 
workshops during which employees were gathered together.
In many circumstances, regular one-hour meetings and multi-day 
workshops appear to be extremely effective tools for initiating change 
processes. They make it possible to gather employees selectively for 
the purpose of solving precisely defined problems. It is nevertheless 
striking that at first glance the workshop concept in particular actually 
contradicts the principle of continuous improvement as demanded by 
the pope of quality, Masaaki Imai, and others, because it is the very 
characteristic of workshops that they represent exceptional situations.
How did it come about that kaizen, as a principle of permanent 
improvement, was reduced primarily to conducting workshops? 
Quality Circles and Kaizen—as Adapted to the Way  
Consulting Firms Function 
If you read the way companies describe their quality management pro-
grams, you have the impression that implementing them in the form 
of workshops arises from the requirements of the respective company. 
It seems that quality management concentrates on meetings and work-
shops because this is the most effective and efficient way to ensure and 
improve quality in the individual companies, as well as to anchor the 
concept of quality in the minds of employees. But are these self-de-
scriptions accurate?
Organizational research has established that many products do not 
reflect the needs and demands of the client; instead, they are an expres-
sion of the internal organizational requirements of the company that 
is producing them (Legge 2002, 80ff.). To a certain degree, that is also 
functional. Production that is tailored exclusively to customer needs 
and demands would be prohibitively expensive because the suppliers 
would have to adjust from the ground up to each new assignment 
and each new customer. What can be observed in many products is 
that rather than being tailored to the customer, they are not made the 
way they are because the customer wishes it, but because creating an 
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economical and effective production process in the supplier company 
requires specific materials and manufacturing methods. 
As a result, quality circles, continuous improvement processes, and 
kaizen initiatives are anchored primarily in the form of workshops. 
The reasons for this are strongly associated with the internal needs of 
consulting companies and quality assurance departments and relate less 
to the challenges facing their external and internal clients. For consult-
ing firms and quality assurance departments, it is not only important 
that the internal or external customer is satisfied with the consulting 
services, but also that the consulting services can be provided without 
expending all too many internal resources. Thus, CIP and quality circles 
in one-hour meetings and kaizen in the form of workshops were very 
accommodating for consulting firms.
Providers of quality management services and consulting firms 
transformed the Japanese philosophy of quality into “ready-to-use” 
toolkits consisting of sequences of visuals, easily applied analytical tools, 
simple questioning techniques, standardized workshop concepts, and 
standards for conducting quality circle sessions that had been timed 
down to the minute. The ready-made toolkits—as research on quality 
circles has already recognized (Midler 1986)—resulted primarily from 
the consulting firms’ interests in rapid growth.
I will illustrate the advantages of these ready-to-use toolkits using 
the highly standardized workshop concepts for quality circles, CIP, 
and kaizen. Irrespective of whether the quality initiatives were con-
ducted under generic names or trademarked concepts such as Genesis, 
CEDAC, VIT or CIP2, in the companies under examination quality 
management structures were observed that were highly tailored to the 
needs of the consulting firms. There appeared to be a number of rea-
sons for this.
First, standardized workshop concepts allowed the Japanese philos-
ophy of quality to be anchored in Europe and America. The relevant 
quality management books by Japanese authors do not, phrasing it cau-
tiously, shine based on their precision and concreteness. For example, 
if one takes a closer look at Masaaki Imai’s book on kaizen, it is at first 
difficult to understand how businesses could have adopted the kaizen 
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method based on this book. The author introduces kaizen in abstract 
terms as “change for the better” which is to be achieved through strict 
process and employee orientation and the ongoing improvement of set 
standards. In his writing, Imai vacillates between describing kaizen as a 
process, an attitude, a method, or a way of thinking—or perhaps all of 
the above. Significant portions of the book consist of impressively docu-
mented appeals that quality and change for the better are important and 
that permanent improvements should play a central role in corporations.
Consulting firms in Europe and America now appeared to face a 
challenge: kaizen was touted as the secret to success and was in great 
demand by corporations, but there was little concrete information on 
precisely how to implement it. If kaizen was presented as an employee 
orientation toward quality, productivity and permanent improvement, 
there was the problem that it was extremely difficult to anchor that 
kind of philosophy in a corporation. Attempts to establish a new way 
of thinking about quality through appeals to employees, glossy bro-
chures, and motivational events are relatively blunt weapons in the 
struggle against quality problems, customer dissatisfaction, and pro-
duction losses. Under these circumstances, the consultants resorted to 
the workshop as a form of organization.
Second, standardized workshops made it possible to use young, 
relatively inexperienced consultants. Particularly at the beginning 
of the boom in quality circles, CIP, and kaizen few seasoned experts 
were available. Young consultants had to be recruited and profitably 
deployed as quickly as possible. Workshops made this relatively simple. 
All the fledgling consultants had to learn was the quality ideology and 
the standard workshop procedures, and the client could be billed at 
a 4-figure per diem rate. Case in point, in one of the organizations 
studied recent university graduates could immediately be used as con-
sultants because the high degree of standardization allowed a straight-
forward reproduction of the analytical tools, forms of intervention, 
and problem-solving mechanisms.
Third, by implementing kaizen, quality circles, and CIP in work-
shops, consulting firms could standardize their interventions to a large 
extent and thereby reduce internal costs. In an ideal case, the presenta-
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tion and evaluation slides could remain virtually unchanged. Often, it 
was enough to replace the client’s name on the slide. In the meantime, 
a number of CIP consulting firms work with standardized posters that 
can be used in a company completely irrespective of the specific nature 
of the problem.
Fourth, to conclude, highly standardized workshops enabled kai-
zen consultants to come into their clients’ firms for a limited amount 
of time and yet still produce visible changes over a relatively short 
period. Photos of “before and after the workshop” could be used to 
demonstrate the obvious differences. This allowed the consultants to 
inform their clients that the investment in consulting services was 
quickly amortized. In the French firm, for example, photos were taken 
at regular intervals of the shop floor and storage areas after they had 
been reorganized, thereby demonstrating that hiring the consultants 
had been worth the money.
The Strengths and Weaknesses of a  
Workshop-Based Quality Concept
Even if accommodating the specific needs of consulting firms was the 
reason that various Japanese philosophies of quality were brought to 
Europe and America in the form of workshops, we must not overlook 
that they also appear to have produced a number of advantages for 
the corporations, government agencies, hospitals, and militaries that 
received the consulting services.
The testing of one-hour quality circles, continuous improvement 
processes, and kaizen workshops in various organizations created a 
relatively sophisticated and repeatedly revised concept. As a result, the 
client of a consulting firm enjoyed a relatively high degree of assur-
ance with respect to the character of the quality process. Even at the 
beginning of a project, one could already envision relatively clearly the 
details of what was going to happen.
Furthermore, the frequent use of the same workshop concept gener-
ated a certain amount of pressure on organizations. Consultants could 
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point out that Company A or Public Administration B in a neighboring 
community had been able to achieve a 30 percent productivity increase 
and a 50 percent reduction of throughput time using the very same 
workshop concept. This satisfied management’s need to be certain that 
the investment in quality circles, kaizen, or CIP would pay off. All 
the same, it put corresponding pressure on the workforce to take the 
quality measures seriously.
In addition, the cost of the quality measures could be reduced. The 
organizations paid only for the implementation of the workshop, not 
for the development of the concept. In one case, the company refused 
to pay the consulting firm for the development of the workshop, citing 
the reason that the services received were of a standardized nature.
Nevertheless, focusing in part on the workshop character of the 
kaizen process also created problems. Due to the high degree of stan-
dardization, a workshop sometimes missed its target, namely, the orga-
nization’s specific set of circumstances. In the facilities management 
firm, consultants applied kaizen principles that had been developed 
primarily for an assembly department. Due to the low degree of stan-
dardization entailed in maintenance work, however, the principles the 
consulting firm then presented were largely ineffective. In another com-
pany, the adaptation of the kaizen worksheets from previous projects 
was so approximate that even those responsible for kaizen inside the 
company did not know the exact meaning of the individual abbrevi-
ations.
A further problem is that concentrating on the workshop form 
initially caused employees to perceive kaizen as a surprise intervention 
from the outside. Some employees experienced it as a team of external 
and internal consultants, supported in part by a Japanese expert, “waft-
ing” into their work area and explaining to the specialists on location 
which principles to use to reorganize the performance of their duties. It 
is understandable that something like that would occasionally generate 
considerable resistance.
Finally, in some cases focusing on workshops creates substantial 
problems for the sustainability of the kaizen process. The improvement 
measures that are implemented directly during the workshop itself are 
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retained (some are also reversed) but improvement measures planned 
for the long-term grind to a halt amidst day-to-day business operations.
To a limited degree, such problems can be brought under control 
by changing (improving) the organization of the quality management 
process. Yet they do not change the underlying situation inasmuch as 
the character of the consulting services provided in quality management 
today tends to be shaped more by the internal needs of the consulting 
firms than the requirements of their clients.
4.5 Being Forced to Have Measurable Services:  
The Silent Spiral of Quality Management 
Given the wide range of quality measures under discussion in organi-
zations, critical voices repeatedly warn about constructing a “quality 
façade.” Organizations that repeatedly proclaim new reorganization 
objectives in an inflationary way, it is claimed, will land themselves 
with a “Potemkin quality village” and run into difficulties with the 
corresponding “dual reality” it creates.
The Potemkin quality management façades are often viewed as an 
outcome of exaggerated efforts on the part of organizational leadership, 
contradictory and unrealistic management goals, or the defensive strat-
egies of employees. Then, depending on the orientation of the observer, 
the approach to tearing down the façades is seen either in closer, more 
effective control of the quality measures taken by management, or a 
stronger employee orientation.
Criticism of the “Potemkin quality village” must not be limited to 
detecting the discrepancy between an organization’s striving for qual-
ity and the dull reality of its day-to-day operations. Rather, it calls 
for reconstructing the strategies of individual players that lead to the 
formation of the quality façades in the organization’s presentation, 
and an examination of the functionality of such façades for the orga-
nization overall.
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The Tendency to Quantify the Successes of  
Quality Management
“Only what is measurable is visible at all. Only measurable factors 
can be controlled and validated and therefore also improved.” At the 
midsized firm of Veletto, this appeared to be the quality management 
motto. For all the quality tools, great value was placed on being able 
to quantify the results and measure employee commitment. In the 
framework of Veletto’s company suggestion system, each employee 
was required to provide a certain number of improvement suggestions 
every year. Each individual suggestion was rewarded. In the quality 
circles, each of the trained internal moderators was required to conduct 
a certain number of workshops. For the kaizen measures, the effects 
of every individual workshop were calculated, and it was determined 
whether during the week in question the costs of the kaizen workshop 
were recovered through economies. For the Japan Diet, progress was 
quantified using the 20 keys and then made public.
The income of the laborers, master craftsman, and office workers at 
Veletto was linked to their performance in the quality management pro-
gram. In addition to their salaries, employees could gain extra income 
through the premiums awarded under the company suggestion system. 
In the target agreement talks where salary increases were discussed, the 
CIP moderators were evaluated according to the number of workshops 
they had conducted. For executives, the Japan Diet was particularly 
relevant because their quantified performance in this quality initiative 
determined whether they received a bonus of up to 20 percent or, 
conversely, forfeited up to 10 percent of their pay.
The combination of quality management measures such as “quan-
tifying the improvement suggestion program” and “rewarding partic-
ipation” produced undesirable side effects. For example, employees 
submitted numerous suggestions, some of them pointless, for the 
sake of receiving additional bonuses. As one department head, put 
it, “Awarding bonuses across the board creates a lot of crap.” In some 
instances, it was observed that individual employees would submit 
suggestions for improvement at times when they needed money for 
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larger personal purchases. “I have one person,” the department head 
continued, “who submitted 22-23 suggestions in January, and some 
of those improvements made absolutely no sense. Some people do it 
deliberately just to put money in their pockets.”
Quality management assumes that company leadership will put an 
end to these universally well-known tricks. The assumption is based 
on the consideration that the higher employees are positioned in the 
hierarchy, the more they will identify with the organization’s goal of 
making “quality products at favorable prices.” Yet this overlooks that 
creating a façade of effective quality management can make good sense 
even for senior executives.
The façade character of quality management was not openly dis-
cussed in our midsize company because no one involved appeared 
to have an interest in turning the hype about their own quality and 
improvement system into a problem. The workers in manufacturing 
and assembly received bonuses for their improvement suggestions. 
Their superiors were required by their target agreements to meet a 
prescribed number of improvement measures, quality circles, and kai-
zen workshops, and could expect salary deductions and loss of face in 
the firm if they did not perform accordingly. The manager in charge of 
monitoring quality initiatives had allowed himself to be committed in 
his target agreement to a certain number of companywide suggestions 
and therefore often kept both eyes wide shut. Finally, Veletto’s CEO 
was aware that having the company designated as the “factory of the 
year,” which was his goal, depended on the number of suggestions for 
improvement, and therefore had no interest in exposing the inefficiency 
of the suggestion system that the employees had detected on the quiet.
Quality Managers, Consultants, and Team Leaders:  
Confederates in Myth
The CEO of Sommet, the French facilities management firm, was 
under considerable pressure to gain control of the quality deficit in the 
company’s services. Customers had complained about it in a survey. As 
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the manager of this business division, his intention was to use a broadly 
conceived kaizen initiative for all French teams as a way of signaling 
his superiors in the holding company that the quality problem was 
being tackled. Consequently, he established a task force consisting of 
seasoned staff members who were tasked with implementing the quality 
initiative in the various teams. The task force was required to report 
to the CEO at regular intervals. To support these internal employees, 
several consulting companies with kaizen credentials were hired. It 
was hoped that this would stimulate competition among the firms and 
thereby encourage greater commitment.
Externally, the kaizen initiative was always portrayed as a success 
that was also quantifiable. When the task force met with the CEO, long 
lists of improvements and calculations were presented, documenting 
that the savings produced by the kaizen initiative were exceeding its 
cost. As reported by a master craftsman, the pressure to succeed resulted 
in the performance of a “success show” at the end of each individual 
workshop. Since the results presented had to be quantifiable, a collec-
tive evaluation of the work steps saved, the storage areas cleared, and 
materials conserved was conducted on the last day of the workshop.
Nevertheless, the numbers reported were no more than loosely cou-
pled with the results of the workshop. In part, the savings were quanti-
fied in areas where such quantification was impossible to undertake due 
to the complexity of the material. In such cases, one simply solicited 
an assessment from the team leader. Furthermore, successes the team 
had already achieved beforehand on its own were also attributed to 
the workshop. In isolated cases, outright pseudo-successes were pre-
sented. In one workshop, for example, a direct parking opportunity was 
designed for a large-scale facility in order to reduce unloading time for 
the laborers. Even though all of the participants knew that this created a 
solution only for the duration of the workshop—afterwards the facility 
once again involved long distances—for the success calculations at the 
end of the workshop savings for an entire year were calculated, to the 
amusement of the laborers concerned.
What was responsible for the exaggerated positive presentations 
of the workshop results? There was no deliberate collusion among the 
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participants to massage the figures. Rather, the presentation of successes 
in the workshops was the result of tacit alliances, created under pres-
sure and based on myths and fictions among the participating groups 
of players. The internal consultants were under pressure to document 
the efficiency of a measure in order to prove their own usefulness in a 
difficult situation, and possibly have additional personnel assigned to 
their task force. The external consultants were under pressure to chalk 
up quantifiable successes in their kaizen workshops in order to distin-
guish themselves against the other consulting firms. At one consulting 
firm, it was actually customary to link employees’ pay to the savings 
achieved in their workshops. For the team and department heads in 
the firms that hired the consultants, the kaizen workshops provided an 
opportunity to present themselves as model teams or branch offices. 
This had been particularly encouraged because the CEO had called 
for increased internal competition between the teams and business 
areas, and promoted it with rankings, prizes, and commendations for 
their leaders.
From a Silent Circle to Spiraling Silence:  
The Escalation of Myth-Based Alliances
The myth- and fiction-based alliances that form around quality man-
agement do not represent organized conspiracies of employees at all 
hierarchical levels for the purpose of duping a customer who is striving 
for quality. Rather, they silently come into being due to the pressure of 
having to set up a comprehensive quality management program. They 
exist in a somewhat unconscious way as circles of silence. In such cir-
cles, interests that diverge from the quality ideology and the apparently 
paradoxical side effects of quality management can only be addressed 
to a limited degree. Although deviations from the supposedly funda-
mental principles of profitability, quality, and customer satisfaction 
may indeed arise frequently, the players cannot admit to them openly.
Not addressing the side effects, to paraphrase social scientist Elisa-
beth Noelle-Neumann, can lead to a “spiral of silence in quality man-
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agement.” Since the side effects are not openly discussed, management 
raises the target figures every year (the number of improvement sugges-
tions, points on the Japan Diet scales, the number of CIP workshops, 
etc.). The employees react by expanding the scope of “Potemkin quality 
management” which, in turn, leads to further escalation of demands.
4.6 Quality Management Is the Answer,  
but What Was the Question, Actually?
If one reviews the current literature on quality management, pro-
nounced end-means constructions become visible. Quality manage-
ment is viewed as the central means to fulfill the supposed meta-goals 
of an organization, namely, securing one’s livelihood and (as is often 
added from a labor union perspective) employee satisfaction. In the 
following step, quality management as a means is then defined as a 
sub-goal, and a wide range of means are utilized to achieve it, for exam-
ple, quality circles, kaizen, or a company suggestion system. In turn, 
the latter are then set as goals, and means such as the use of standard 
instruments, employing consultants, and freeing up human resources 
are applied to achieve them. 
As an example, in his quality planning concept pioneering Ameri-
can management thinker Josef M. Juran (Juran 1991, 168ff.) developed 
a hierarchical structure of quality ends or goals. From the top-level 
ends/goals he derives secondary ends and goals which then serve as 
fixed points for tertiary ends and goals. This results in pyramid shaped 
goal and sub-goal structures suggesting that the top-level goals can 
be achieved by gearing work strictly to the orders of ends and means.
Organizational research over the last 50 years has completely refuted 
the idea of clear end-means configurations. There is no doubt that they 
do exist and that the players have an interest in their sophisticated 
concatenation. The challenge is to the assumption that clear end-means 
chains even come close to allowing us to understand organizational 
processes. Instead, it is now assumed that the relationship between 
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ends and means is significantly more complex. The implementation 
of quality management methods in day-to-day organizational reality 
is the very place this can be observed.
First, quality management is not a meta-goal toward which orga-
nizational activity would be oriented. In our example of the facilities 
management firm, there were the competing meta-goals of customer 
satisfaction and satisfying the holding company. Since these could 
not always be reconciled, informal structures emerged that allowed 
the processing of contradictory demands from the environment to go 
forward. The quality management program, which also addressed the 
informal processes, posed a danger for the organization inasmuch as 
the contradictory demands could no longer be processed informally 
as before. 
Second, the use of means not only leads to the achievement of the 
desired goals but also creates a wide range of undesirable and para-
doxical side effects. The blockade effect created when a number of 
different quality instruments are used, the recoil effect when quality 
management is linked to the Japan myth, and the limited perspective 
that results from the channeling of quality management efforts are 
examples of such undesired and paradoxical side effects.
Third, the means employed are not the only thing that results in 
the accomplishment of an intended goal; there are other, unplanned 
causes that contribute. While a number of factors which cannot be 
influenced may be responsible for an increase in revenues, customer 
satisfaction, or quality parameters, players who have vested interests 
frequently attribute them monocausally to a previously initiated quality 
management program. In the production of the “kaizen success” in the 
French company’s workshops, the cause of certain effects was repeatedly 
traced to the kaizen method even though completely different reasons 
were responsible for the positive changes.
Fourth, it can be observed that goals are in part generalized to such 
a degree that they represent no more than abstract values. To state it 
in oversimplified terms, at the beginning of the quality management 
discussion one can observe a close linkage between quality and the 
supposed top-level goal of maximizing profit. An increase in quality 
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that did not lead to increased profit would be rejected as irrational. In 
the current discussion, however, the usefulness of this means in terms 
of the top-level goal of increasing profit is in part no longer evident. 
Quality management is promoted because quality is a value in itself. 
In the midsized firm we studied, several employees expressed the sus-
picion that quality had in the meantime become a goal unto itself, 
independent of the goal of profit maximization.
In this context, we would like to mention a fifth point, namely, 
that goals change in conjunction with the means. Goals require and 
allow the use of certain means, the classical assumption runs. But as 
part of a recursive process, the availability of means also facilitates the 
emergence of new goals. Take computers as an example. It has been 
repeatedly shown that they are not only used as a means to achieve 
certain ends; their existence has also led to the formation of entirely 
new goals. Once a means has come into existence, the question arises of 
what other things one could use it for. In the case of our midsized firm, 
we observed that quality management as a means increasingly detached 
itself from the original goal of increasing profit, and a growing interest 
developed in using sophisticated quality management to win prizes for 
“business excellence.” The goal change became so encompassing that 
critical voices were heard warning that one should not lose sight of the 
profit maximization motive.
For many years, the deconstruction of the instrumental-rational 
understanding of organizations was of interest exclusively to researchers 
in the field of organizational theory. An external description of orga-
nizations made it possible to examine aspects, development lines, and 
principles other than those which organizations were presenting in their 
self-descriptions. This divergence between external scientific descrip-
tion and practice-oriented self-description should not be construed as 
making a case for “correct” or “incorrect.” Organizations certainly have 
many good reasons to promulgate an instrumental-rational model in 
their self-descriptions. Nevertheless, I think that even a practice-oriented 
discussion of quality management would receive important impulses 
through a greater focus on observing paradoxical and undesirable side 
effects and their integration into a more complex organizational model. 
5.  
Centralization  
through Decentralization
“Nobody is sure anymore who really runs the company  
(not even the people who are credited with running it),  
but the company does run.”
Joseph Heller
In businesses, public administrations, and associations, the term “hierar-
chy” has unpleasant connotations. If one is to believe the scientific stud-
ies, in many organizations complaints about the undesired side effects 
of inadequate communication are part of everyday life. Apparently, 
employees at the top as well as those at the base complain that there is 
a type of information osmosis in the organization: much like semi-per-
meable membranes, hierarchical positions slowly diffuse information in 
one direction only, from the top to the bottom. Top management levels 
complain that this osmosis forces it to make important decisions based 
on unconfirmed information, because information filters up from the 
bottom reluctantly or in distorted form. The base, meanwhile, complains 
that the top echelons of the company do not consult it when decisions 
are made for which it has the corresponding professional know-how.
The reasons for this information osmosis in hierarchies were already 
worked out in the debate over Max Weber’s concept of bureaucracy. 
Contrary to the classical premises of hierarchy theory, it has been shown 
that it is rarely possible to monopolize professional knowledge as well 
as external contacts at the top of the hierarchy. Due to the growing 
need for specialized know-how, subordinates often have greater exper-
tise than their superiors. In addition, even positions located in the 
lower reaches of the hierarchy have their own external communications 
through which they obtain information that is relevant for the organi-
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zation. As a result, superiors do not have at their disposal per se either 
the detailed expertise and knowledge of the environment or the good 
relationships of their subordinates to specific groups. Since all expertise 
and every contact with the environment cannot be reflected at the top, 
one also cannot expect the positions located at the top of a business’s 
hierarchy to react to every change in the company’s environment (for 
greater detail, see Luhmann 1971, 97ff.). 
When decision-making competencies are centrally located at the 
top of a business, information that is relevant for decisions must be 
laboriously drawn up to the top from below. Yet even network studies 
from the 1950s showed that hierarchies are very rarely able to pull 
information upward against the flow of orders and sanctions. People 
who attempt to inform their superiors about a problematic situation 
expose themselves to the danger of being seen as the cause of the prob-
lem. Those who bear bad news risk being branded as culprits, and for 
that reason problematic information is often passed to higher levels 
only after it has been “doctored up” or not at all. 
Instead of trying to perfect the flow of information from the bot-
tom to the top, organizations are relying more and more on flatten-
ing hierarchies on the one hand, and decentralizing decision-making 
competencies on the other. While there is no logically compelling 
connection between the flattening of hierarchies and decentralization, 
most of the studies on new forms of business enterprises report that 
these two organizational strategies coincide.7
Research until now has pointed out two strategies for flattening 
hierarchies and decentralizing decision-making competencies in the 
7 To simplify the matter, one can imagine a diagram with 4 fields: the one axis runs from 
“pronounced hierarchy” to “flat hierarchy,” the other from “centralization” to “decentral-
ization.” Whereas the organizational model characterized by “pronounced hierarchy—cen-
tralization” corresponds to the ideal “classic” Taylorist organization, the model defined by 
“flat hierarchy—decentralization” is consonant with the ideal “new” form of organization. 
The two other possible organizational models in the 4-field diagram have until now been 
largely neglected by scientific research. An organization with a flattened hierarchy and cen-
tralized decision-making competencies would have to rely on strong standardization of de-
cision-making programs and monitor compliance centrally through IT. In an organization 
with decentralized decision-making competencies and a pronounced hierarchy, one would 
expect “slack” to arise at the middle management level. 
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value-adding areas of an organization. The first entails a decentralization 
of responsibilities in parallel to removing entire levels of the hierarchy, 
thereby shortening lines of communication between top and bottom. 
This was researched in detail, particularly using major corporations 
such as GE, Siemens, or ABB as examples. It was found that although 
this strategy increases the span of control for superiors, the problem 
of too wide a range of contacts can be offset by decentralizing tasks to 
lower levels. 
A second strategy for flattening a hierarchy involves no longer 
installing individual managers at the respective levels of the hierarchy, 
but forming teams and groups of members who have equal rights. This 
organizational principle has been analyzed in detail using assembly, 
production, and sales groups at the lowest hierarchical level. In spite 
of increased demands to expand the group principle to the executive 
level, until now there have been hardly any systematic studies of the 
transition from one-person leadership to leadership groups in the field 
of operative management. 
In this chapter I will analyze how the introduction of leadership 
teams effects an organization. My thoughts are based on the observation 
of a company we will call Kontongo. Here, considerations on dehier-
archization and decentralization were further radicalized, inasmuch as 
the company expanded the group work model from the production 
and assembly areas to the first management level by forming so-called 
leadership groups. Leadership groups are units that are formally equal 
teams and perform management duties relating to units below them 
in the hierarchy. The leadership group has no direct superior who can 
resolve conflicts based on formal authority. To the extent it is possible, 
conflicts are supposed to be resolved within the team through commu-
nication, negotiation, and coordination through discourse. 
In the first part (5.1), I will analyze the motives that led to the 
expansion of the group principle from the value-adding level to the next 
higher levels. The second part (5.2) delineates four central organiza-
tional problems that arise through the introduction of team structures. 
Building on these considerations, part three (5.3) analyzes to what 
extent the goal of decentralizing competencies and responsibility can 
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be achieved through the introduction of group work in the value-add-
ing core and at the operative management level. In part 4 (5.4) and 
the concluding summary (5.5), I demonstrate that the very extensive 
form of decentralization created through the introduction of leadership 
teams actually creates a process that leads to the exact opposite, namely, 
a centralization of decision making.
5.1 The Concept of Managing as a Team:  
Expanding Group Work to the First Management Level
In the past, the concept of partially autonomous group work was 
applied almost exclusively to the lowest level of work organization, 
the immediate value-adding core. In experiments with teams in the 
context of programs to “humanize the workplace” during the 1970s 
and 80s, as well as in the operative decentralizations during the lean 
management wave of the 1990s, team structures without superiors were 
set up only at the level of direct value creation, which is to say, in the 
assembly and production areas of businesses, in the patient care areas 
of hospitals, or the service providing units of public administrations. At 
the first leadership level—the master craftsman, departmental, process 
line, or sector level—the principle of one-person leadership continued 
to be relied upon rather than the team leadership model.
Demands that one should no longer focus on the “one-man leader-
ship model” but instead permit autonomy without the actual presence 
of a superior were implemented by executives almost exclusively for 
smaller project groups. Yet project groups have a completely different 
character than partially autonomous workgroups. Whereas the latter 
involve clearly defined work units with their own comprehensive tasks 
and a fixed place in the organizational chart, project teams form only on 
a temporary basis. The members of a project team, in addition to being 
part of the specific team, generally retain their ties to a department, 
sector, or executive position where they are integrated in a person-cen-
tered leadership structure.
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Planning and Consulting Groups as a Team-Oriented  
Leadership Structure in Operative Management
Nevertheless, in practitioner literature on group work, we find the 
observation that the introduction of project teams and partially autono-
mous group work at the operative level of a company can only be a first 
step toward a flexible, learning organization. Trendy sounding orga-
nizational principles like “cellular organizations,” “modular systems,” 
or “agile businesses” are used to demand that the organizational struc-
ture of an enterprise should follow the “group principle” as much as 
possible, thereby creating an “organic group organization.” The “basic 
groups”—which are called teams, partially autonomous groups, or 
tribes depending on the organization—are combined under the head-
ing of “second-level groups.” Following Rensis Likert (Likert 1961), 
there are demands that the superordinate leadership groups should 
primarily perform coordination and monitoring tasks, thereby placing 
all executive tasks in the hands of groups and no longer individuals.
The metaphor of a fractal organization is used to underscore the 
notion that leadership tasks should be transferred to groups and work 
teams to the greatest degree possible. According to this concept, all 
units of a business, association, or public administration are self-or-
ganized and self-similar in structure due to comprehensive team and 
group work. The assumption is that fractal enterprises, because of the 
special structure of their decentralized units, are better equipped to 
master the increasing complexity of day-to-day business operations. 
The idea is to facilitate coordination between the decentralized units 
by having all of the units function according to the same principles 
and thereby create a mutual understanding across all levels and areas 
of the organization. For example, the members of the board would be 
able to understand the problems of employees working together in 
groups because they themselves are organized in the form of group. 
Among employees, an understanding for the concerns of the company’s 
leadership would arise because the employees act as quasi-entrepreneurs 
and can therefore relate to the thinking style of their “colleagues” in 
the top echelon.
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Particularly in pioneering companies, a process of fermentation 
can be observed when it comes to the introduction of leadership 
groups at the master craftsman, departmental, and divisional levels. 
Transferring tasks such as job planning, resource planning, qual-
ity assurance, logistics, maintenance, and coordination to partially 
autonomous groups changes the tasks of the first leadership level. 
Instead of acting as technical experts, progress chasers, staffing 
planners, task allocators, and problem solvers as before, first level 
leadership is now called upon to perform tasks such as supporting 
self-governing groups, personnel development, promoting collabo-
ration in groups, planning the qualification process, and providing 
assistance with relaunch projects.
In light of this shift in tasks at the first leadership level, companies, 
and especially their consultants, raise the question of why the leader-
ship tasks are not also performed by groups, instead of individuals. 
Particularly in the dominant thread of labor science literature on group 
work, there are calls for the introduction of planning and advisory 
teams at the first management level which, jointly and without formal 
superiors, are supposed to assume the tasks of strategic planning, pro-
duction program planning, materials management, quality planning, 
and operations scheduling.
The Reasons for the Introduction of Team Structures
Kontongo implemented the idea of planning and advisory groups at 
the first management level and thereby assumed a pioneering role in 
the European, American, and Japanese automobile industry. The over-
all framework was to split the company into five sectors, but rather 
than installing classical one-person leadership for each, responsibility 
for the respective sectors was transferred to a team. Personnel and 
organizational development viewed the creation of leadership/sector 
teams as an “extension of teams to the next hierarchical level.” The 
“traditional master craftsman function” was to be integrated into a 
holistic leadership team. 
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The sector teams were composed of master craftsmen from pro-
duction and engineers from the engineering departments, in other 
words, people who had been active in different areas until that time. 
The teams consisted of 4–6 employees. Team members were supposed 
to assume the jobs of process engineering, personnel support, materials 
management, and information management, as well as responsibility 
for the budget and quality assurance. The sector team was in charge of 
the budget and was authorized to purchase several million euros worth 
of spare parts, lubricants, auxiliary supplies, and maintenance services. 
Every employee in the sector team was assigned a primary duty, but 
was also supposed to be able to stand in for other members. 
All members of the team were coequal and had the same authority 
over subordinate groups. Just as in the production and assembly groups, 
the leadership team also had a spokesperson who was supposed to act as a 
contact person to plant management and assume a coordinating function 
in the sector team. The sector spokesperson did not have disciplinary 
authority over the other members of the leadership team. The corporate 
development officer of Kontongo explains: “The sector spokesperson can 
be compared to the group spokesperson in the assembly and production 
islands. That means, the job is truly supposed to be that of a speaker who 
acts as an intermediary between individual positions.”
Management hoped that establishing coequal leadership groups 
would produce synergy effects, increase the exchange of experience 
among employees, and encourage flexibility through mutual assistance 
and substituting for one another. In particular, the inclusion of engi-
neers in the leadership groups was intended to stimulate a transfer 
of know-how on location, which would then lead to faster and more 
direct problem solving.
By setting up leadership teams, Kontongo’s top management 
wanted to overcome the problems of functional differentiation in the 
organization. The original idea underpinning functional differentiation 
was to break down the organization’s overall objective into individual 
tasks, each of which could be accomplished through separate, highly 
professionalized departments. From the perspective of top manage-
ment, however, the difficulty of this strategy was that departments such 
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as quality assurance, construction, and production dedicate themselves 
to perfecting their respective local rationalities. On this basis, specific 
interests of the individual divisions subsequently emerged which stood 
substantially in contradiction to one another. Frequently, the only way 
to reconcile such particular interests is to weigh one against the other at 
the highest level of the organization and resolve the inter-departmen-
tal conflicts there as well. In such cases, the hierarchy functions as a 
specialized agency for coordinating what was previously differentiated.
In the company under examination, management hoped that by creat-
ing leadership teams the problems resulting from specific interests would 
be brought together in one place where they could be solved through 
compromise, communication, and consensus. The expectation was that 
the top echelon of the company would no longer be burdened with 
rectifying internal conflicts. Groups with heterogeneous compositions in 
particular would be able to reproduce the complexity of a sector’s relevant 
environments better than groups that were dominated by an executive, 
and it was hoped that this would offer advantages. The leadership groups 
were intended to introduce fuzziness where individuals, based on their 
professional logic or their affiliation with a specific department, resorted 
to either-or simplifications. In this manner, the ambivalence and dis-
crepancies inherent in an organization were to be turned into a resource 
that would open up the sectors to a range of rationales. Carrying out 
conflicts in the leadership teams was supposed to prevent problematical 
simplifications and contribute to finding more appropriate solutions. 
5.2 The Problems of Collaborating in Teams
In labor science, a controversial debate is underway as to why it is 
so very difficult to introduce group and team-oriented structures. 
Although one might expect that the employees affected would welcome 
this new form of work due to its humanizing potential, one observes 
instead that, in part, the employees who are to be organized in groups 
and teams put up resistance.
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For many years, the resistance was explained through the psychology 
of learning: it was insinuated that the employees would actually like to 
become involved with this new form of work, but were not yet able to 
because of defensive routines. Later, explanations gained traction which, 
following Pierre Bourdieu, attributed the resistance to the introduction 
of a bourgeois work habitus into the fields of production and assembly 
that were characterized by a proletarian concept of work. For example, 
ethnologist Andreas Wittel (Wittel 1998) argued that while collaboration 
in groups, with its emphasis on intrinsically motivated and discursively 
oriented work, encourages the formation of a bourgeois habitus, labor-
ers resist it because they have been shaped by a concept of work that is 
oriented toward earning, physicality, subordination, and routine.
This line of argumentation enriched the discussion of the problems 
and resistance created through the introduction of group work with an 
additional cultural-sociological explanation. Nevertheless, it suggests 
that it would be easier to introduce group and team structures in the 
areas of a business, public administration, or hospital that are not char-
acterized by a proletarian work habitus, and that it would not encoun-
ter the same resistance and problems. According to this reasoning, 
introducing team structures at leadership levels, where an intrinsically 
motivated and discursively oriented work habitus has always played an 
important role, should be easier to accomplish than in the operative 
areas. But do the problems with group work really diminish the more 
we have to do with employees who have higher qualifications, are better 
paid, and more articulate?
In the following section we will use four problem areas to examine 
in greater detail the difficulties of workgroups on the one side and 
leadership groups on the other.
The Problem of Decision Making under the Consensus Principle
The need to make fast, accurate decisions under “turbulent conditions” 
is a key argument in favor of the introduction of group work, segmen-
tation, and the flattening of hierarchies. Henry Mintzberg (Mintzberg 
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1979, 183), for example, justifies dehierarchization and decentraliza-
tion measures by pointing out the opportunity they provide to react 
quickly to local conditions. Transferring information back and forth 
from a branch office to headquarters takes time which businesses simply 
no longer have in today’s environment.
From the perspective of the employees at Kontongo, however, 
the advantages of introducing group structures at the operative and 
the leadership levels only became apparent when a decision could be 
taken “in peace.” In contrast, the dismantling of hierarchical author-
ity structures emerged as a problem when decisions were made under 
time pressure, which is to say, the very situations in which decen-
tralized organizational structures are assumed to offer an advantage. 
According to the head of the assembly department, “Under overload 
conditions, group work tends to get in the way. You’re better off with 
clear instructions. Because you just can’t keep talking about things 
for hours or days. A heavy workload tends to have a negative effect 
on group work.”
In a classical organizational structure, the hierarchically legitimized 
instructions of a previously defined person in charge allow decisions 
to be reached quickly. Since there is no one who is authorized to issue 
instructions, either at the level of group work or in leadership teams, 
consensus-oriented mechanisms for reaching agreement become more 
important. The necessity and the opportunities for communication 
in the teams intensifies. In the process, the “communication load” 
increases rapidly as the number of team members grows.
The employees in the groups find themselves in a communica-
tions dilemma. They must rely on routine, scheduled communication 
because it is difficult for them to assess what must be agreed upon and 
what information needs to be supplied. At the same time, a sense of 
communication overload arises. One member of a leadership team 
at Kontongo complained, “I can’t be forever trying to inform myself 
what the other people in the segment team are doing at any moment. 
There’s simply too much duplication of effort. There’s a lot of talk, 
and that leads to the exchange of information, but we’re also blocking 
each other’s resources. The duplication of work is caused by imprecise 
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definitions or the incomplete implementation of precise definitions.” 
In this dilemma, the team members inclined toward laborious voting 
processes because they didn’t want to risk that one of their colleagues, 
with whom they worked together every day, felt left out.
Particularly when questions are controversial, a decision cannot 
be reached even in extreme situations, because there is no entity in 
the group who has the final say. This causes decision-making pressure 
so intense that one puts up with the serious psychological stress and 
ultimately reaches a decision—although sometimes the groups have 
no option but to leave the decision to a superior. One member of a 
leadership team facing a problematical decision reported, “In spite 
of the lack of time, progress was made because the people up above 
intervened with guidance—at our request, because as a group of six 
we can’t take a vote on everything. If you do that, you can’t make any 
decisions at all, it takes too long.”
It is interesting that the problem of reaching decisions quickly 
existed in very similar form in the production and assembly groups 
as well as the leadership groups. The higher qualifications and greater 
discursive orientation of the members of the sector team therefore did 
not appear to guarantee that consensual agreement functioned any 
better in this group than in the production and assembly groups. On 
the contrary, there are indications that the problem arises even more 
frequently and intensely in leadership groups, because their tasks are 
less standardized in comparison to those of the production and assem-
bly groups.
Moreover, the introduction of group structures aggravates the time 
problem when a decision is reached only after the next higher level 
of the organization has been involved. It can happen that a problem 
will remain in a production or assembly group for a long time, where 
a decision based on the consensus principle cannot be reached, and is 
then handed up to a leadership team because a deadline is in danger. 
Since the nature of the problem often involves conflict and discrep-
ancies, the problematical decision now reproduces itself in the lead-
ership team, which is burdened with an extremely time-consuming 
decision-making process.
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The Diffusion of Responsibility
A frequently mentioned problem of classical one-person management is 
that responsibility lies with a single individual, and the other employees 
do not feel accountable for the performance of the team. To prevent 
this, in group work the responsibility for quality, productivity, and 
adherence to schedule is no longer assigned to one individual but to 
the group overall. As an example, the personnel development officer 
at Kontongo remarked, “For the sectors, there is one uniform job 
description. Allocating the numerous duties is then up to the mem-
bers themselves.” The members also had to be able to stand in for one 
another. Each of them had to be independently able to order supplies 
and parts, conduct conversations with employees, and schedule shifts 
and vacations.
Nevertheless, contrary to the expectation that team leadership in 
the sectors would lead to greater acceptance of responsibility, a greater 
diffusion of responsibility was observed in the company under exam-
ination. Particularly at the plant management level, complaints were 
voiced that the sector teams were not assuming responsibility for qual-
ity, production, and adherence to schedule in a form that was appro-
priate for a sector structure. For example, in the question of vacation 
planning—which was actually a task of the production and assembly 
groups themselves—the decisions which ultimately applied were not 
even reached at the level of the leadership team. Here, the problems for 
which the members of the leadership team dodged responsibility were 
formulated in such a way that they could no longer be seen as the duty 
of the leadership team, but were viewed instead as a cross-functional 
task. The formulations conveyed the impression that the leadership 
team was no longer responsible. In the words of the head of production, 
“On the one hand, they don’t have the confidence to make the decision, 
so they pass it up to a higher level. The submissions are phrased like 
this: we in the sector team are not able to make this decision, we don’t 
have permission to do so.”
The members of the leadership team justified their rejection of 
responsibility by saying that taking too prominent a stance would 
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ultimately result in a person becoming the scapegoat for every problem 
that arose. “Here’s the way it is in our company,” one member of the 
leadership team remarked. “Once somebody’s been held responsible, 
then that’s the only person they always beat up on, to put it bluntly.” 
That was particularly problematical when one had no hierarchically 
anchored authority over one’s colleagues. When it came to the spokes-
people, one had the impression that they had to put their neck on the 
line for certain things even though they did not bear sole responsibility 
for them.
In this respect as well, it was emphasized that in the assembly and 
production islands the problem of the diffusion of responsibility did not 
arise with the same stridency as in the leadership teams. The assigned 
task, according to the head of production, “keep the group on track.” 
In contrast, the tasks of managers were burdened with much greater 
insecurity factors, which tended to make standardization difficult. In 
the team structures at the middle management level, this apparently 
provided more room for games involving the acceptance and rejection 
of responsibility than in the fields of operative activities.
In leadership teams, the diffusion of responsibility escalated to a 
point where, contrary to the recommendation of plant management, 
no sector spokesperson was appointed. As justification, the teams 
fielded the argument that responsibility for the work rested on the 
entire sector. “If we’re a sector,” said one member of a team that was 
particularly at loggerheads, “then that means four, five, or six of us. 
Because the executives at the top were planning, if there are problems, 
to single out just the sector spokesperson and solve the problem with 
him, or hold one individual responsible for not solving the problem.” 
Employees Play One Member of the Leadership Team  
against the Other
Management hoped that the introduction of team-oriented leadership 
structures would allow it to present itself to employees in a clear, coor-
dinated fashion. The classical strategy of the production and assem-
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bly workers was to pit executives from operations scheduling, quality 
management, construction, and job controlling, who were located in 
different departments, one against the other. Management calculated 
that this could be counteracted by combining the executives from the 
various departments into a leadership team with shared responsibility. 
When there was no time pressure, the sector team actually did 
present a unified, consolidated front to the employees. Yet contrary 
to management expectations, under stressful conditions the introduc-
tion of sector teams did not result in clear and coordinated behavior 
of the sector team toward production and assembly workers. As a 
result of combining representatives from operations scheduling, quality 
management, construction, and job controlling into one team with 
shared responsibility, there was no longer a clear contact person even for 
technical questions. The employees therefore had the impression that 
there was no longer a clear line in the sectors. As one assembly worker 
remarked about his leadership team, “They’re constantly changing their 
tune, because now communication in the sector is not clearly defined.”
The poorly delineated responsibilities gave the partners of the sec-
tor teams an opportunity to play one member against the other. This 
tendency could be observed in the relationship between the leadership 
team and the work groups as well as the relationship between the 
leadership team and the job controlling department. For example, the 
controllers from the order processing center tried to pit the members of 
the sector teams against one another. Each of the seven job controllers 
tried to sway the members of the sector team to treat his own specific 
jobs preferentially. If he was unsuccessful with one team member, he 
would move on to the next, thereby exploiting communication gaps 
in the leadership team for his own ends.
Particularly the subordinates of the leadership teams developed 
sophisticated strategies to profit from the unclear allocation of respon-
sibilities. As the personnel development officer remarked, “Often, the 
group doesn’t know who the contact person is, because that’s also not 
really communicated externally. So, then the members of the group 
try to push through their personal interests and play games.” And a 
member of the leadership team commented, “When people in the lead-
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ership team aren’t talking with one another, then your own people turn 
out to be really filthy characters. If I tell someone, ‘You can’t do that,’ 
he’ll move on to the next person; so, something’s already gone wrong.”
Attempts to prevent the employees’ games by increasing communi-
cation between them were not always successful in day-to-day business 
operations. A member of the sector team told us, “The members of the 
groups have already realized that you can play one member of the sector 
team against the other. They look for the path of least resistance, and 
we prevent that by coming to an agreement among ourselves. Vacations 
and comp time is the only area where some people succeed in getting 
a vacation day by talking to the right person.” 
Power Struggles in Leadership Groups
The hope behind introducing group and teamwork is to achieve better 
cooperation and communication among employees. The idea is to 
provide employees a home and security in the group by creating circles 
of people that remain as constant as possible and can perform their 
duties independently to a large degree. The group structure is meant 
to reduce internal conflicts, and conflict potential is supposed to be 
diverted to external “enemies.”
Empirical research on lateral cooperation in businesses nourishes 
this hope. Lateral cooperation is defined as the “goal-oriented fulfill-
ment of cross-functional tasks, based on the division of labor and in 
a structured work situation, by members of an organization who are 
formally or approximately equal in terms of the hierarchy.” In its obser-
vations of people on the same hierarchical level, quantitative research 
on lateral cooperation has found that employees have more than twice 
as many conflicts with individuals outside of their group as inside. This 
suggests that cooperation inside the same department functions better 
than cooperation between employees of different departments.
In contrast to that, research from an industrial sociological and 
systems theoretical perspective has found that the principle of self-or-
ganization does not completely eliminate power struggles; on the con-
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trary, they now become especially relevant. Self-organization hampers 
the establishment of structured authority. The distribution of power 
becomes more diffuse for everyone involved, and it becomes very 
difficult for individual members of the group to defend themselves 
against misuse of the power structure. Technical problems quickly 
become overlaid with personal antipathies. As one sector team reported, 
“Punches were being thrown below the belt.”
The power struggles tended to be personal and were explained 
through the absence of a superior. One member of a leadership team at 
Kontongo remarked, “If there were a superior, a formal sector leader, we 
wouldn’t have these interpersonal problems, because then there would 
be a boss.” In other words, in operative management superiors were not 
seen exclusively as a hindrance by any means. Instead, they were also 
viewed as protecting employees from escalating internal group conflicts.
In the production and assembly groups, the orientation toward 
clearly defined tasks allowed us to observe an informal regulating 
mechanism that could not arise in leadership teams in the same 
form. The “Darwinist power struggle” seen in workgroups that had 
no superior resulted in the development of pecking orders based 
on the criterion of performance. Influence and status in the group 
depended to a large degree on mastering tasks and were therefore rel-
atively easy for members to determine. If a person could not perform 
the task required, others in the group took note and the respective 
individual was sanctioned. As a final consequence, members who 
did not perform, thereby reducing the bonus payments for the entire 
group, were removed. Case in point, a group speaker in the assembly 
department at Kontongo reported, “There was one person where there 
were documented quality problems, so then the group wouldn’t put 
up with that anymore.”
The reason that leadership teams have so few options for regulating 
internal power struggles is related to the fact that, in principle, they 
have no standardized tasks. Even early research on the rationalization 
of work in the service sector pointed out that tasks in the support areas 
of a business are characterized by a high degree of technical, time, per-
sonnel, and economic indeterminacy (Berger 1984). As a result, it is 
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difficult for informal pecking orders to arise in leadership teams. The 
corporate development officer at Kontongo compared the situation 
in a particularly problematic leadership team to Monty Python’s Silly 
Olympiad: “Everyone was running in a different direction.” In terms 
of their contributions to adding value, leadership, engineering, and 
support tasks cannot be precisely defined, which made it impossible 
for the sector team to form a group consensus on the performance of 
individual members. In this sense, resorting to the supposed author-
ity of experts is a means of exerting power that is strongly defined by 
subjective impressions. The option of regulating or reducing a conflict 
by evaluating a member’s performance does not exist.
The structural problem arising from the difficulty of determining 
performance is exacerbated because executives have a different moti-
vational structure. A member of the sector team remarked, “Far too 
much energy is wasted … on ranking in the company.” According to 
the corporate development officer, for example, executives were not 
only motivated by money, but had a strong interest in advancing their 
careers and receiving recognition by their superiors. Meanwhile, in 
decentralized structures the chances of advancing in middle manage-
ment are extremely limited because there are hardly any opportunities 
to do so. If one wanted to have any kind of career at all, the corporate 
development officer stated, when opportunities for advancement are 
limited it was important to be “identifiable as a person.” The only way 
to have a career was to be perceived as an individual and not as a team 
member. A sector team member at Kontongo told us, “I see my boss 
twice a month, and then only if he comes down here … Then there 
are people who can’t stand that, so they have to run and see the boss 
three or four times a month. And then false information is spread; you 
have absolutely no idea.”
When the plant manager was brought into the escalating conflicts 
as the top executive, the result was often nothing more than a further 
exacerbation of the conflict because he had hardly any knowledge of the 
detailed processes in the sectors and could therefore be used by various 
team members for their own purposes. As the personnel development 
officer at Kontongo remarked, “Many times, the respective higher-level 
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executives can’t make that judgment … because they don’t know what’s 
going on in the sectors. There are a lot of opportunities to scheme and 
do something nasty to a colleague.”
The Blind Spots in Team Leadership 
In part, the above-mentioned difficulties can surely be traced to prob-
lems caused by establishing a new, unfamiliar leadership structure. 
Those who were promoting it expressed the hope that informal regu-
lating mechanisms would evolve in the leadership groups that would 
mitigate the problems observed up to that point. Nevertheless, it would 
be a mistake to trace all of the problems of team and group organi-
zation—in the style of the sometimes euphoric literature on group 
work—exclusively to its introduction or the lack of team-oriented 
socialization in employees. In the four problems discussed above, it 
was instead a question of the “blind spots” that are created when group 
work is used to achieve greater flexibility.
The problems described above represent the other side of the coin. 
They arise at exactly the points where an attempt is made to use group 
work to escape the negative effects of Taylorist work organization. If 
one intends to increase the quality of decisions by grouping players 
with divergent interests together and pressuring them to achieve a 
consensus, then one has to accept the problematical nature of decisions 
that have been reached quickly. Strengthening a sense of responsibility 
by holding entire groups responsible, as opposed to a single individual, 
entails the risk of diffusing responsibility. The effect that the members 
of teams pit themselves against one another is understandable if the 
object is to make a number of contact people available and thereby 
achieve the most seamless support possible for upstream and down-
stream areas. True, conflicts and power struggles can be painful for 
individual employees, but they must be accepted if one combines once 
functionally differentiated areas of responsibility in a team, and views 
conflicts as an opportunity to expand the organization’s spectrum of 
awareness.
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Comparing production or assembly groups with leadership groups 
provides clear indications that the difficulties encountered in group 
work have less to do with the cultural characteristics of production 
and assembly workers, than with the specific conditions created by 
the process of reaching decisions without a superior. The problems and 
resistance that arise on the operative leadership level with respect to 
group and team structures seem very similar to those in the immediate, 
value-adding core.
Due to the different position of executives in an organization, 
the problems of group structures arise in part even more stridently 
than in teams in value-adding departments. First, the high degree of 
task standardization in the production and assembly groups, and the 
existence of clear programs and specifications, can partially prevent 
the escalation of problems entailed in consensual decision making. 
In contrast, the spectrum of responsibilities in leadership teams is far 
less standardized, and the criteria available to mitigate discursive deci-
sion-making processes are therefore less clearly defined. Second, since 
middle management is sandwiched between top management above 
and the value-adding areas below, power, control, and responsibility 
games can be played in two directions—and not just unidirectionally 
as in assembly and production teams.
Building on the structural problems of team decision making elu-
cidated here, the next section will discuss the paradoxical effects that 
can arise when two serially connected levels of the hierarchy are based 
on group structures instead of one-person leadership.
5.3 The Decentralization Paradox: Team Leadership 
and the Centralization of Decision Making
As a rule, one assumes that flattening hierarchies and introducing group 
and team structures on all levels of a business will result in greater 
decentralization of responsibility. Granted, there are isolated cases of 
organizations attempting to reduce their hierarchies without decentral-
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izing decision-making authority. In most businesses the maxim would 
appear to be: the greater the flattening of the hierarchy and the more 
pronounced the decentralization efforts, the more competencies and 
responsibility are shifted downward. There is talk of the “cascade effect 
of decentralization.” Mid-level managers who have received greater 
responsibility and authority in flatter hierarchies can only survive if 
they themselves, in turn, cede authority and responsibility to levels 
underneath them.
At first sight, the assumption seems convincing. At Kontongo as 
well, management assumed that flattening the hierarchy, introducing 
team structures on various levels, and decentralizing responsibility 
would also lead to better decision making at the two lowest levels of 
the hierarchy. In the following, I will analyze why the desired effect 
materialized only to a limited degree.
Opportunities to Exert Hierarchical Authority  
in Team-Oriented Leadership Structures
Hierarchical positions that are filled by individuals have a central func-
tion in organizations. They are crystallization points for decision-mak-
ing authority, and they are points at which flows of communication and 
information are interrupted. The interruption function of the hierarchy 
works in both directions. Not all information in an organization is 
transferred from the bottom to the top because this would completely 
overwhelm the uppermost echelon. Likewise, not all information is 
passed down from the top to the operative area, the technical core, via 
the middle management level. The task of middle management lies 
in filtering information from superiors according to its relevance and 
then passing only some of it along.
The interruption function allows organizations to process a high 
degree of complexity. In the thinking of Herbert A. Simon (Simon 
1965), it is a central function of hierarchy to produce a series of inter-
locking systems and subsystems. Simon claimed that, as a rule, com-
munication is stronger and more intense within the individual systems 
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and subsystems than between them. There is greater communication 
within a department than between departments; the exchange of ideas 
within a group is more intense than between groups. In this manner, a 
modular system of partially autonomous units arises where complete 
partial solutions can be worked out. It is only at the end that these 
must be combined into a total solution. And when new tasks arise, 
one can selectively refer back to them. 
Linking their units in pyramidal chains of command is what makes 
it possible for organizations to communicate in a consistent fashion to 
begin with. According to the thinking of Niklas Luhmann (Luhmann 
1997, 834), in the absence of a time-consuming (and impossible) cre-
ation of consensual agreement among all employees, the sole reason an 
organization can speak with one voice is that a CEO, chairman of the 
board, or mayor can depend on his instructions being implemented 
as concrete actions in semi-autonomous modules via the hierarchical 
pyramid.
At Kontongo, over the course of decentralization measures the old 
master craftsmen-based structures were removed; the “kingdoms” of 
the master craftsmen were abolished. Yet the master craftsmen and 
the decision-making authority so closely associated with them as indi-
viduals had fulfilled an important function for the interruption of 
communication in the company. There is another side to complaints 
about the paralyzing, deadwood echelons of middle management in 
business operations, namely, that the managers with their extensive 
competencies were very effectively able to secure the functioning of 
the company’s modular structure. Casting it in positive terms, a mas-
ter craftsman in the company under discussion was previously able to 
relieve the pressure put on his superiors by information coming from 
his unit, but he also filtered information from his superiors for its 
relevance to levels below. 
The introduction of team structures at the first management level 
resulted in a modification of the information filtering structures. When 
day-to-day operations were functioning, there was no great difference 
to the previously existing master craftsmen structure. Since sufficient 
time was available to reach consensual decisions on the leadership group 
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level, decisions could be reached at that point as to which information 
would be passed along to employees in the form of instructions or 
suggestions. Information could move through the official channels.
In time-critical situations—for example, when complaints were 
filed or rush jobs had to be inserted into the production stream—
the function of leadership teams as filters from higher to lower levels 
was limited. The large span of control and the often tedious process 
of reaching agreement in the team made it increasingly difficult for 
production management to gain access to employees “by the book.” 
The regular procedure—plant management turns to sector team, sec-
tor team reaches an agreement and then passes information along to 
the groups, the groups reach an agreement and speak to individual 
employees—was perceived as extremely time-consuming by the head 
of production and was often overridden.
Thus, particularly in critical moments the sector team was bypassed 
and direct drastic measures were taken. The director of total quality 
management at Kontongo reported, “The head of production inter-
vened in the group externally without discussing it beforehand.” The 
personnel development officer concurred, “That actually happens very 
often. When something happens that requires immediate action, then 
the boss becomes personally involved. Meanwhile, when the direction is 
from the bottom to the top, they usually stick to the ‘official channels.’” 
From the perspective of the sector team, the agreed-upon division of 
tasks was rarely upheld. A member of the sector team remarked, “The 
managers don’t care about the internal job descriptions. Even though 
they are aware of them, if there’s a problem, more often than not they’ll 
pick out the next best person in the sector team, even if the person has 
no responsibility for it at all.”
Here, it can be seen plainly how the loose linkage that was intro-
duced through team structures was perceived by those affected as a 
source of stress to which they reacted with tight linkage. Organiza-
tional psychologist Karl Weick (Weick 1976) pointed out early on that 
loose linkage in organizations can result in a sudden conservation of 
structures because hierarchies, due to the problems created by all-too-
loose linkage, suddenly remobilize classical chains of command. The 
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decentralization produced by group structure on a number of levels 
gives the head of production the ability to access production employ-
ees directly to a much greater degree than under the previous master 
craftsmen-based structure.
Hierarchy as a Stop Rule for Idling in Group Decision Making
Parallel to the head of production’s ability to override the weak level of 
middle managers who have been organized into a team, the paradox of 
centralization through decentralization also manifested as a result of 
initiatives from below. At Kontongo, we observed that a decentraliza-
tion of decision-making competencies also occurred when the teams 
had sufficient time to reach their decisions, when the problem did 
not mobilize overly controversial positions in the team, and informal 
hierarchization, divisions of labor, or coordination processes formed. 
Nevertheless, particularly when the decisions were time critical and 
were handled by groups where the distribution of power had not been 
clarified through informal negotiations, the decentralization of deci-
sion-making authority did not work. Since decisions in groups could 
not be made based on authority of office, when conflict arose decisions 
were passed upward in the hierarchy until they reached a person who 
had a decision-making monopoly.
In such cases, we noticed that, paradoxically, all of the measures 
directed at decentralization or dehierarchization and all of the change-
overs from hierarchical to discursive management took place within 
the framework of a hierarchy that remained in force. In unproblem-
atic situations, the underlying existence of a fundamentally hierarchi-
cal organizational structure is often difficult to perceive in strongly 
decentralized organizations. It is obscured by management’s talk of 
democratization, empowerment, and dehierarchization. In moments 
of crisis, however, the basically hierarchical structure becomes viru-
lent: decisions relating to terminations, salary cuts, or increased work 
hours are not reached through consensus, but are suddenly based on 
precedence of rank.
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When decision-making processes were going nowhere, or problems 
were time critical and groups did not reach consensus immediately, in 
the organization under discussion the head of production represented 
the first level where conflicts could be decided through a vote. This was 
because it was the first level where responsibility was concentrated in 
one person. According to a member of the sector team, “The only way 
you can resolve the conflict is to take it to the boss.” As an example, 
in one team problems related to the allocation of tasks were reported 
that could only be resolved through an intervention by the head of 
production. The question concerned which team member was allowed 
to perform which tasks, and how responsibilities would be allocated. 
Since the debate also involved the question of who would have what 
kind of influence in the future, the team had a falling out and could 
not reach a consensus. As a member of the sector team told us, “First 
we tried it on our own. That wasn’t so great. Then we took it to HR, 
and that didn’t work either. So, then we went to the plant manager, 
and that was very effective.”
It is considered a strength of hierarchies that they can call a stop to 
negotiation processes or “pull the emergency brake.” They ensure that 
solutions to problems can be found. Even Max Weber (Weber 1976, 
561) emphasized that bureaucracies, because of their unequivocal deci-
sion-making programming through record-keeping and official instruc-
tions, as well as their tight principle of super- and subordination, had 
prevailed over collegial, volunteer, and adjunct forms of organization. 
Precision, speed, unambiguity, and continuity, the central character-
istics of an organization, could only develop due to a combination of 
programming and hierarchy. 
Systems theory in particular presents a variation on this thought 
by pointing out that from a functional perspective, hierarchy makes 
it possible to transform an infinite information load into a finite one. 
The stop rules or emergency brakes are constructed in such a way that 
when a process that normally occurs through discursive coordination 
encounters a crisis, the hierarchy is mobilized. Dirk Baecker (Baecker 
1999, 298ff./330ff.) states that employees in modern organizations are 
in a position that makes them experts in a highly sensitive intermediate 
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step, and thereby forces them to check back in every halfway demand-
ing task. The hierarchical stop rule or emergency brake suspends this 
very principle of being able to check back. The hierarchy derives its 
legitimation from itself; it is not required to justify itself by referring 
to technical knowledge, contacts in the environment, or inspiration.
As a rule, the new organizational hierarchies are constructed in 
such a way that following each level with group or team structures 
there is a level with unequivocal personal assignment of responsibility. 
Following the level of partially autonomous assembly and production 
islands comes the level of the master craftsman who bears personal 
responsibility. Following the level of a coequal management team in the 
leadership of a profit center comes a board member who bears personal 
responsibility. Situated above a project team with coequal members, 
there is a project leader who can make decisions about problems in the 
project team by referring to her position. In this manner, a hierarchy 
can very quickly contain the undesired paradoxical effects of group 
and team structures.
In contrast to this, at Kontongo the hierarchical stop rule was only 
triggered close to the top. The employees spoke of a “broken organiza-
tion.” The production levels with the two team and group structures, 
building one upon the other, were strongly decentralized and got along 
with a very flat hierarchy, but the rest of the business organization 
continued to function according to strict, hierarchical principles. At 
the interface between the decentralized and the classical, hierarchical 
organization based on one-person leadership—which is to say, in the 
function of the production or plant manager—problems occurred that 
could not be decided using the team structures because there was no 
single person with clear responsibility. When decisions were time crit-
ical, the topics highly adversarial, and the team situations problematic, 
it could happen that, due to the late triggering of the hierarchical stop 
rule, problems stemming from the production and assembly groups 
were not solved until they reached the production management level.
We can speak of a paradox because the existence of two levels 
with group and team structures built one upon the other has the 
effect that decisions are reached in an even more centralistic manner 
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than if a classical master craftsmen structure were in place, where a 
master craftsman was able to shorten a decision-making process by 
referring to his hierarchical competencies. When groups are unable 
to regulate conflict through informal hierarchization, the division of 
labor, or by reaching a consensus, particularly in such pronounced 
decentralized structures, decisions are moved up to a higher level 
in the hierarchical pyramid. The outcome is that critical problems 
gather at one point in the organization, namely, a single individual, 
in a process that Henry Mintzberg (Mintzberg 1979, 385f.) refers 
to as “centralization.”
The Erosion of Decentralized Decision-Making Structures 
In summary, it can be said that in stress situations the establishment 
of group structures across two hierarchical levels can lead to an ero-
sion of the planned decentralization of decision-making processes. 
Organizational practice deviates from the intended and agreed-upon 
decentralized approach. It was striking that neither the members of 
the production and assembly groups, the members of the management 
group, or plant management appeared in principle to be interested 
in recentralizing decision-making competencies. Moving decisions 
upward when organizational stress situations arose was recognized by 
everyone affected as a procedure that increased complexity unneces-
sarily, but paradoxically was almost unpreventable.
One could view the deviation from the agreed-upon decentralized 
decision-making structures as a necessary and, for the organization, 
functional infraction of the rules. Infractions that are practiced in a 
contained manner can actually contribute to adherence to the regula-
tions because situations and contexts in which the rules do not appear 
to be applicable do not immediately result in delegitimization of the 
rules overall.
Under the circumstances described, however, the result appears to 
be a self-reinforcing circle where decentralized decision-making struc-
tures erode more and more. Deviations from the intended and agreed-
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upon rule that “decisions are to be made in groups” are so frequent 
that escalating problematic decisions up to a higher level increasingly 
threaten to become a dominant organizational practice. Because the 
hierarchy is flat, more and more decisions need to be reached by the 
plant manager who thereby becomes the eye of the needle for time 
critical and controversial decisions.
The following considerations will integrate the proposition as 
developed until now into two central threads of the decentralization 
discussion.
5.4 Variations on Centralized Decentralization:  
Consequences for the Discussion of  
New Forms of Organization
There are two discussion threads that are important for defining the 
observations that have been made. The first consists of the attempt 
to elaborate the simultaneity of decentralization and centralization 
strategies—rather than simply juxtaposing them—and thereby to 
define more precisely the proportions of the mixture of centralization 
and decentralization. The second discussion thread attempts to point 
out in greater detail the undesired ancillary consequences, paradoxi-
cal effects, and dilemmas that decentralization and dehierarchization 
efforts produce.
In the following, I would like to draw on the empirical results 
presented in the previous sections and the theoretical considerations I 
developed there. This will connect the two discussion threads which, 
until now, have tended to run parallel to one another. In the new 
post-bureaucratic forms of organizations, not only do identity con-
flicts, politicization problems, and explosions of complexity arise as 
undesired but unavoidable costs of a more flexible organizational 
structure, under certain circumstances decentralization strategies 
can actually accomplish the very opposite of what was originally 
intended. 
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Centralized Decentralization as a Management Strategy
The postmodern sounding replacement of the either-or principle with 
the as-well-as principle has also found its way into the management 
debate. Whereas it initially looked as if deciding between decentral-
ization or centralization involved the question of creating clearer, 
cleaner conditions in an organization, it is now increasingly argued 
that organizations pursue decentralization as well as centralization strat-
egies simultaneously. A number of studies on decentralization have 
defined more closely the apparently paradoxical relationship between 
centralization and decentralization, and it has been brought to light 
that management attempts to exploit the advantages of decentralized, 
self-organization, at the same time that it utilizes the synergy effects 
of centralized governance.
Alfred Kieser (Kieser 1994, 219f.) elaborated that it would be an 
illusion to believe that external organization would be dialed back for 
the purpose of promoting self-organization. Rather than making a blan-
ket assumption of “self-organization instead of external organization,” 
he suggests focusing greater attention on the “external organization of 
self-coordination and self-structuring.” This opens up the perspective 
that it is only external organization that makes self-coordination in 
decentralized units possible in the first place. Seen from different theo-
retical perspectives, various combinations of external organization and 
self-organization, that is, centralization and decentralization, suggest 
themselves.
An initial line of argumentation in the tradition of control theory 
points out that, contrary to post-Fordian assumptions, decentralization 
does not lead to a strengthening of small, autonomous units. Instead, 
control is concentrated to a much greater degree in the hands of a glob-
ally active company management. It is claimed that decentralization 
tends to shift the distribution of power in favor of the corporate central 
office, which can use new IT-based and target-oriented control mecha-
nisms to exert pressure on the decentralized units. With these strategies 
there is no longer any need to control specific individuals or processes. 
It is sufficient to exerting control over whether targets are met.
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A second line of discussion is informed by the theory of power 
and assumes that decentralization measures allow the leadership of an 
enterprise to gain greater influence because they enable managers to 
play one autonomous unit against the other. As a rule, independently 
operating profit centers have control over the important functional 
areas of production, purchasing, sales, quality assurance, construction, 
and personnel. Thus, they can be carved out of the overall organization 
without creating overwhelming complexity. This puts the corporation’s 
central office in a position to set the profit centers in competition to 
one another and divest them if they perform poorly. And since the 
performance evaluation criteria are defined largely by the central office 
itself, it also has a considerable say with respect to the decentralization 
of entrepreneurial competencies.
A third line of argumentation can be found in governance theory 
and is based on the possibility that the different units of an organization 
can be coupled to or de-coupled from one another to different degrees. 
For example, Henry Mintzberg (Mintzberg 1979, 385f.) argues that 
the introduction of profit center structures represents only a partial 
decentralization of a holding company. Whereas relationships between 
divisions can indeed be loose, relationships within the individual divi-
sions must be all the stronger because of their clear goal orientation. 
The introduction of divisionalization often has the effect that the indi-
vidual independent units develop greater internal centralization and 
formalization than they had as non-autonomous organizations. This 
then leads to greater cohesion in the holding company.
The variations in nuance and in the underlying theories not-
withstanding, all three lines of argumentation have in common the 
assumption that management deliberately links decentralization and 
centralization. It becomes clear that the emergence of the decentral-
ization/centralization paradox is primarily considered the outcome 
of a strategic management decision. Paradoxical formulations such 
as “controlled autonomy,” “externally managed self-organization,” or 
“centralized decentralization” already speak to the hypothesis that a 
specific combination of decentralization and centralization is the result 
of a management strategy.
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The value of research on the relationship of centralization and 
decentralization is that it differentiates the simplifying assumption 
of a wave-like alternation between these organizational strategies. It 
contrasts the frequently undifferentiated self-descriptions of reorgani-
zation projects as measures to promote “empowerment,” “self-organi-
zation,” and “intrapreneurship” with a more differentiated definition 
of the simultaneous occurrence of centralizing and decentralizing 
factors. 
The Paradoxical Effects, Ancillary Consequences,  
and Dilemmas of Decentralization
The discussion of the polarity between decentralization and cen-
tralization can profit through greater openness to more recent 
approaches which address undesirable, paradoxical side effects and 
dilemmas in organizations. For example, Nils Brunsson (Brunsson 
1989, 231f.) warned about assuming too close a connection between 
intentions and effects when analyzing organizations. While it is true 
that influential players propagate the idea that their strategies are log-
ical and rational, it is not a foregone conclusion that these goals will 
also be achieved. According to Brunsson, the structures, processes, 
and ideologies that are observed do not necessarily correspond with 
those that the organization itself or a management theory would 
like to achieve.
Focusing on unplanned ancillary consequences, paradoxical effects, 
and costs that were not taken into account has made it possible to iden-
tify in the new forms of organization the main problem areas to which 
management’s thinking on recentralization generally refer. Concepts 
such as “management overload,” a “company policy dilemma,” “sector 
egotism,” an “identity dilemma,” “Balkanization,” the “participation 
paradox,” a “politicization dilemma,” and a “complexity explosion” 
indicate that greater differentiation into partially autonomous, self-or-
ganizing units makes overall integration in organizations become not 
only increasingly necessary, but also increasingly difficult.
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Based on research conducted in organizations with leadership teams, 
it has now become possible to merge the discussion of simultaneous 
decentralization and centralization with that of undesirable ancillary 
consequences and paradoxical effects.
5.5 The Centralization of Decision-Making  
Competencies as an Undesired Side Effect  
of Decentralization 
Contrary to the intentions of management, systematic decentraliza-
tion produces the undesired side effect of a centralization of decision 
making. From this perspective, the resulting controlled autonomy, 
externally organized self-organization, or centralistic decentralization 
is an undesired outcome of the decentralization measures. The more 
strength Sisyphus exerts to roll the rock up the hill, the greater the 
momentum of the boulder as it crashes down again.
The new forms of business organization entail a specific, selective 
replacement of hierarchical management with coordination based on 
discursive agreement (see, among others, Sturdy/Wright/Wylie 2014). 
Whereas overall hierarchical management of the company is retained, the 
internal coordination of work units in the value-adding area is addressed 
primarily through discursive or consensual agreement. The goal is, as 
demonstrated above, to gain control over the undesired side effects of the 
hierarchy. Yet this does not need to result in a lessening of the hierarchy’s 
importance, as already indicated by Farson (Farson 1997, 22).
Instead, the hierarchy is restructured in such a way that it defines, 
restricts, and imposes time limits on the use of group and team struc-
tures (see, for example, the informative work of Hodgson 2004, 
McSweeney 2006, and Hodgson/Briand 2013). When levels with 
group structures and levels with one-person leadership alternate, it 
can have the effect that the two levels mutually keep one another in 
check to the degree that the undesired side effects of the two respective 
forms of organization can be mitigated. 
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Nevertheless, when a number of levels with team and group struc-
tures are connected in series, it can happen—particularly in crisis situ-
ations—that the hierarchy’s definition, restriction, and time limitation 
of group structures is not triggered until very late in the process. Then, 
in extreme cases, the structural problems of group work in the form of 
tedious decision-making processes, power struggles, and the diffusion 
of responsibility can proliferate for so long that they hit upon a hier-
archical level with one-person leadership. 
6.  
Failure as Success  
in Group Work Projects
“Changing the formal organization is sometimes the most effective 
way to influence the informal operating environment.”
David A. Nadler
In the literature on management, industrial sociology, work science, 
and organizational psychology, in terms of new forms of organization, 
no other topic has been discussed as intensively and comprehensively 
as group work. This broad interest arose because group work is viewed 
as the central measure taken to turn away from Taylorism and embrace 
more holistic forms of work organization. Models such as “post-Ford-
ism,” the “new production concepts,” and “operative decentralization” 
are based to a significant degree on the introduction of partially auton-
omous group work in the value-adding area of businesses.
In the meantime, the way group work functions has been described 
not only for key sectors such as the automotive, machine manufactur-
ing, electronics, and chemical industries, but also for service businesses, 
government agencies, and hospitals. The case studies presented until 
now have concentrated primarily on the introduction of group work 
or on the way it functions shortly thereafter.
The major shortcoming of this research is that it consists almost exclu-
sively of one-point studies. The status quo of work organization at a certain 
time is ascertained, and from that generalizable statements are derived. 
Longitudinal studies, multi-point studies, and re-evaluations of businesses 
are rare exceptions. On the one hand, this limitation is related to the short 
duration of the studies, while another explanation would be that research-
ers have committed themselves based on their previous publications. When 
researchers publish studies on group work, they commit themselves to 
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statements which can later be refuted if the business is re-evaluated. As a 
result, the literature almost exclusively reports successes using group work; 
reports of failures or miscarried attempts with group work are virtually 
nonexistent in the business press and in scientific literature.
This chapter examines three businesses in which earlier researchers 
have conducted important consulting projects and studies on decentral-
ization. In lectures and in print, these companies were (and in part still 
are) portrayed as organizations that pioneered decentralized structures. 
Yet while the public—which is primarily interested in the display side 
of organizations—has not registered it, two of the companies have in 
the interim altogether eliminated group work. The third is currently 
engaged in a process of recentralization and re-Taylorization.
In a midsized supplier to the automobile industry, which we will call 
Ladra, previously introduced customer and product-related production 
islands were dismantled and classical, process-oriented departments 
reintroduced. Indirect tasks such as personnel planning, order flow 
control, maintenance, and quality insurance which had initially been 
transferred to the competency of the islands, were once again consol-
idated into centralized departments. The group speakers were granted 
hierarchical authority. As the CEO put it, they once again “became a 
little bit like” department heads or shift leaders. According to the CEO, 
the entire business had now embarked on the road “back to the future.”
In another company, which numbers among the world’s leading 
machine manufacturing corporations, group work was allowed to tail 
off two years after it was introduced. In this company, which we will call 
Jamus, group work was based on weekly planning which was drawn up 
by the employees themselves in the production islands. Yet the job coor-
dination office, which was intended to feed assignments to the groups, 
was already jettisoned after less than a year. The weekly planning schedules 
were worth no more than wastepaper and had no further effect on man-
aging production. Rotation between jobs within the group, as practiced at 
the beginning of the group work endeavor, was halted. In the meantime, 
all of the employees once again have their set workplace. The offices of 
the group speakers have been abandoned. The little pool houses, where 
the groups’ coordination efforts were to take place, have been torn down. 
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Practically speaking, all that is left to bear witness to group work is the 
positioning of the machinery and the signage over the group areas. 
At a midsized supplier to the automobile and machine building 
industry, which we will call Keymac, a process of recentralization is 
now underway following a very extensive decentralization. According to 
the observations of production and assembly workers, group work had 
dropped off in several areas. As a first step, there were indications that 
team-oriented leadership was being dismantled in favor of person-focused 
leadership. In a newly founded field office, it appeared that players who 
made a case for a classical Taylorist structure had gained the upper hand.
As a reaction to these findings, one might reflexively assume that 
businesses are in a recentralization trend. After every wave of decen-
tralization, not only the business press, but also the fields of sociology 
and work science observe a trend toward re-Taylorization. For the 
automobile industry, which is often attributed a pioneering role in the 
implementation of new production concepts, the fact is then docu-
mented that attempts at partially autonomous group work have been 
rescinded in favor of more restrictive forms of work, and that forms of 
highly repetitive production line work with short cycle times become 
increasingly prevalent in the assembly areas.
Nevertheless, the debate over recentralization and re-Taylorization 
tendencies must not be limited to once again postulating a “return to 
old production concepts,” a “Renaissance of the old rationalization 
types,” “re- or neo-Fordism,” or a “new narrow-mindedness” in the 
wake of “new types of rationalization,” “post-Fordism,” or “new broad 
mindedness.” Rather, the findings pertaining to the rollback of group 
work should be used to expand the discussion of group work in the 
companies by selectively adding a perspective based on the theory of 
power, neo-institutionalism, or systems theory. A theoretical focus of 
this kind can complement the approaches of economics, work science, 
organizational psychology, and industrial sociology (and in part also 
challenge them to object). These approaches orient their interpretations 
of the new work forms primarily on criteria that supposedly can be 
objectively defined such as efficiency and productivity on one hand, 
and humanization of the workplace on the other.
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In the first part (6.1) I discuss the question of why this form of 
work has been phased out once again in spite of the positive eco-
nomic advantages seen in group work by management at the time 
and by the scientific researchers who facilitated it. Taking recourse 
to neo-institutionalist considerations, this section reconstructs that 
the efficiency or non-efficiency of group work is not an objectively 
definable parameter but rather a social construction of the respectively 
dominant coalition within the company. The second part (6.2) centers 
on the question of why employees offered hardly any resistance to the 
elimination of group work and in part actually welcomed it. By draw-
ing on micro-political considerations about infractions of rules and 
on a differentiation between conditional and goal programs, I show 
that group work limited employees’ ability to expand their sphere of 
influence; in part, they actually lost influence. Part three (6.3) explains 
why the concept of operative decentralization can be so easily eroded 
and why, once group work has been introduced, one finds hardly any 
structural inertia, no “lock ins,” and no path dependency. Here, there 
is a tendency in group work for conditional programs to be replaced by 
goal programs. The personnel factor gains importance. Goal programs 
and human resources decision programming are, however, subject to 
far less structural inertia, and therefore facilitate the erosion of group 
work. In the concluding part (6.4), I discuss whether one is justified 
at all in speaking of a general failure of the group work concept in the 
three companies examined, or whether it is not instead a question of 
group work projects failing successfully.
6.1 The Relativity of the Efficiency Argument  
in Group Work
There is a large amount of research pointing out that group work 
accomplishes a wide range of optimizations: the shortening of through-
put times, the reduction of unit costs and revolving stock, quality 
improvement, increased flexibility, decreased inventory, higher delivery 
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quality, and scheduling reliability. In spite of all the discussion about 
which instruments can be used to measure its effectiveness, group 
work overall is considered positive in an economic sense. The results 
of meta-analyses show that group work has a positive effect on bottom 
line productivity. From this, one could conclude that self-regulating 
work groups are in a better position than a production system based on 
Taylorist principles to adapt to changing internal and external demands 
and that all in all this form of work leads to greater productivity.8
According to the logic of these scientific studies, the descriptions 
of the introduction of group work prepared by participating managers 
of the three companies, as well as the reports of the accompanying 
researchers, read as economic success stories. At Ladra, the effects of 
group work were described with catchwords such as “increased effi-
ciency, lower overhead,” “significant savings on overhead,” “marked 
quality improvement and cost savings,” and “improvement of inter-
national competitiveness through cost-effective organization.” It was 
determined that revenue per hour worked increased by 50 percent in 
six years. At Jamus as well, the introduction of group work was judged 
as a success across the board. As an example, the positive development 
of revenue figures following the introduction of the new work form 
was viewed as a clear indication that desired effects such as a reduction 
of idle time and reworking had taken place. The production islands 
reduced production costs by up to 20 percent and decreased through-
put time by up to 50 percent. At Keymac, too, it was also assumed 
that group work increased efficiency.
In light of these positive and in part euphoric assessments, the 
questions in this area are obvious. For all the positive ratings by man-
agement as well as the accompanying scientific researchers with respect 
to productivity, adherence to schedule, throughput time, and quality, 
why was group work revoked? Did the productivity calculations reflect 
the “objective” situation in the businesses or were they constructed to 
legitimize the measures taken?
8 Rather than citing a multitude of individual studies, I refer here only to the early meta-anal-
ysis conducted by Beekun (Beekun 1989).
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The Relativity of the Efficiency Argument
The point of view that long dominated the discussion of group work 
is based on the premise that organizations have overarching goals 
(efficiency, humanization, etc.) which can be used to orient, evaluate, 
and sanction the behavior of employees. The rationality of the orga-
nization and therefore also the decision about potentially introducing 
group work are based on tough efficiency calculations. The implicit 
assumption is that the market situation and the overarching goals allow 
management to derive preferences and enable it to reach decisions 
between alternatives such as a Taylorist work form, restrictive group 
work, or partially autonomous value-adding islands. From this perspec-
tive, rationalizations are attempts to improve end-means relationships 
in organizations. According to this logic, to draw on a simile used by 
James March (March 1962, 669), organizations are like a tree that 
attempts to optimize its exposure to the sun; the growth of its leaves 
are subject to the tree’s optimization strategy.
From an instrumental-rational perspective there are, broadly speak-
ing, three approaches to explaining the elimination of group work. 
They already began to emerge in the 1970s as part of the discussion 
of the failed group work projects undertaken in various countries 
within the framework of programs to humanize the workplace. The 
first explanatory approach assumes that the framework conditions (the 
market, technology, logistics systems, the employee base, ownership 
structure, cross-company strategies, etc.) changed to such a degree 
that group work could no longer be seen as the most efficient form of 
work and was therefore abandoned. The second approach postulates a 
management learning process which, after phases of experimentation, 
measuring, and reflection, led to the insight that work forms other 
than partially autonomous group work offered greater advantages. The 
third explanation attempt is found frequently in group work literature 
and traces the problems that arise with group work, even though it is 
actually an economically superior concept, to avoidable factors such 
as “faulty design,” “a halfhearted approach,” employee ineptitude and 
ignorance, and egotistic interests. In that case, it is the reprehensible 
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“micro-political interventions” that undermine a concept which is 
intrinsically successful and economically sensible.
Systems theoretical research challenges the instrumental-rational 
view of organizations at the fundamental level. These approaches do not 
express doubt that organizations have purposes. The doubt is directed 
at whether purposes and the means chosen to achieve them can be 
used to explain organizations. It is pointed out that organizations have 
a multitude of contradictory goals and that goal setting consequently 
cannot be used as a point of departure for organizational analyses. 
Organizations have numerous units with a wide range of preferences, 
inclinations, and goals. Decisions are the results of conflicts and/or 
compromises between the various units. Seen in those terms, and once 
again referencing James G. March’s simile, organizations function like 
a tree where each individual leaf strives to catch the sunlight. Thus, 
the growth of the tree is merely the result of the conflicting interests 
of its leaves.
This theoretical approach opens up a new perspective on the dis-
cussion of efficiency, effectiveness, and profitability of group work. The 
limited rationality which serves as a basis for this theoretical concept 
also applies for profitability calculations that appear “hard” and “objec-
tive.” Particularly in light of the notoriously “turbulent and uncertain 
environment,” keeping framework conditions stable enough to allow 
an unequivocal attribution of effect to causes is possible only in excep-
tional cases. In a number of studies based on decision-making theory it 
has meanwhile been shown that there is a tendency in organizations to 
impute results even to situations that actually do not permit unequivo-
cal quantification, and subsequently to assign monetary value to them. 
As well, tools for determining efficiency and effectiveness are often 
used in situations where their application can be judged inappropriate.
Efficiency and effectiveness, according to this line of thinking, can 
no longer be understood as a goal to which all actions refer. Instead, 
with respect to group work, efficiency-, effectiveness-, and profitability 
calculations are internally formed constructs the organization uses to 
connect with the management concepts circulating in the environment. 
Here, it is not so much a question of the veracity of the profitability 
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calculations as the question of how the seemingly objective definition 
of efficiency and effectiveness “closes gaps,” while at the same time 
“rendering the improbable probable.” What matters is how and with 
what consequences the meaning generated by the calculations serves to 
orient and legitimize the actions of the players, and ultimately makes 
them appear necessary or unavoidable. 
Early on, Ulrike Berger (Berger 1988, 127) pointed out that proof 
of efficiency and effectiveness lends a coalition’s preferred alternative 
the appearance of being sound and economically rational, thereby 
increasing the chances that the preferred alternative will prevail. These 
calculations have the advantage that, compared to “softer” types of 
formal rationality, they use the hard “language of money.” Even though 
the “translations” are very free, in businesses they have the advantage 
of being the “language of the land” because in capitalism the survival 
of a business depends on its financial solvency. Berger comes to the 
conclusion that from this point of view economic rationality does not 
appear so much a computable and unequivocally definable allocation 
principle, but as a myth which under conditions of uncertainty can 
be helpful in legitimizing actions and decisions internally as well as to 
the outside world.
The Construction of Efficiency and Effectiveness  
and the Argument over the Power to Interpret Them
Multi-point research on organizations enables us to bring to light the 
social construction of efficiency and effectiveness by various coalitions. 
At least two different coalitions with partially opposing interests occu-
pied themselves with the profitability of group work in the companies 
examined. As a result, not only did significant discrepancies of eval-
uation arise, but the construction of the efficiency (or inefficiency) 
calculations of the different coalitions also came up for discussion.
In all three companies, Ladra, Jamus, and Keymac, economic cri-
sis situations were the initial reason for the introduction of partially 
autonomous group work. In two of the cases, the holding company 
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threatened to shut down, sell off, or relocate the subsidiary if man-
agement couldn’t get out of the red ink. In the third company, a crisis 
in the automobile industry put management under pressure to strike 
out in new directions. Under these circumstances, the object was to 
open up some maneuvering room, especially for the two businesses 
operating under holding companies. At Ladra, it was particularly the 
board of directors that was pushing for new forms of production. After 
the company was acquired by a major overseas corporation, Ladra’s 
board needed to prove to the new owner that it could gain control 
of its costs as well as its quality problems through new forms of work 
and production. At Jamus, management faced an ultimatum from the 
holding company: they could either get into the black within the next 
two years or the product line would be divested. The CEO initiated a 
change in the structure of the organization because referring to a sound, 
modern concept would not only enable him to obtain additional capital 
appropriations but also allow him to catch his breath.
From a neo-institutionalist perspective, it is not surprising that 
the companies oriented themselves on the current model of operative 
decentralization. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (DiMaggio/
Powell 1983) cite the mechanism of mimetic isomorphy as one of the 
reasons for the striking homogeneity of organizational forms across 
the boundaries of corporations. Particularly under conditions of great 
uncertainty, for example, in economic crises, when organizations cre-
ate structures they often draw on each other as models. They mimic 
the structures of organizations they either consider to be particularly 
successful, or those that play a central role in their environment, say, 
for their customers. 
As an illustration, when automotive manufacturers—which pioneer 
the introduction of new production concepts in many cases—intro-
duce group work, other smaller companies that supply them often 
quickly follow suit. Since automotive corporations represented the 
most important customer group for two of the three companies exam-
ined here, and the third business also kept a very watchful eye on 
developments in the automotive industry, group work played a central 
role in the decentralization strategies of the three companies. As the 
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corporate development officer at Keymac reported, “We introduced 
group work because the other people were doing it.
It didn’t matter what kind of catchphrases were on the market, our 
company participated.” And a member of the sector team in the same 
company stated, “Midsized firms react to passing fashions … group 
work started at Mercedes, with sermons about group work. So then, 
naturally, as a direct supplier to Mercedes, the midsized firm has to 
introduce group work, too. They’re not reacting out of conviction, 
they’re reacting to trends.”
Seminars, lectures, and conferences where current developments 
in key industries are reported play an important role in promulgating 
production concepts. Whereas the framework conditions of the hold-
ing companies played a central role for the two firms that were their 
subsidiaries, in the third, privately held company, much depended on 
the managing partner. “You have to think of it in very simple terms,” 
the accompanying researcher at Keymac reported. “The business owner 
goes to conventions and hears presentations by professors who are 
saying that sector organization is important. So, then he says to the 
professor, aha, then why don’t you introduce it at my firm … And then 
he (the professorial consultant) holds two or three events, and that 
costs a little money, and then he sends in his employees and they do 
a little of this and that, and then they say, ‘OK, now you have sector 
organization.’”
Particularly in recent years, the neo-institutionalists have been dis-
cussing the danger that researchers base their assumptions on overly 
socialized behavior in organizations and have been neglecting inten-
tional actions. Members of an organization then appear as nothing 
more than victims of socially legitimized expectations who are trapped 
in a “iron cage.” The three firms under examination showed that reor-
ganization processes in businesses do indeed orient themselves toward 
dominant models in their organizational environment, but that it 
required a coalition of company management and the personnel depart-
ment, the employee representatives, and the accompanying external 
researchers to make reorganization possible within the framework of a 
dominant model. Even though all of the players espoused the rhetoric 
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of buying into “saving the company,” there were a large number of 
individual rationalities that led to the formation of coalitions.
As an example, the introduction of group work, and in particular the 
high visibility the company gained because of it, meant a significantly 
improved career outlook for executives. As the head of the employee 
organization at Ladra described it, just before the company’s poor 
economic condition became known the director of human resources, 
highlighting his experience with group work, switched to a different 
company. The head of human resources for the entire concern, who had 
facilitated the introduction of the new forms of business organization, 
went into business for himself as a group work consultant and acquired 
his first assignments by pointing to his success at his previous company. 
In all three businesses, management entered into a coalition with 
the employee organization which assumed a type of co-management 
role in the introduction of group work. The employee representatives at 
Jamus emphasized that they had been “strongly involved in the project” 
at the time and had become a “close partner” of company management. 
In fact, the employee organization had still continued to “push when 
company management had already begun to slack off. It was still our 
baby, too.” At Ladra, the employee representative likewise sided with 
management and distanced himself from union headquarters which 
at the time was still taking a critical stance toward group work. “Our 
first works council agreement was a huge slash at the union line … 
And that’s also why we threw the union out of here … We just started 
doing group work on our own … You can imagine how incredibly 
hard the unions came down on me for that.” And at Keymac as well, 
“Close cooperation between management and the employee organi-
zation played an important role in the introduction of group work.”
The third players in this coalition were the accompanying external 
researchers. In one case, the introduction of group work was facilitated 
by a semi-governmental research institute, which urgently needed the 
undertaking as a reference project. The institute used the group work 
project to advertise in its informational brochures on teambuilding, 
process analysis, and qualification guidelines, and invited managers 
from other businesses to participate. The CEO explained, “They carried 
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the concept to the outside world so they could make other companies 
enthusiastic about it.” The second group work project was accompanied 
by a work science research institute whose employees had made a name 
for themselves as group work experts. In the third business, a researcher 
in work science conducted a long-term study on group work.
From the perspective of current management in two of the three 
businesses examined, the dominant coalition of group work advocates 
used its strong hand at the time to determine in which groups, using 
which tools, and at which intervals profitability calculations would be 
undertaken, and how the data were to be interpreted. As a result, the 
evaluation of group work was artificially positive.
As a first piece of documentation, new management cited the fact 
that the profitability calculations were strongly based on experiences 
with pilot islands. All three companies experimented with pilot islands, 
and the supposedly positive experiences were used to justify further 
expansion of the group work models. From where the current CEO of 
one company stands, a deliberate decision was made to select a pilot 
island that would support the advantages of group work. Company 
management at the time chose an area that was “down and out.” Sub-
sequently, a group with the best people was set up to manufacture a 
product that was in relatively constant demand over the course of the 
entire year.
A second piece of evidence was that productivity gains were 
attributed to the introduction of group work, even though the attri-
bution clearly had feet of clay. For example, in its external presentation 
one of the companies pointed out that the introduction of group work 
brought about visible productivity gains. Internally, meanwhile, the 
difficulty of defining productivity gains was being discussed. As the 
head of production at Keymac remarked, “I do not feel confident 
making a statement about how much of the productivity gains can be 
attributed to group work. I think we did achieve an increase, but it 
can’t be measured.” Thus, it was not possible to determine analytically 
the extent to which the construction of assembly lines (the reduction 
of buffers) and the introduction of group work respectively contributed 
to productivity gains.
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The erosion of group work and an increasingly critical stance on 
the profitability of decentralized organizational structures were closely 
related to the collapse of the coalitions of those who advocated it. Partic-
ularly in businesses that worked with the automobile industry, it became 
apparent that group work in its partially autonomous form was no lon-
ger necessarily en vogue. For that reason, pressure to introduce partially 
autonomous groups also decreased on supplier companies. One of the 
master craftsmen at Keymac stated, “Now the coming trend … is that 
Mercedes, BMW, and Opel are moving away from it. And in the USA, 
entirely different things are going on. So, I’m convinced that it won’t 
take long here either before we have disciplinary superiors in the group 
and in the sector team.” An employee from the company’s production 
department told us, “The development has already happened. BMW, 
Mercedes, Opel, they don’t have self-governing groups anymore. The 
only way it works is with a manager. It’ll happen faster than we think. In 
less than three years you won’t find a single group anymore that doesn’t 
have that manager, a direct superior. I’m totally sure of it.” 
Particularly in the two companies where we not only saw a silent 
erosion of group work but later also conscious strategic decisions to 
recentralize, the elimination of group work was justified through a lack 
of efficiency and profitability. The CEO of one firm explained, “You 
can kid yourself for a long time, but when you can document that 
productivity … is heading south, then you have to change things.” 
And yet, paradoxically, the reasons the companies cited in support of 
recentralization were the very ones that had been used to justify the 
introduction of group work. In one firm, for example, it was pointed 
out that if incoming orders remained constant the customer-specific 
groups worked at capacity, and rationalization gains could be achieved. 
When incoming orders fluctuated, however, serious problems arose 
because the groups experienced phases of underutilization. In another 
company, it was argued that the employees involved in group work 
frequently developed specialization in one specific task. It was only 
the recentralized structure and the strengthening of the master crafts-
man level that put the first management echelon in a position to urge 
employees to work at different machines more often.
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A Perspective: The Deconstruction of Efficiency Definitions
The assumption of the companies’ new management that classi-
cal process-oriented work organization is more efficient than group 
work is likewise a social construction that is based on simplifications 
and attributions that can be problematized. Yet it is more difficult to 
demonstrate the way this assumption is constructed because it currently 
represents the dominant perspective. It is only the former promoters 
of group work in the businesses who question the efficiency measures 
new management is taking. They attempt to prove that the profitability 
calculations used to document the superiority of process-oriented pro-
duction methods rest on dubious premises and serve only to legitimize 
centralistic reorganization projects.
The promoters as well as the opponents of group work systems 
are not entirely at liberty in the social construction of efficiency and 
effectiveness calculations. The principle of financial reproduction is a 
structural factor that cannot be arbitrarily deceived. Nevertheless—and 
this is the central difference in the approaches of the advocates com-
pared to the opponents of group work—the profitability principle is 
not the “autonomous primal source” from which alone all economic 
and strategic action must be derived. Efficiency, effectiveness, and prof-
itability are initially no more than empty phrases that need to be filled 
with content and brought to life by the players who allegedly derive 
their actions from them.
6.2 The Humanization Argument with a  
Dash of Power Theory: Group Work as an  
Employee Barter Exchange
The dominant group work thread in the literature emphasizes that 
group work not only provides efficiency advantages for organizations 
but additionally achieves greater employee satisfaction with their jobs. 
Studies conducted in the framework of the Scandinavian “Quality 
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of Worklife” program (Lattmann 1972, 54) established early on that 
group work increased productivity, but that employees also found their 
activities more interesting and richer in variety than the jobs they 
previously performed by themselves. Later research as well was based 
on the overall assumption that moderate to highly autonomous group 
work had a beneficial effect over the mid to long term on motivation, 
the employees’ attitude toward the business, and social and cognitive 
attendance (Weber 1997, 41ff.). Thus, the majority of scientific studies 
support the argumentation that is well-established in management 
literature and in practice, namely, that the new work structures bring 
about win-win situations that connect productivity improvement with 
humane job design. It is said that company leaders profit from greater 
efficiency and employee motivation, while employees are assigned 
interesting tasks and have an opportunity to participate directly in 
structuring their work environment.
There are only isolated reports of employee resistance to the intro-
duction of group work. Such resistance is generally explained merely as 
employees’ “defensive routines.” Particularly employees who previously 
performed narrowly defined tasks are said to doubt whether their quali-
fications are adequate for the holistic approach in group work and resist 
taking on new activities. The literature, which is often normatively 
charged, points out that the problems with defensive employees are 
not structural in nature and can be remedied by informing employees 
at an early stage, including them in the design process, by qualifying 
those who are not team material, and creating corresponding positions 
for them. Resistance, conflict, confrontations and in some cases stag-
nation are said to be normal during the introduction phase, but as the 
process unfolds they supposedly subside in light of the benefits group 
work provides for employees.
In the companies examined, the advocates of group work assessed 
this form of work organization as beneficial and meaningful for 
employees. At Ladra, for example, it was said that the humanization 
of the work environment was an additional goal of everyone involved. 
As the company’s former employee spokesperson put it, “The fact that 
employees could become involved was initially a positive thing for 
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everybody.” In two of the businesses, this assessment was largely shared 
by the accompanying scientific researchers as well.
The hope that group work would lead to a humanization of the 
workplace and strengthen the position of employees was also a rea-
son why the unions, after some initial skepticism, particularly at 
Jamus and Keymac, supported the initiatives. As an example, while 
visiting one of the companies a board member of a major regional 
labor union announced that “the philosophy behind order-driven 
production islands and the associated concept of production plan-
ning and control are very interesting.” They represented, he stated, 
“a very positive example” and a “step toward the humanization of 
the workplace” and had a “certain role model character.” The union 
leader concluded with, “We will be making the pilgrimage here fre-
quently in the future.”
Given the positive assessment of the humanization effects by man-
agement, the accompanying researchers, and the labor unions, it is 
surprising that the employees did not block or prevent the rollback of 
group work in a company which, according to the CEO, had actu-
ally responded “very positively.” The lack of resistance is surprising 
because industrial sociology, with its interest in political constellations 
of action, points out how difficult it is to dismantle institutionalized 
influence and power structures. The argument is that the established 
power structures have the tendency to resist change because any reor-
ganization could throw the unstable balance of power in a company 
into confusion.
An examination of the humanization argument involves a series of 
power theory-oriented research questions. Why is it that employees 
do not resist the revocation of group work, even though the litera-
ture alleges that this form of work organization allows them to gain 
influence? Which new zones of uncertainty do employees control in 
partially autonomous group work; which do they lose compared to a 
classical Taylorist structure? How does the transition from tasks based 
on detailed instructions to leadership through target agreements influ-
ence the distribution of power? 
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The Hybrid Character of Power,  
and Skepticism about Group Work 
Employees who can assert their will over others command a central 
source of power based on their control of zones of uncertainty with 
respect to competencies, contacts in the environment, or authority. 
There is no doubt that an employee with hierarchical authority, who 
enjoys a privileged relationship with important customers, and addi-
tionally numbers among the few people who control a complicated 
production planning system, has good chances of asserting her interests. 
Another, often overlooked source of power lies in the discrepancy 
between players’ actual opportunities for action and the officially for-
mulated actions required of them. In micro-political games, opportu-
nities to act become particularly valuable when the actions cannot be 
enforced through directives, regulations, or job descriptions, but are 
instead performed as “voluntary,” informal barters that must be repaid 
at a later time. 
This point is key in terms of the lack of employee resistance against 
the elimination of group work. Organizational theory assumed that the 
success of organizations in modern society is based on the existence of 
an elaborate set of regulations that coordinate and control organiza-
tional processes, and that the members of organizations also abide by 
them. Meanwhile, empirical research beginning as early as the middle 
of the 20th century has shown that there is a large discrepancy between 
the blueprints of an organization and the way operations unfold in 
reality. It was ascertained that the goal of an organization cannot be 
to reduce deviations from formal structures to the greatest degree pos-
sible. On the contrary, the way an organization functions depends 
significantly on the acceptance of deviations from formal structures. 
Working by the book would cause any organization to break down. It 
would collapse under its own rigidity.
This is where we encounter the “paradox of the organigram.” Offi-
cial structures and formal regulations cause problems because they 
cannot be adapted to all the demands of day-to-day operations and 
therefore cannot (or are not permitted to) prevent deviations. Rules 
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that are actually intended to reduce uncertainty in an organization 
necessitate daily infractions which, in turn, introduce new uncertainty. 
Although regulations supply fixed points that can be used to orient 
decisions, this is counteracted by the fact that deviations from these 
rules must always be taken into consideration as well. In practice, 
an organization’s rules must be applied in a way that adapts them to 
respective situations but also permits deviation from the rules without 
rendering them completely inoperative.
There are good reasons why such functional deviations relating to 
the entire organization cannot be programmed in the form of “explicit 
deviation instructions.” Frequently, the exceptions cannot be defined in 
advance with such precision that they can be adapted to the sequence 
of events in the form of rules. In part, instructions for deviation that 
are too explicit would be detrimental to the earnestness of the basic 
regulations. For that reason, tacit acceptance of deviations is prefera-
ble. Also, in some instances formulating deviation rules would require 
mobilizing a large number of quarreling organizational entities, making 
it appear unlikely that a deviation rule would be formulated officially 
(Luhmann 2000, 265).
A willingness to deviate from rules when “it is in the interest of 
the organization” has always been implicitly required of employees. 
Nevertheless, it cannot—and herein lies the peculiarity—be enforced 
through the formal sanctioning options of the hierarchy. And it is this 
very discrepancy between officially stipulated obligations and actually 
expected job requirements that can serve as a source of power and 
influence, even for employees at low levels of the hierarchy. Important 
resources are created which are traded on the organization’s barter 
exchanges. The possibility (and necessity) of controlling the perfor-
mance of one’s job independently and the functional redefinition of 
duties, as already indicated in the 1960s by David Mechanic (Mechanic 
1962), provide de facto opportunities to exert influence for employees 
who are supposedly powerless.
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The Threat of Employees Losing Power through  
the Transition from Conditional to Goal Grogramming
My proposition is that a partial rearrangement in the programs curtails 
the sphere of influence of employees in the organization’s value-adding 
core. Organizations use programs to create criteria that can be used to 
make statements about the correctness of decisions. Decision-making 
programs presuppose that compliance or lack of compliance with them 
can always be discerned. Yet that does not mean they have to be defined 
in detail. Demanding that someone “See to it that the unit ultimately 
generates at least a 10 percent return on sales” can be understood, the 
lack of precision notwithstanding, as an action guiding decision-mak-
ing program.
James G. March and Herbert Simon (March/Simon 1958, 164ff.) 
differentiate between two types of programs: conditional programs and 
goal programs. Conditional programs are “if-then programs” that prescribe 
certain ways in which the members of an organization must behave in 
response to a previously defined stimulus. If the stimulus occurs, it is 
expected that a stipulated sequence of actions will be set in motion. As an 
example, in assembly line production the receipt of a previously specified 
part is the stimulus for the initiation of formalized and codified sequences 
of action. Conditional programs do not require that players seek solutions 
of their own. Such programs create a high degree of predictability (or at 
least an illusion thereof) because they are designed for repetition over the 
long term and can produce consistent decision-making behavior when 
similar stimuli occur (Luhmann 1969, 130).
Goal programs, in contrast, are geared to desired effects. They merely 
specify goals. Members of the organization are expected, while tak-
ing secondary conditions into consideration, to find the appropriate 
means to accomplish their goals. Goal programs require only that a 
certain amount of work be accomplished; it is left up to the employees 
themselves which means they use to accomplish the assignment. Com-
pared to conditional programs, goal programs are more future oriented 
because they do not determine in advance which means must be used 
to react to a given impulse (Luhmann 2000, 256ff.).
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Organizations always resort to both kinds of programs, but the 
program types are also combined with one another in different ways 
depending on environmental conditions, management strategies, or 
work organization. When group work is introduced, a selective tran-
sition from conditional programs to goal programs takes place in the 
coordination of work in the value-adding core. Putting it in the lan-
guage of the practitioners, the shift could be aptly summed up as, 
“They don’t tell us how to do our jobs anymore; they just say what 
kind of results they want.” Yet the only thing that matters, as they say, 
is the bottom line.
The transition from conditional to goal programming is most obvi-
ous in management by objectives. When the changeover to group 
work took place in the three companies discussed, employees were no 
longer required to follow strict routines, but only to meet the goals 
that had been set at the beginning of the week, month, or year. As an 
example, in one company at the beginning of every week a pool of 
orders was determined in a consultation between the order planning 
department and the group. Over the following days, the group had to 
work through the orders. Internal coordination, the choice of technical 
means, and the amount of time required to accomplish the goal, within 
the framework of the work assigned, were left to the discretion of the 
group. Goal programming has an effect on quality management as 
well. With conditional programming, the potential for optimization is 
achieved to a large degree through the company improvement system, 
and the often technically based routines and regulations are changed 
accordingly. When the transition to goal programming takes place, the 
centrally directed optimization measures apply only to the interfaces 
between the groups. In contrast, the improvement of internal group 
work processes—in other words, the optimization of the means—is left 
up to the groups and is no longer necessarily standardized and formal-
ized. This means that in the framework of continuous improvement 
processes groups are literally expected to deviate from the rules, and 
the deviations are no longer even registered by their superiors.
But how does the distribution of power in the organization change 
through the transition from conditional to goal programs? One’s first 
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impression might be that the influence of the employees in groups 
and assembly islands increases. They take over zones of uncertainty 
that were previously controlled by master craftsmen or the opera-
tion planning, order planning, quality assurance, and construction 
departments. In the companies examined, however, the members of 
the groups adopted a somewhat ambivalent attitude in this question. 
At Ladra, it was noted that the tasks of the groups were not expanded 
to such a degree that the employees would have been able to assume 
a position of greater power. At Jamus, where specialized production 
workers wielded influence even under the traditional conditions due to 
the complexity of their jobs, simplified processes were indeed observed 
in the very beginning but an overall expansion of the groups’ sphere 
of influence was not reported. At Keymac, particularly the groups in 
mechanical production with experienced technicians balked at group 
work because they saw no advantage for themselves.
The reason for this skepticism toward group work is that employees’ 
opportunities for action are more pronounced with conditional pro-
grams than would appear at first glance. It is correct that conditional 
programs provide a good defense for management against employees 
refusing to cooperate because refusal is immediately obvious. Yet con-
ditional programs also offer protection for employees because they 
represent secure roles for the people involved. The very fact that with 
conditional programs everything that is not permitted is forbidden 
makes it possible for employees to evade what is required of them. 
Everyone knows what to expect and what they are permitted and not 
permitted to do. This offers protection from the whims of the powerful 
in the organization because employees can always fall back on following 
the rules correctly and are absolved of unlimited responsibility and 
risky decisions.
Employees were able to selectively play deviations from these pro-
grams and the associated forfeiture of such protection as a trump card 
when trading on internal power exchanges. Thus, the highly elaborate 
rules, detailed instructions, bureaucratic regulations, and precisely spec-
ified working hours represented more than just restrictions for employ-
ees; in addition, they always served as negotiating points with superiors 
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when deviations from the rules became necessary. In my opinion, the 
explanation for the lack of employee interest in group work, or their 
interest in seeing it rolled back, is that at the bottom line the introduction 
of group work did not increase employees’ actual influence. Granted, 
employees were given greater control over customer contacts, but the 
introduction of new work-time models and target orientation caused 
them to lose negotiating power with management. Lost as bargaining 
chips in negotiations with company leadership, was the possibility and 
willingness of employees to stay on the job beyond the defined core time 
or to deviate from stipulated work processes. It also became impossible 
to receive compensation in the form of perks in other areas for pointing 
out errors in the program. Likewise, shirking responsibility was no longer 
possible in the same form, because there were now globally set targets. 
Applying this to a famous example from the tobacco industry that 
was presented by sociologists Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedberg 
(Crozier/ Friedberg 1977), the sole reason the maintenance work-
ers were so powerful was because they were (or had to be) managed 
through conditional and not goal programs. The maintenance workers 
received instructions that if the stimulus “a machine stops working” 
occurs, then they were to initiate the necessary courses of action. The 
game the maintenance workers played consisted of allowing so many 
problems to arise in the machines that maintenance was perceived as 
a crucial source of uncertainty in the company, while the maintenance 
workers themselves could not be accused of unprofessionalism. If pro-
gramming at this point had been changed from conditional to goal 
programming—for example, an annual rate of 98 percent machine 
availability—the maintenance workers would have gained greater 
authority in organizing their work, but they would no longer have 
been able to control the zones of uncertainty in the same form. 
An examination of the hybrid character of power could provide 
an explanation for why the introduction of group work is frequently 
viewed with skepticism, particularly by technicians in the production 
area. The difficulty of standardizing production tasks and the techni-
cians’ skill in dealing with them gives technicians in Taylorist work 
structures a considerable amount of informal influence. Studies of 
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production units in machine construction companies that are organized 
along Taylorist lines were able to demonstrate that technicians gain 
influence by declaring themselves willing to take a flexible approach 
to rigid instructions in order to guarantee the on-time delivery of 
machinery—even though their instructions would not oblige them to 
adopt a goal program orientation. Yet when group work is introduced, 
goal programs obligate them to be flexible, subject to order flow, and 
to complete products on schedule. They face the threat of losing the 
informal flexibility bonus they previously enjoyed. 
To sharpen the argument: the main thrust of group work research 
proceeds from the assumption (and with good reason) that employee 
resistance becomes particularly virulent in businesses where the form 
of group work introduced is restrictive, structurally conservative, or 
implemented in a halfhearted way. Yet based on the perspective devel-
oped in this chapter, we can conclude that, especially in the partially 
autonomous, structurally innovative, and enthusiastically implemented 
version of group work, a goal programming-based target agreement 
system causes employees to forfeit their previous ability to play the 
trump card of “informal flexibility.” Therefore, in terms of power, 
group work only appears to be attractive for players in production 
and assembly units when it expands their formal options for action but 
does not overly erode the informal power potential they gain through 
their willingness to functionally deviate from the rules. When there is 
a changeover from conditional to goal programming, however, this is 
obviously the exception rather than the rule.
6.3 The Missing Lock-In:  
The Erosion of Group Work
One of the central questions is why Taylorist production methods based 
on the division of labor are capable of such persistence, and why it is so 
difficult for partially autonomous group work to establish itself as an 
alternative rationalization concept. In general, it is pointed out that the 
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current rationalization strategies run up against rationality patterns in 
the form of tried-and-true techniques and ingrained routines that have 
evolved over many years. The past has shown these Taylorist rationality 
patterns to be reliable, and they therefore prove resistant to changes 
undertaken in the direction of more holistic forms of work. 
This line of thinking is similar to the approaches in organizational 
theory that occupy themselves with the question of why organiza-
tions are so resistant to attempts to change them. Expressions such as 
“organizational inertia” (Hannan/Freeman 1977), “defensive routines” 
(Argyris 1985), “functional conservatism” (Child/Ganter/Kieser 1987), 
“deadlocks” (Brunsson 1989), “lock-ins” (Grabher 1993), and “path 
dependence” (David 1986) are used to point out that current decisions 
are always based on decisions made in the past, thereby restricting the 
opportunities to act.
The negative connotation of concepts such as inertia, lock-ins, or 
defensive routines notwithstanding, these approaches toy with a central 
ambivalence of organizations. The definition of rules and procedures 
is necessary because it is only through this that consistent perception 
and action become possible. Yet there is always the danger that the 
members of the organization content themselves with such definitions. 
The basic idea is that for employees, routine patterns of action relieve 
the pressure of undertaking constant reinterpretations. In that sense, 
they are functional for the organization. But they also cause organiza-
tions to become snared in proven patterns of behavior and therefore 
unreceptive to changes in the environment.
An approach that seems obvious but yields at best limited new 
insight would be to explain complaints over the persistence of Taylorist 
production methods through organization theoretical considerations 
on structural inertia, lock-ins, or path dependency. This leads to the 
conclusion that the path of Taylorist production methods based on the 
division of labor has been drawn so narrowly that new approaches can 
only establish themselves with difficulty, if at all.
This dominant perspective treats the topic of group work as if it had 
never fully established itself, and its promoters were still laboriously 
working their way through the established paths and defensive routines 
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of the old form of organization. It is pointed out that group work was 
never introduced in the entire company, that the framework condi-
tions such as remuneration for working hours were not adjusted, and 
as a result only “islands of group work” formed that were threatened 
by existing “classical” forms of work. Group work problems are then 
primarily cast as problems encountered with its introduction and not 
as the structural difficulties of a decentralized form of organization.
In this chapter, I would like to rephrase the question: why is it that 
production methods based on partially autonomous group work have 
such difficulty establishing themselves as a dominant path and, in 
contrast to Taylorist production methods, do not present themselves 
as lock-ins? What explains the relapses into Taylorist forms of work 
even though, according to the concept of decision-making corridors, 
in reforms there is (almost) no way back.
Reversing the direction of the questions seems sensible for two 
reasons. First, it allows us to trace the difficulties of establishing group 
work to structural characteristics of this production concept and not 
have to explain it exclusively through a lack of commitment on the 
part of company management, resistance at the middle management 
level, or technical errors. Second, it allows us to add to the discussion 
of structural inertia, lock-ins, and path dependency the question of 
why certain forms of organization do not present themselves (or only 
to a very limited degree) as defining a decision-making corridor.
Conditional Programs, Technization, and Lock-Ins
The concepts of lock-ins and path dependency stem from American 
technology research and were subsequently generalized for application 
to organizational phenomena. The basic idea of a lock-in and path 
dependency is that it is not respectively the most efficient organiza-
tional solution that prevails, but that current decisions are bound to a 
corridor or path by decisions that were made previously. The QWERTY 
keyboard design, to draw on a hackneyed example of a lock-in, repre-
sented the most sensible arrangement of the letters at the time it was 
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introduced in the middle of the 19th century because this suboptimal 
arrangement of the keys alone was able to decrease the speed of typists 
and thereby prevent the type bars from jamming. Today, with com-
puters and optimized typewriters, sticking type bars no longer pose 
a problem, but although an ergonomically more efficient keyboard 
arrangement would be appropriate, no change is taking place because 
the investment in learning to use a new keyboard would be too great 
(David 1985).
The central question is one that organizational sociology has left 
aside until now: to what extent can this description, which is so plausi-
ble for technical processes, be generalized to include processes in orga-
nizations overall? The inner structure of a technical machine involves 
an extreme form of conditional programming. Causes and effects are 
determined simultaneously. Because of the tight linkage between cause 
and effect, processes occur quasi automatically and are no longer inter-
rupted by decisions. In a technical process an input is differentiated 
solely according to its condition of absolute identity or absolute dif-
ference, and in accordance with that a previously defined process is 
either set in motion or not. Social systems, too, as Luhmann (Luhmann 
2000, 263/370) importantly added, can function very similarly to such 
technical machines, as long as the individuals involved are asked only 
to perform routine tasks and not to make decisions.
Technologies lead to strong path dependency because conditional 
programming relies on precise elaboration of if-then definitions, and 
such relationships are difficult to unwind. Technologies are character-
ized by interdependencies that depend on a frictionless meshing of the 
individual elements. If parts of a conditional program are changed, 
then, because of the tight connections, the other elements are auto-
matically affected as well. Since interventions into the way an organi-
zation functions entail highly critical calculations that are extremely 
difficult to make, when systems based on conditional programming 
are involved, one often encounters the maximum, “Never touch a 
running system.”
There is a structurally built-in mechanism in conditional programs 
that leads to self-stabilization of the program structure. For example, 
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the use of a technology—due to the associated investment in produc-
tion planning systems, machines, and personnel training—increases 
the probability that this technology will continue to be pursued. The 
investments in production planning systems, machines, and training 
the personnel who will be brought into line with the conditional pro-
grams represent “sunk costs” that limit the possibilities for change in 
an organization (Hannan/Freeman 1977, 931f.).
Turning away from Taylorist production concepts is difficult 
because it is a type of organization that is strongly based on condi-
tional programs that manifest as formalized work processes, technol-
ogies (assembly-line production), production planning systems that 
are programmed in detail, and job descriptions. The great significance 
of conditional programs for Taylorist concepts makes this form of 
organization difficult to change because the “sunk costs” entailed are 
very high.
As portrayed in the previous section, introducing group work causes 
an easing of conditional programs as well as a partial transition to goal 
programs, and this shift appears to have an effect on the stability of 
group work.
The Decision-Making Premise Model and the Increased  
Importance of Personnel in Group Work
What structural changes take place in an organization when group 
work is introduced, and how do these structural changes relate to the 
ease with which group work can be eroded? 
First suggested by Herbert A. Simon and later developed by Niklas 
Luhmann, the model of decision-making premises puts us in a posi-
tion to analyze organizational structures without slipping into the 
static understanding of organizations seen in structural functionalism. 
According to Luhmann’s basic thinking, decision-making premises 
guarantee that decisions in an organization reference one another in 
the first place and thereby ensure the organization’s ability to reproduce. 
The three types of premises, namely, conditional and goal programs 
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(for example, assembly-line production or management by objectives), 
the organization of competencies and communication channels (for 
example, hierarchies), and personnel (for example, hiring lawyers exclu-
sively) limit the space of contingency of decisions that can be expected. 
A production line increases the probability that an automobile will be 
assembled on a conveyor belt and the body panels will not be randomly 
shuffled across the factory floor. Hierarchies and co-signing authority 
define competencies and communication channels and prevent every-
one from making (or having to make) decisions on every matter. Hiring 
lawyers increases the likelihood that problems will be resolved in court 
rather than through mutual agreement. 
Luhmann (Luhmann 2000, 222ff.) pointed out that the three 
types of decision-making premises represent functional equivalents 
and thereby create a basis for a change-oriented understanding of 
structures. The three kinds of decision-making premises are mutu-
ally interchangeable. If an organization places less value on qualified 
personnel, then it is to be expected that there will be an increase in 
the demands placed on the quality of the decision-making programs 
and the organization of communication channels. If hierarchies are 
flattened, pressure increases for personnel to be better qualified or for 
the programs to be more accurately designed. 
The introduction of group work as an organizational concept 
represents a particular challenge because a reduction of conditional 
programming and the number of hierarchical levels goes hand-in-
hand with a reduction in importance of two proven types of premises, 
namely, conditional programs and the organization of communication 
channels and competencies in the form of hierarchies. As a result, the 
decision-making premise of personnel gains importance. Research on 
public administrations has already ascertained that when rigid condi-
tional programs are canceled and there is a shift of emphasis to rel-
atively open goal programs, the personal characteristics, professional 
orientations, and decision-making styles of executives have a stronger 
effect (Koch 1993). In the companies described above, a parallel devel-
opment could be observed. After the introduction of group work, the 
players involved emphasized the increased importance of personnel. In 
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the company where elements of group work could still be observed, a 
particular increase in the importance of the personnel premise type was 
recorded: an employee survey conducted by the personnel department 
drew particular attention to the increased importance of the personnel 
factor after the introduction of group work.
The Problems with the Personnel Decision-Making Premise
In my view, the central importance of the personnel decision-making 
premise is the reason that group work can slowly (and sometimes in 
the absence of a formal decision) erode to the point where this form of 
organization is rescinded. At Jamus, a leading advocate of group work 
emphasized that initially there was no formal decision pertaining to 
the cancellation of group work. According to the company’s former 
employee representative, “It happened very quietly, it was just rolled 
back a little bit.” At Ladra, likewise, there was no formal decision on 
canceling group work; the rehierarchization was subtle. The group 
speakers, who had assumed a strong position in the company as coor-
dinators and had also received privileges and financial perks, had, in 
the words of the CEO, “gradually morphed into master craftsman.” 
And at Keymac as well, it was observed that group work was silently 
allowed to lapse. In some production and assembly units, the groups 
no longer elected speakers, group discussions no longer took place, and 
a strategy of successfully “muddling through” was adopted.
How are the personnel factor and the erosion of group work related? 
The sociological discussion of organizational learning and knowledge 
management has implicitly drawn attention to the weakness of this 
decision premise. It has been pointed out that while learning in indi-
viduals, particularly among top executives, represents an important 
resource for an organization, it is even more important to create an 
organizational memory for what has been learned. The problem with 
individual learning is that it is difficult to translate experience into 
business routines, and when individuals leave the organization, the 
knowledge is lost (Hedberg 1981).
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The “personnel paradox” consists of this: individuals themselves 
are difficult to change, and forms of organization that rest heavily on 
the personnel decision premise are very unstable. Due to the circular 
interaction of internal and external perception of the self, it is difficult 
to change a specific member of a company, if the person can be changed 
at all. Many personnel development measures fizzle because employees 
resist being changed as individuals. If suitable staffing has resulted in 
a functioning team, changing its composition can cause big problems 
because programs and hierarchies can ensure cooperative relationships 
only to a limited degree.
In the businesses examined, the people surveyed pointed to the 
fragility and instability of this decision-making premise. An initial 
observation in the companies was that group work depended on a 
broad-based willingness of employees at the various levels to participate 
in this production concept. Group work quickly faces the danger of 
eroding when individual players exercise restraint with respect to the 
concept. At Jamus, for example, reluctance on the part of employees 
in the job controlling department as well as the master craftsman con-
tributed significantly to the erosion of the concept. A former group 
speaker reported, “Group work was flatly undermined when there was 
a rush job, and the executives attached the well-known ‘top priority,’ 
‘extremely urgent,’ or ‘rush’ labels to the components. That made it 
difficult for the groups to manage by themselves.” At Keymac, group 
work could no longer be enforced in certain areas after experienced 
technicians in particular pointed out that it was all useless and were 
no longer willing to participate in group discussions. As the quality 
manager described it, “For many employees, not working in a group 
is simple. They come to work in the morning, and they know, ‘This 
is my job, this is what I do’ … and then they try to do it as simply as 
they can, (and) keep their responsibility to a minimum … As long as 
there are a certain number of employees who think like that, and it’s 
not turned into some other mechanism from the outside … they’re 
the ones who will prevail.”
A second observation was that the group work system is extremely 
vulnerable when staffing fluctuates. At Ladra and Jamus, the critical 
Failure as Success in Group Work Projects    161 
economic situation led to terminations. As a result, some of the exist-
ing groups were torn apart. A laboriously created balance was upset, 
and in several groups the employees had little inclination to resume 
their coordination tasks. At Keymac, the situation was reversed. An 
economic boom urgently necessitated the hiring of new employees, 
but the existing staff saw this as a problem for working in groups. 
The rapid integration of new employees, floaters, and temporary staff 
created tension in some of the groups and brought about an internal 
resignation in some of the established employees.
The third observation was that maintaining group work requires 
ongoing investment in the personnel factor. In the opinion of those 
who promote decentralized business structures, maintaining group 
work requires continuous investment of resources. The corporate devel-
opment officer at Keymac told us, “We were too quick to sit back 
and say that group work functions here … You can’t think, well, I’ve 
introduced group work, and now it’s up and running.” The tenor in 
all three businesses was that group work functions only if executives, 
corporate development, and the consultants are constantly involved 
in personnel development.
Several employees commented on the problem of the strong focus 
on the personnel premise type by pointing to “human imperfections.” 
An employee representative remarked, “Yes, it’s great, but you can’t put 
it into practice the way it’s described on paper. Doesn’t work … just too 
many human factors.” One of the people we interviewed sarcastically 
expressed the hope that there would be scientific progress in the field 
of human genetics: “Group work might function—if gene research 
makes some progress.”
Group Work’s Split Lock-In 
In group work, a split lock-in can be observed. On the one hand, it 
appears to establish itself as an organizational concept in such a way 
that it is difficult for management not to officially endorse group and 
teamwork in some form. In contrast to other models, such as lean 
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management, business process reengineering, kaizen, or total quality 
management, the concept of group work does not appear subject to 
the half-life times usually seen in management discussions. On the 
other hand, in organizational practice no sufficiently compelling path 
develops that would be difficult for organizations to abandon. The 
decision-making corridor created by the introduction of group work 
seems to have very weak boundaries. This split lock-in aggravates the 
often-observed discrepancy between an organization’s external presen-
tation and its operational reality as perceived internally by employees.
6.4 The Successful Failure  
of Group Work Projects
An obvious reaction to all this would be to view at least two of the 
three group work projects studied as failures. At Ladra and Jamus, the 
groups have practically no autonomy anymore with respect to job con-
trolling, order planning, maintenance, logistics, quality assurance, and 
personnel planning. In some cases, they have been completely disman-
tled. For many employees, particularly in production, the introduction 
of group work is an episode they would rather forget. Nevertheless, 
this interpretation would mean viewing group work projects from an 
instrumental-rational perspective, which we have called into question 
above. One would be viewing group work under the criterion of a 
promising means to increase business efficiency and effectiveness, and 
group work’s inability to establish itself as a failure of that means.
Rather than designating the group work projects as failures out 
of hand, we would like to cast them as reorganization measures that 
have “failed successfully.” Research on inefficient and ineffective orga-
nizations that were able to survive in niches of the welfare state has 
elaborated that their success relates to their ability to internally model 
the contradictory demands of the environment and mobilize the sup-
port of important interest groups (Meyer/Zucker 1989). These insights 
into the functioning of organizations that are failing successfully can 
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be transferred to businesses in the market economy. I would briefly 
like to point out two effects.
First, in at least two of the companies group work in any event 
gave management important room to maneuver. By associating with 
the decentralized production concepts that were gaining traction at 
the time, the CEOs once again managed to convince the holding 
companies to make substantial investments in their loss-making busi-
nesses. These funds were subsequently used for reorganizing the form 
of production, but also for the acquisition of new machinery. In the 
framework of the group work project, according to an employee in 
one of the companies, “They bought machines like they were a dime a 
dozen.” By pointing out that the emerging efficiency increases could be 
attributed to group work, the companies were able to weather a difficult 
phase. When the economic situation began to improve, the board of 
the holding company was only marginally interested in whether the 
improved results could actually be traced to the new production con-
cepts or (more likely) to changed market conditions.
Second, it was observed that the introduction of group work, partic-
ularly in the firms working with the automobile industry, represented 
an additional selling point that improved sales opportunities in their 
core market. According to the former employee representative of one 
company, “Group work was certainly a good form of external adver-
tising.” And the former employee representative of another company 
told us, “Frankly, you’d have to admit that because everyone was talking 
about Jamus, that was the reason for one customer or the other, maybe 
indirectly or subconsciously, staying with us, or maybe someone else 
became a new customer.”
By pointing to these aspects of successfully failed group work proj-
ects, it is not our intention to introduce a more encompassing concept 
of instrumental rationality through the back door. It is a banal insight 
that preserving solvency is a central survival criterion for organiza-
tions in general and businesses in particular. However—and this is an 
important addition—remaining solvent is one criterion among others, 
and not the sole criterion to which organizations gear all of their activ-
ities, or according to which they are to be evaluated. Striving for profit 
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represents a constraint, a necessary condition, and not an objective, 
which is to say, an overarching goal. Even though striving for financial 
reproduction plays a key role in a business’s discussions, there is always 
a continually changing mix of purposes, targets, values, and interests.
This differentiation also allows us to observe the introduction and 
elimination of group work under entirely different aspects than merely 
increasing efficiency or inefficiency. It opens the perspective that even 
though, in the eyes of some executives and employees, the hoped-for 
immediate gains in efficiency and effectiveness did not materialize, 
these reorganization projects—albeit planned and intentional only to 
a limited degree—did make a contribution to the companies’ survival. 
Not only the granting of a reprieve, but also the approval of additional 
funding and the effect of the new form of organization as a further 
selling point were to a large extent undesired ancillary effects that 
contributed to the businesses’ survival.
7.  
Innovation in Spite of Imitation
“Most imitators attempt the inimitable.”
Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach 
There are obvious reasons for a manager to fall into line with the 
respective dominant models of “successful organizations,” “good man-
agement,” and “efficient organizational leadership.” The models free 
managers from the need to justify themselves and minimize their risk 
of being held accountable for a wrong decision. For example, during 
a time when decentralized organizational structures are en vogue, man-
agers who choose a pronounced Taylorist form of production that is 
based on the division of labor will need to justify themselves, even if 
their businesses are economically successful.
Due to the complexity of the decision-making situation, it is often 
difficult to make decisions about efficient value-adding processes. Deci-
sion-makers often do not weigh more than a small number of alterna-
tives against one another and do not make an attempt to think through 
in detail every variation of the decision, orienting themselves instead 
on ideas of suitability (March 1994, 100ff.). Rather than engaging in 
laborious discussions and decision-making processes and designing new 
approaches that require justification, they orient themselves on what is 
viewed by those in their environment as an appropriate way of proceed-
ing, for example, by their customers, competitors, suppliers, researchers, 
political entities, and the media. There are many regulations, positions, 
procedural instructions, and programs that exist solely because they are 
seen by the environment as successful, rational, and modern. Whether 
they actually lead to more efficient internal procedures is a question that 
the decision-making process often does not examine.
Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (DiMaggio/Powell 1983) 
labeled this tendency to adapt to environmental expectations as “iso-
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morphy,” thereby describing the process that causes an organization 
to resemble other organizations that are active in the same or similar 
fields. From their perspective, the mechanism that is particularly prom-
inent, aside from conforming due to (legal) constraints and normative 
pressure, is imitation. Uncertainty as to what the right approach could 
be causes organizations to respond with mimesis. They copy other 
organizations considered to be especially successful. 
This allows organizational scientists to offer a good explanation of 
why organizations in the same field have a strong resemblance. Euro-
pean businesses orient themselves on the model of their US competitors 
whom they believe to be particularly successful. Large expert consulting 
firms define the way an efficient organization should look and cause 
their clients to adopt the model. Businesses undergoing reorganization 
processes that are fraught with uncertainty orient themselves on their 
competitors who are considered best-practice companies.
Although the category of isomorphy does a good job at describing 
the diffusion of ideas about “sound management,” it is nevertheless 
difficult to use it as an explanation for innovations, transition, and 
changes in organizational models. To the degree that the effect of objec-
tives receives very prominent treatment, the question of the creation 
of institutions and the way they change is neglected (see the critique 
expressed in Strang/Meyer 1993, 503ff.).
The question, therefore, is this: if it is correct that organizational 
structures cannot simply be changed arbitrarily into other structures, 
and adaptation to the environment cannot be designed according to 
efficiency criteria, then how do changes in organizational models come 
about in the first place? Or, putting it in different terms, if the strategic 
actions of those involved play a subordinate role in comparison to the 
pressure of isomorphy, how do organizations free themselves from the 
steel casing of the institutions and introduce variations?
The objective of this chapter is to develop an argument for why 
organizational models change in spite of the pressure to homogenize. 
We propose that organizations are increasingly using organizational 
structures as a marketing tool. As a result, isomorphy strategies often 
unfold in a way that ideas of what is “good organization” in the orga-
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nization’s own practice are surpassed by the organization’s own inno-
vations and variations.
In the first part (7.1), we point out not only the problems caused by 
the divergence of an organization’s external presentation from its internal 
reality, but also the functions that such separation fulfills. In the second 
part (7.2), we show that changes in organizational structure are often 
undertaken for the purpose of presenting the organization to the outside 
world as modern and rational. A number of organizations are increasingly 
using organizational structure that is aligned with current management 
models as a product marketing tool. Part three (7.3) develops an “imi-
tation plus” model. This is based on the assumption that the various 
businesses do not simply copy the ideas about rational, efficient organi-
zation that are prevalent in their environment, but introduce variations 
as they adjust to them. Part four is a summary and presents the argument 
that organizations face two disparate, often contradictory demands. The 
first consists of copying the ideas about rational management that are 
dominant in their organizational field, and thereby increasing their own 
legitimacy. The second requirement is to portray oneself not simply as 
copying organizational and product innovations undertaken elsewhere, 
but to initiate innovations of one’s own. This polarity creates a dynamic 
that can lead not only to a high variability of talks within the organiza-
tions, but also to a multitude of applied organizational patterns.  
7.1 The Utility of a Pleasant Appearance
Sociologist Friedrich Weltz (Weltz 2011, 67ff.) coined the incisive term 
“dual reality” as a means of pointing out that there are two levels of reality 
in organizations. One consists of designated rules, defined processes, and 
established structures; this is the “official reality.” The other is a “practical 
reality” that unfolds quasi “behind the stipulated procedures.” The prac-
ticed reality, which is to say, the actual modes of operation and cooperation 
deviate in part substantially from official work instructions, channels, 
organization plans, standard operating procedures, and sets of regulations.
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With the catchy concept of a dual reality, Weltz—much like socio-
logical neo-institutionalism and systems theoretical organizational 
research—touches on a sensitive issue for the fields of critical man-
agement research, the sociology of work, and industrial sociology. He 
points out that although the latter focuses intensively and critically on 
the self-descriptions of the businesses and administrations it studies, 
it does not recognize that practiced reality in businesses is often only 
loosely connected to the fashionable rationalization concepts of the day.
From this perspective, critical management research, the sociology 
of work, and industrial sociology appear to have a blind spot similar 
to the rationalistic mainstreams of management and business admin-
istration. The loudly propagated rationalization concepts are confused 
with operational reality, and the actually very plausible differentiation 
between the formal and informal aspects of an organization remains 
to a large degree inconsequential for empirical research. The difference 
between the two approaches, as seen from this point of view, is that 
classical management research and the science of business administra-
tion refer to the rationalization concepts in a positive sense, whereas 
critical management research, the sociology of work, and industrial 
sociology, based on their employee orientation, subject the rational-
ization concepts to critical questioning.
The brilliance of his observations and the acuity of his criticism not-
withstanding, Friedrich Weltz has also developed a blind spot inasmuch 
as he treats the discrepancy between external presentation and operational 
reality as a problem, while overlooking its functionality. As an example, 
Weltz tied his observation of the discrepancy between official reality and 
practiced reality to a call for a greater degree of authenticity. He lamented 
the organizational double standard. Everybody knows, he claimed, that 
the other “immoral world exists,” and everyone participates in it, while 
acting as if it weren’t there. Using profitability calculations as an example, 
frequently everybody knows that they have nothing to do with reality, 
and yet they are taken at face value in internal company negotiations. In 
view of the huge discrepancies, the important thing is supposedly to bring 
the two realities closer together and thereby to promote understanding 
in the business (Weltz 2011, 67ff.).
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A Learning Disability: Difficulties with the Dual Reality  
of Businesses 
Raised particularly in the field of psychological organizational research, 
the primary objection to the discrepancy between pious talk and actual 
management behavior is that the resulting cynicism has a negative effect 
on the organization. It is said that employees merely deride new man-
agement initiatives as the fashionable “culture of the month” and react 
with demotivation (see, for example, Bartlett/Ghosal 1995). It is seen as 
particularly problematical that a discrepancy between external presenta-
tion and operational reality could hinder learning processes. A rational 
and coherent presentation of the enterprise to the external world could 
make it difficult to bring internal problems up for discussion.
In a pioneering company, which we will call Tomolus, it was reported 
that, very much in keeping with the above, strong public advertising 
based on the firm’s own group work models had led internally to the 
formation of circles of silence. Outside visitors at technical events were 
told, “We’re all just great,” which had the effect that the firm’s own 
weaknesses could barely be discussed openly anymore. Because group 
work figured so prominently in the firm’s external presentation, the 
associated structural problems were kept taboo until top management 
could no longer fail to notice the employees’ growing unrest.
In another exemplary company, which we will call Acme, the 
employees proposed the idea that although their CEO’s very high-pro-
file external presentation would certainly produce benefits, her self-con-
fidence was creating learning difficulties for the firm. For example, 
the quality assurance officer reported, “We always had a problem with 
that. What she presented to the external world, the things she said, 
didn’t line up with the reality I experienced day in and day out. There 
was a difference, and that bothered me for a long time, because I said, 
‘Whatever she’s saying, it’s not the way things really are. So, what’s 
that all about?’” Then, gaining insight into the underlying causes had 
enabled him to take a more relaxed view of the discrepancy. “So, then I 
talked with a psychologist, and her opinion was that beating the drum 
is part of the trade. Ever since then I can differentiate. She can tell the 
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outside world anything she likes. It doesn’t faze me. I know my reality, 
and that’s it.” Nevertheless, difficulties arose because the CEO actually 
believed what she was proclaiming. “The problem is that Ms. Meyer, 
the CEO, says things to the outside world, and she actually believes 
that’s the way things are. It’s a huge problem. And a lot of employees, 
who see her on some talk show, are saying, ‘What’s she talking about 
now? That’s funny!’ Sometimes she talks about the way things are here, 
and we don’t even know about it. There are two realities.”
The problem seems to be that the display side becomes progressively 
important for parts of management, and executives become increas-
ingly attached to it. Internal criticism is viewed as fouling one’s own 
nest. An effect is created which Friedrich Weltz (Weltz 2011, 169ff.) 
aptly describes as a “learning disability.” As a consequence of the pres-
sure to maintain the plausibility of one’s own external presentations, 
pseudo-successes are presented as actual successes, and actual security 
is replaced by myths of security. 
At Tomolus and Acme, the learning disability was created, in 
particular, because the businesses were structured in a way that is 
typical for mid-sized companies, and the function of the stringent 
and shimmering display side coincided with the function of operative 
management. Interestingly, many employees at these two companies 
were not demanding that management start reporting “honestly” 
about the company. Their wishes were directed instead at having the 
executive responsible for the firm’s external presentation stay out of 
business operations to a greater degree. In a third company, which 
we will call Belzano, an employee in marketing remarked that the 
CEO was “a big child, a high-achiever with no love for detail,” but 
that in a certain unit of the company business moved ahead any-
way because the CEO focused exclusively on the display side. “It 
works, because Smith (the CEO) stays out of it.” When he became 
involved in operative management, as he did in a different part of the 
company, the discrepancy between display side and company reality 
immediately became a problem. “If he would stay out of Cinco (the 
unit where he managed business operations), the outfit would run 
better. And if he got more involved with us (the Avda unit), then 
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Lord help us.” At Acme, it was said that a greater distance between 
the display side and internal operational reality would be helpful. 
“The CEO would have to take a trip to an island for two years, where 
she couldn’t reach us,” the head of sales told us, “and I’m absolutely 
convinced things would quiet down, the business would run just as 
well … we could finally get organized—by ourselves. She’d just have 
to go away for a year so that we can stabilize the company among 
ourselves, get organized.” The quality assurance officer added, “She 
should go out and do that, she’s a fantastic speaker. She should go 
on lecturing forever. And she fancies self-presentation a little bit, 
too. But here inside the company, she would have to arrange things 
somewhat differently.”
In contrast to this conflation of display side and business opera-
tions in companies with typical midsized organization, the managers 
in charge of the display side in major corporations keep their dis-
tance from day-to-day organizational reality. Such distance reduces 
the risk that management will be held responsible on site for what 
is presented externally and thereby see itself forced to bring opera-
tional reality into line with the external presentation. The ability to 
decouple gossip, decisions, and action thematically, organizationally, 
and in terms of time makes it possible to absorb inconsistencies 
internally better than is the case in midsize companies (Brunsson 
1989, 34ff./221f.). 
Discussing Dual Reality on a Morally Neutral Basis
It is the merit of sociological neo-institutionalism (Meyer/Rowan 1977, 
340ff.) and systems-theoretical organizational research (Kühl 2013, 
138ff.) to have placed the debate over the discrepancy between display 
side and the organizational reality perceived by employees on morally 
neutral ground. This contrasts with critical management research, the 
sociology of work, and industrial sociology. Dual reality is no longer 
viewed primarily as a defect that gives rise to calls for creating greater 
authenticity. Instead, the focus shifts to the question: what function 
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is fulfilled through the formation of a display side that is decoupled 
from internally perceived organizational reality?
Organizations face contradictory demands and norms. They must 
not only fulfill technical requirements and produce, say, cooking pots, 
software programs, and automobiles that work more or less well, but 
must also frequently satisfy the demands for political, legal, economic, 
and scientific legitimacy imposed on them through the environment. 
The problem now arises that the often contradictory demands from the 
institutional environment as a rule are not consistent with streamlined 
production. Calls for environmentally friendly production, shareholder 
demands for rationalization, or a desire to have a production method 
that is in step with the most current management fashion must be taken 
seriously, but many times present obstacles to organizing production 
in a streamlined, efficient manner (for a summary, see Brunsson/Olsen 
1993, 8f.).
Organizations react to these contradictory demands by decoupling 
the internal core structures and processes, which ensure day-to-day 
production, from the surface structures that can be perceived from 
outside. Ultimately, it is this decoupling that gives organizations the 
freedom they require to continue operating in spite of the contra-
dictory expectations they face. It enables them to maintain a façade 
that appears to be legitimate and to conform to their institutional 
environment, but parallel to that they can also gear their day-to-day 
activities to the concrete demands, thereby ensuring that production 
continues to function.
Nils Brunsson (Brunsson 1989; Brunsson 1993; Brunsson 2003) 
takes the idea of decoupling even further by speaking of “hypocrisy” or 
“dissimulation” as strategies that are necessary for every organization. 
The necessity of creating political, scientific, or legal legitimation in 
addition to creating products leads to discrepancies between what is 
expressed to the external world and internal organizational decisions 
and actions. An organization’s actions are only loosely connected with 
the decisions that have been made and what is said about the organi-
zation.
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The Function of the Dual Reality
The decoupling of words and actions fulfills an important function. 
A central function of decoupling the display side and organizational 
reality is that demands from the environment do not impact the orga-
nization directly. Organizations are under obligation to meet legal, 
political, and economic demands, yet at the same time they must ensure 
that ever-changing and contradictory demands to adjust do not throw 
their production processes into disarray.
A further important function of decoupling is that internal unrest 
does not immediately lead to critical inquiries from the environment. 
A true-to-life portrayal of organizational processes to the external world 
would cast doubt on the organization’s legitimacy in its environment and 
result in critical inquiries from government agencies, the media, financial 
institutions, and the judiciary. All this would enter the organization in 
the form of uncertainty and further exacerbate internal conflict and strife. 
Such effects were observed when Daimler merged with Chrysler. Even 
though all the automobile industry experts knew that the merger would 
cause enormous difficulties for DaimlerChrysler, and in spite of the high 
degree of dissatisfaction executives expressed in surveys, the organiza-
tion was able to portray the merger as a success for over two years. The 
corporation’s CEO at the time, Jürgen Schrempp, was celebrated as the 
hero of the merger, and his strong media presence allowed the company 
to keep its internal turmoil under the surface. Even when the company’s 
stock price collapsed—after the merger, DaimlerChrysler was at times 
worth less than Daimler alone beforehand—the valuation could still 
be portrayed as “unjustified” for some time. During the first two years, 
the adeptly managed discrepancy between display side and the bitter 
reality of the merger was helpful for the organization, because a public 
debate over the damage the merger had done would have hampered the 
process of merging internally. It was only when the CEO was replaced 
that employees could speak out about the problems associated with the 
merger, and the deal was ultimately cancelled.
The third important function of the decoupling is that it affords a cer-
tain freedom of thought, particularly for management. Since neither the 
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environment nor the employees can legally demand authenticity, man-
agement is required to be mindful of what it says only to a limited degree. 
It can formulate portrayals of the organization, perceptions, thoughts, 
and ideas without considering whether they correspond to reality. Acme, 
Inc. particularly commended itself for its policy of promoting women; it 
participated actively in the “Total-E-Quality” campaign. By disconnect-
ing from operational reality, management was able to propagate Acme as 
exemplary in the field of the advancement of women. Thus, filling man-
agement jobs exclusively with women, family-friendly working hours, 
and special programs for the advancement of women could arise as ideas 
and even be included in the organization’s self-description. Internally, 
however, the topic of women in the company was discussed very much in 
terms of high staff turnover. A number of employees mentioned “strategic 
pregnancies” as one of the most effective means of escaping pressure in 
the company. The CEO, who was a woman, discussed this internally 
under the heading of a “remasculinization” of the firm. “We’re going 
to have more men now, and I mean right away.” “Bookkeeping is the 
most pregnancy-prone department. Six of them in the last several years, 
and I’m really fed up with it now. I said I was going to find somebody, 
a man, so we found Frank Meyer. And I’m going to hire another one, 
a man.” “Now I don’t know whether I’ll hire three or four men—but 
they have to be people who are committed to making 100 million with 
this company, and not be simultaneously flirting with how much family 
time they can get.” Decoupling discourse about actual hiring policies 
repeatedly allowed management to generate new ideas about promoting 
women, and even set national initiatives in motion, without allowing 
too much distraction by internal “needs.”
7.2 Organizational Structure as a Marketing Tool
Apparently, many organizational researchers are observing that the 
discrepancy between down stage and backstage is growing. The formal 
structure of organizations is being shaped less and less through the 
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demands of competition or efficiency, and increasingly through envi-
ronmental expectations. Nils Brunsson (Brunsson 1989), for example, 
suspects that organizations cannot respond unequivocally and con-
sistently to the contradictory expectations of their ever more diverse 
environments, and are therefore progressively decoupling technical and 
institutional dimensions using hypocrisy and dissimulation.
The decoupling of mythical rationality façades from actual internal 
behavior is often seen in relationship to the development of organiza-
tions in modern society. As an example, Klaus Türk (Türk 1995, 334) 
raises the question of whether Max Weber’s supposition of rationality 
does not require modification to the effect that in Western societies the 
demonstration of rationality has become more important than ratio-
nality itself. In a society where the rationality paradigm is dominant, 
organizations are obliged to erect ceremonial, ritual-supported façades 
of rational procedures in order to create internal maneuvering room.
The Reasons behind the Increasing Importance  
of a Dual Reality
One of the reasons for the construction of rationality façades may 
be seen in the dependency of businesses on external but also internal 
(organizational) capital markets. Holding companies and banks will 
often approve investments only if a business conforms to relevant ideas 
of rational organization. Companies that are searching for capital must 
create the impression that the investment will allow them to adopt 
a value-adding strategy that will pay off financially, but also corre-
sponds to cutting-edge management ideas. At Tomolus, for example, 
the holding company tied the approval of investments to the company 
abandoning a form of production and assembly that was strongly based 
on the division of labor, and introducing more group-oriented pro-
duction methods. Management was able to use the new production 
and assembly strategy, which was widely discussed in public, to secure 
considerable investments in new machinery and thereby survive a dry 
spell. Formulating the situation more pointedly: market-listed compa-
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nies depend on being traded on the capital market at a high valuation 
so that when they increase capital they are able to raise as substantial an 
amount as possible, and thereby protect themselves from hostile take-
overs. Market value is also driven higher by the “fantasy” the company 
creates in investors. This fantasy is fueled less by a realistic description 
of the business’s internal operations than by its rationality façade. 
A second reason for the construction of rationality façades is that 
large companies are increasingly pressuring their suppliers to adopt a 
“modern” structure that suits the major buyer. Sociologist W. Richard 
Scott (Scott 1981) pointed out that many organizations do not receive 
their main impetus to create project-oriented management structures 
from internal sources—as a rational response to the requirements of 
the flow of information, so to speak—but from the outside. As an 
example, the US Department of Defense was already demanding that 
its contractors introduce project structures in the 1950s. The Depart-
ment hoped this would allow it to deal with a single contact person 
in each company, as opposed to being passed from one contact to the 
next as before.
The third reason for the construction of rationality façades lies 
in the increasing mobility of high level executives both within and 
between companies. Because of this, they associate themselves with 
success stories in their own organizations. Managers use a successful 
divisionalization strategy, the introduction of a group work model, or 
a successful SAP project when they apply for other positions. Thus, 
they are not so much interested in describing projects the way they 
actually unfolded, but rather in linking themselves with the myths of 
the organization.
The three reasons cited—the importance of the capital market, 
dependence on important customers, and increased executive mobil-
ity—explain why creating legitimacy is gaining importance for organi-
zations, and also why the discrepancy between the “different” realities 
appears to be growing. Yet there is a further reason that might explain 
the expanding discrepancy between down stage and backstage, namely, 
the necessity of using one’s own structure as an advertisement.
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Organizational Structure as a Marketing Tool
Classical management theory states that products and services are in 
demand because of their specific qualities. According to this idea, the 
customer is interested solely in the quality of the end product and is 
by and large indifferent to the production process. As long as the prod-
uct fulfills its purpose, it is supposedly unimportant for the customer 
whether it was made and assembled on a conveyor belt, through group 
work, by networked independent contractors, or supplier companies.
Contrary to this assumption, in a market environment where prod-
ucts and services appear to be becoming ever more similar and long-
term customer relationships are gaining importance, there is still a 
tendency for businesses to use their own organizational structures for 
advertising purposes. Sociologist Marshall Meyer (Meyer 1979, 494ff.) 
referred to this advertising strategy as “signaling.” Originally, the con-
cept of signaling referred to the jobseeker strategy of using one’s formal 
education as a signal to employers. Employers cannot be sure how an 
employee will behave in the workplace. In order to evaluate employees, 
they therefore resort to signals such as the jobseekers’ presentation, 
their career to date, or their education. In turn, as employees engineer 
their résumés they address this insecurity factor by not selecting their 
education and training on the basis of technical considerations alone, 
but also from the perspective of whether they will be sending the “right 
signals” to potential employers (Spence 1974, 3ff.).
Organizations engage in similar strategies. By creating new posi-
tions, flattening hierarchies, introducing group projects, or instituting 
new regulations, they signal that they are serious about their plans. 
Structural changes send stronger signals than mere window dressing 
in the form of speeches by the CEO and PR campaigns, because struc-
tural change requires significant investment, while speeches and PR 
are relatively cheap. This is why the public attaches so little value to 
them. To give an example, transitioning from a functionally organized 
business to a profit center structure has a stronger signaling effect than 
simply announcing that one will soon be paying closer attention to the 
firm’s profitability. Setting up a specific department for environmental 
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protection has a greater internal and external impact than repeatedly 
raising the subject in speeches by top executives.
With the concept of signaling, Marshall Meyer takes his thesis 
even further, that changes in organizational structures can make sense 
irrespective of whether or not they offer an efficiency advantage in the 
value-adding core. The question of changing organizational structures 
is quasi decoupled from considerations of direct gains in internal use-
fulness and viewed more strongly under the aspect of their internal 
and external signaling effect.
The strategy of no longer advertising through products alone, but 
increasingly also with one’s own value-adding processes, can be found 
almost ideal typically in consulting firms. Companies such as Boston 
Consulting Group or McKinsey do not promote their services exclu-
sively through print advertising, brochures, or books; instead, they 
present their own internal processes and their facilities as reference 
objects to their clients—such as cutting edge office space where con-
sultants work at a different desk every day—to show that the company 
has taken the principles of modern office management to heart. The 
efficiency of internal knowledge management is presented to the client 
as a sales point for purchasing the firm’s consulting services. The agency 
re-engineers its own consulting organization, thereby turning it into a 
reference project for clients from industry and trade.
Yet the same strategy can also be observed in companies in the more 
classical branches of industry and commerce. Here, too, we notice that 
reorganization measures are apparently not always initiated because of 
certain problems in the value creation process. The priority is often 
the “production” of a modern image instead. At Belzano, employees 
pointed out that the various reorganization measures such as CIP, kai-
zen, or the Japan Diet were initiated because they had enabled other 
midsized firms to win business contests. As an example, the Japan Diet 
was put in place after the winner of the “Factory of the Year Award” 
told the CEO at Belzano, “Buy this book, do exactly what I did, and 
in three years you’ll be ‘Factory of the Year.’”
At Tomolus, certain organizational measures were tackled only 
because customers in the automobile industry demanded the intro-
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duction of new forms of work organization. Under pressure from its 
customers, the company pushed through ISO 9001 certification, an 
ecological audit, and a range of customer-specific quality audits by 
adjusting its structure in ways that would allow it to pass the audits as 
successfully as possible.
The development in one of the holding companies was particularly 
interesting. It owned a loss-making and chaotically organized business 
unit named Cinco that was very much geared to the retail trade. Any 
time the company or the CEO gained public exposure, it had a direct 
beneficial effect on marketing. Meanwhile, an older and highly prof-
itable business unit called Avda was exclusively geared to wholesale. 
Due to Cinco’s strong dependence on the retail trade, organizational 
changes were introduced in the entire holding company so that it could 
project the image of a model company.
Advertising with one’s own organizational structure is an indication 
that the homogenization tendencies of organizations are coming up 
against their limits. If it is correct that organizations are becoming 
increasingly similar in structure, then conforming to a model would 
no longer offer a competitive advantage. In this sense, conforming to 
one of the current management models would amount to a hygiene 
factor: one could not dispense with it, but it would also not represent 
any particular asset. In contradistinction to this assumption, my goal 
in the following is to use the above considerations on organizational 
structure as a marketing tool to explain the change in models of mod-
ern organizations. 
7.3 Imitation Plus, Or,  
How Do New Forms of Organization Arise? 
In organizational research, there are three standard explanations for 
why, in spite of the isomorphic pressure on organizations, changes 
occur in the models of modern organizational design. The first expla-
nation is based on the concept of the institutional entrepreneur. Paul J. 
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DiMaggio (DiMaggio 1988, 14) uses this to describe players who strive 
to ensure the creation of new organizational concepts. Professions, 
lobbying organizations, and social movements endeavor to establish 
ideas such as “working efficiently,” “humane politics,” or “sustainable 
business” to which other players must then nod, at least in their public 
remarks. Depending on how strongly such “institutional projects” can 
be linked to existing concepts of rationality, the undertakings prove 
to be more or less elaborate. The classical example of this institutional 
entrepreneurism are consulting firms. They invest a great amount of 
energy in establishing ideas of “good management” which subsequently 
enable them to sell their consulting services.
The second explanation for changes in organizational models 
is based on the observation that social norms often contradict one 
another. As a result, organizations are forced to deviate from the norms 
in the pursuit of their day-to-day activities. Since it is impossible to 
fulfill all the norms at the same time, it becomes necessary for organi-
zations to distance themselves from some norms and decouple their 
legitimation structures from their internal processes. The concept of 
decoupling draws attention to the fact that organizations in the same 
field are indeed similar in formal structure, but that in actual prac-
tice substantial differences arise. From this perspective, organizational 
models change in such a way that actual practice can distinguish itself 
in the area that is protected by rationality façades and, if it proves its 
worth, is integrated as an element of the display side.
The third explanation derives from the observation that the applica-
tion of rules leads to variations of the rules. Even though there may be 
generally accepted ideas about what efficiency and effectiveness entail, 
the ideas must always be transferred to the circumstances of a specific 
organization. As the transfer takes place, the rules and programs that 
have been deemed sufficient and effective are adjusted, changed, and 
varied. It has been shown in examples of the introduction of Japanese 
quality circles in the USA (Strang 1997), the spread of a Japanese 
Buddhist movement in the USA (Snow 1993), and the diffusion of the 
notion of hostile takeovers (Hirsch 1986) that innovations are often 
the outcome of suboptimal attempts at imitating others. The variations 
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then give rise to new institutionalizations that assert themselves through 
an evolutionary process.
It is possible to distinguish two directions for explaining the emer-
gence of organizational models. The first is based on interested, active 
players outside of organizations who are undertaking efforts to cre-
ate new institutional expectations. The second understands changes 
as (undesired) side effects of adaptation processes. Both directions of 
explanation are inclined to view as rather low an organization’s chances 
of actively influencing the adaptation and imitation process. Yet in my 
view, a further point is even more important.
More Than Just Copying
My theory is that ideas of rational, efficient organization are not sim-
ply copied, and variations on them do not arise merely as undesired 
side effects. Rather, when adjustments to prevailing ideas of rational 
organization are made, processes of conscious adaptation also occur. 
This adaptation is not geared exclusively to making notions of “good 
management” practicable for one’s own value creation processes; the 
adaptation processes are organized in such a way that an attempt is 
made to exceed the notions of good management, rational organiza-
tion, and innovative structure. Organizations do not increase their 
legitimacy by merely copying ideas of rational organization, but by add-
ing contributions of their own. Thus, imitation does not take place in 
the form of simply copying the ideas of rational management. During 
the copying process, members of the organization consider which new 
aspects they could use to supplement the concepts that are currently 
en vogue. The model is one of “imitation plus.”
The tendency to adopt the “imitation plus” model can be observed 
almost ideal typically in consulting firms. They enrich current man-
agement fashions with concepts, ideas, and terminologies of their 
own in the hope of differentiating themselves from their competitors. 
Using the example of “business process reengineering,” the dominant 
reorganization strategy in the mid-1990s, we can easily show the way 
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different consulting firms associated themselves with this concept and 
gave it their own twist (Micklethwait/Wooldridge 1996). As an illus-
tration, the consulting firm of Arthur D. Little modified the heavy 
IT emphasis of the reengineering concept and introduced it as the 
“high-performance business model.” Gemini Consulting Services called 
its reengineering concept “business transformation,” placing its own 
emphasis on the area of process design.
Research in organizational science informs us that industrial, com-
mercial, and service companies—and not only consulting firms—must 
also present themselves as unique. Philip Selznick (Selznick 1957, 139), 
for example, argues that in order to survive it is essential for an organi-
zation to emphasize its unique features and convey the impression that 
it operates in a way that other businesses do not achieve. Organizations 
compete for the attention of other organizations and attempt to stand 
out through permanent innovation.
It is reasonable to suspect that it is enough for organizations to 
display their innovations merely in their external presentations, while 
leaving their formal side, not to mention their informal side, untrou-
bled by them. But the more organizations spruce up their display 
sides, the more they are subject to the general suspicion that they are 
merely repeating empty phrases, and that their proclamations will bear 
no fruit. For this reason, in many cases organizations cannot limit 
themselves to talk alone.
As an example, Belzano participated in 30 business competitions 
annually. It employed a person whose primary responsibility was to 
coordinate the company’s participation in the various contests. As the 
CEO put it, “Here at Belzano, we have the will to change and to win. 
After all, we enter almost 30 competitions every year—always search-
ing for new benchmarks. Where do my colleagues stand? Where do 
I stand?” It was remarkable that Belzano’s strategy for winning the 
competitions did not consist solely of following in the footsteps of 
the best practice business, but rather in deftly combining different 
management fashions, further developing management tools, or using 
particularly peppy concepts to portray itself as a company that was 
actually driving the current management discussion forward. As an 
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example, the company advertised that it had integrated kaizen, CIP, a 
company suggestion system, and the Japan Diet into a comprehensive 
quality management system.
Automotive supplier Tomolus emphasized that it had taken all of 
the important management concepts into account: lean management, 
simultaneous engineering, kanban, benchmarking, total quality man-
agement, total productivity maintenance, group work, product clinics, 
management by objectives, success-based compensation systems, and 
the learning organization approach. The CEO publicly announced, 
“You won’t find anything that we’re not already doing.” But here as well, 
the company was attempting to signal its customers, who were very 
sensitive to current management fashions, that it was independently 
developing those concepts further. For example, Tomolus advertised 
that it had not only applied group work to the value-adding produc-
tion and assembly processes, but that all levels of the company were 
organized in groups, right up to the top echelons.
At Acme, particular emphasis was placed on policies for the 
advancement of women. The company coined the term “leading ladies” 
to emphasize that it, contrary to other midsized firms, had clear guide-
lines to put women in management positions. It stressed that it could 
also imagine half-day positions for managers, which would enable this 
group of people to combine work and family. Easily verifiable from the 
outside—what is the percentage of women in leadership positions?—
this personnel policy was proclaimed as one of the company’s unique 
features, and utilized both to position itself in the employment market 
and for purposes of public perception.
The innovation initially takes place on the organization’s display 
side, downstage, so to speak, but particularly when current manage-
ment concepts are adopted (and exceeded) there is pressure that inno-
vations must also be visible in actual operations. This does not eliminate 
the discrepancy between an attractive downstage and a significantly 
more flawed and inconsistent backstage. Organizations appear sig-
nificantly more stringent in their display side than they are in the eyes 
of their employees. The decisive factor, however, is that the strategies 
of surpassing, in the sense of “imitation plus,” are not just window 
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dressing, but that presentation to the environment is also viewed as a 
motor for internal reorganization processes.
The Institutionalization of Model Innovation
The “imitation plus” strategy profits from the existence of two pro-
cesses. One is that management concepts are quick to lose their dis-
tinctive fashionability. They are subject to the problem of satiation, a 
problem which makes it important for organizations not to present 
themselves as late comers, but to supplement management concepts 
with angles of their own. The other process is related to the mega-myth 
of rationality. One aspect of rationality is that it is always possible to 
act even more rationally. As a result, there are always opportunities for 
businesses to “go one better.”
Organizations whose business policies simply copy a partner com-
pany or competitor and bring a “me-too product” to market create a 
need to explain themselves. This becomes apparent when we look at the 
current management discussion. Reinhard Sprenger (Sprenger 1997, 
146) laments managers’ tendency to “flatten their noses against the 
windows of their best practice competitors.” According to Sprenger, 
“Those who walk in the footsteps of others, don’t make any impressions 
of their own.” In a similar vein, philosopher Peter Sloterdijk remarks, 
“You can’t create uniqueness on a copy machine.”
7.4 Paradoxical Demands
Organizations face two different and often contradictory demands. The 
first is that they copy the ideas of rational management that dominate 
their organizational field and thereby increase their own legitimacy. 
The second is that they must not present themselves as merely copying 
organizational and product innovations created elsewhere, but also as 
initiating innovations of their own.
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Organizations view the “imitation plus” model presented above as 
a promising strategy for meeting the partially contradictory demands 
of their environment. By copying currently dominant management 
models in this manner, they address the expectation of rational, mod-
ern management. Yet they also fulfill the demand for innovation by 
supplementing their organizational model with their own competencies 
and portraying these as organizational innovations to their customers, 
suppliers, and competitors.
8.  
Beyond a Restricted  
Instrumental-Rational Understanding 
of Organizations
“Perfect order would be the ruin  
of all progress and enjoyment.”
Robert Musil
The main advantage of understanding the paradoxes and dilemmas 
of organizations more deeply lies in gaining access to their contin-
gency. An organization consists of nothing other than the decisions 
it repeatedly makes in its day-to-day processes, and not much more. 
Niklas Luhmann (Luhmann 2003) expresses this opinion in a state-
ment that appears esoteric at first sight, namely, that organizations 
are systems that consist of decisions and produce the decisions of 
which they consist by themselves, through the very decisions of 
which they consist.
The reason this process functions is because organizations do not 
continually bear in mind the contingency of their own decisions, but 
repeatedly introduce shortcuts: previous decisions are viewed as so 
self-evident that no consideration is given, say, to whether technical 
processes are justified or whether a market orientation is logical. The 
assumption is that market changes have occurred that allow only one 
course of action, such as greater technologization, job cuts, or inno-
vation.
The paradox of the decision is that each decision has the effect 
of either making subsequent decisions possible or preventing them 
(Luhmann 1993, 298f.). Irrespective of whether the decisions are struc-
tural and stipulate new regulations, new communication channels, and 
personnel changes, or are simply mini-decisions that clarify questions 
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arising over the short-term, organizations have no choice but to base 
their current decisions on previous ones, thereby screening out the 
limitations entailed in calculating the ones that were made before.
8.1 It Is Impossible to Continuously Consider  
Paradoxes and Dilemmas
Organizations cannot constantly bear in mind all of their paradoxes and 
dilemmas. The problem is that constantly making paradoxes and dilem-
mas the subject of discussion would construct a complex and diverse 
view of the political, economical, scientific, and cultural environment, 
but that would make it increasingly difficult for them to demarcate 
themselves in relationship to their surroundings. Unbridled develop-
ment of paradoxes and dilemmas would generate internal complexity 
that would indeed do justice to the complexity of the environment, 
but would ultimately make it impossible for the organization to achieve 
internal stability.
There is no meta-rule for when organizations should elaborate par-
adoxes in their self-portrayals and when they should screen them out. 
This has the effect that every organization swings from one decision 
to the next and does not realize until afterward whether or not all the 
decisions contribute to its further existence. Every simplification that 
ignores paradoxes is vulnerable to disruptions that point to circum-
stances not taken into account (Luhmann 2000, 123ff.). Just as manag-
ers can draw attention to missed opportunities, shareholders can point 
to competitive situations that have not been addressed, unions to busi-
ness errors, and consultants to changing ideas on the “one best way.” 
Nevertheless—and this is what makes the difference—the chances of 
being taken seriously, and not merely dismissed as static, vary.
An understanding of organizations that goes beyond instrumen-
tal-rational concepts is not tantamount to “anything goes.” On the 
contrary, since organizations can ultimately build only on their previ-
ous decisions, they are committed to decision-making corridors and 
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developmental paths. This commitment has the effect that paradoxes 
and dilemmas repeatedly manifest, to which the organization must 
react with new deliberations, discussions, and decisions.
This process always results in problems because organizations can 
never know whether or not they will continue to exist with their deci-
sion chains. Since they can only perceive a limited spectrum of their 
environment, and the future remains necessarily unclear, organiza-
tions can never be certain whether their decisions are right. Market 
observations, field research, observing competitors, internal evaluation 
processes, and employee surveys can provide a sense of security. Ulti-
mately, however, such actions always result in surrogate security that 
is produced by the organization itself with all of its limited perceptual 
abilities (Luhmann 2005). Thus, organizations face a dilemma. They 
can decide in favor of a cultivated illusion by persuading themselves 
that they have acted rationally in the best sense of the word. Or they 
can permit cultivated incongruence and hope that the elaboration of 
paradoxes, dilemmas, and contradictions will develop into a more com-
plex worldview, albeit one that also has a tendency to block decisions. 
8.2 The Benefit of the Sisyphean Task
It may make sense not to lose faith in one’s ability to reach the summit 
and, like Sisyphus, to keep rolling the boulder up the hill. Perhaps the 
constant striving for an optimal organizational structure is the very 
function of management itself. If businesses, government agencies, or 
hospitals functioned like clockwork, or a machine, there would be no 
reason to employ people to manage uncertainty. If one succeeded in 
depositing the boulder at the peak, management would render itself 
superfluous.
In brief, a manager’s job description boils down to the idea of 
undertaking a Sisyphean task. In the thoroughly organized, value-add-
ing processes of assembly line, call center, and administrative organi-
zations, the dilemma for employees is that they jeopardize their own 
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jobs through organizational optimizations. Managers, on the other 
hand, can depend on an organization continually providing surpris-
ing new contradictions, side effects, and paradoxes to occupy them. 
Managers will only need to worry about justifying their existence when 
the impression arises that their work no longer has the character of a 
Sisyphean task, and that everything is running like clockwork.
Methodological Epilogue
The material I use for my organizational scientific books draws on 
three sources: my own research projects, in which I pursue specific 
questions; consulting projects, which generate interesting insights 
into organizations quasi as byproducts; and accounts of specific orga-
nizations that have been prepared by other consultants, executives, 
or scientists.
In analyzing the organizations mentioned in this book, I resorted 
to a method I used in my book When the Monkeys Run the Zoo: The 
Pitfalls of Flat Hierarchies and subsequently developed further in various 
research projects. It consists of focusing on organizations that pioneered 
decentralization. I define pioneering organizations as those that drew 
attention to themselves through the introduction of organizational fea-
tures that are considered modern (decentralization, dehierarchization, 
the dismantling of functional division of labor) and stood as models 
for organizations in the same field.
The case analysis of organizations that pioneered decentralization 
stands in contrast to the methodologies of both contingency theo-
ry-oriented organizational research and of industrial psychology, with 
its interest in comprehensive trends. These disciplines generally refer to 
“typical” businesses, governmental agencies, hospitals, or universities, 
and strive to match as many variables as possible. Contrary to this 
method, my objective is not primarily to develop an empirically doc-
umented thesis based on extensive samples. Instead, the examination 
of pioneering organizations serves to develop considerations and to 
illustrate a theoretically supported argumentation.
The problem in studying organizations in general, and pioneer-
ing ones in particular, is that the initial accounts given by discussion 
partners merely portray the organization’s display side. The dominant 
tenor of management is that clear goals are set, instructions are given, 
deviations are measured, and re-adjustments are made. What managers 
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tell researchers is often geared to the lists of objectives, visions, and 
plans that are circulating in the business.
As an outsider, one risks confusing the organization’s display side 
with its formal or informal aspects. While constructing an external 
presentation has a function for an organization, it presents a limited 
view. The façade often presents intentions which, as Nils Brunsson 
(Brunsson 1989, 231ff.) points out, often do not materialize. The 
cause-and-effect chains portrayed on the display side are often much 
different from those found in day-to-day operations. The in part myth-
ical portrayal of the relationships between certain causes and effects 
fulfill an important function, but they are not a realistic reflection of 
what goes on in the firm. Reconstructing the façades of pioneering 
organizations is important; equally pivotal, however, are the accounts 
of day-to-day operational reality given by employees.
For this reason, I have tried as much as possible to work with 
three special methodological features in order to achieve this level of 
description. First, a multi-point analysis was conducted in each of the 
businesses. Visiting the companies a number of times allowed us to 
detect inconsistencies in descriptions. Second, a mixture of various 
methods from empirical social research was used. Particularly, the com-
bination of one-on-one interviews, group discussions, and observation 
made it possible to identify discrepancies in self-descriptions. Third, 
in some of the one-on-one interviews and the group discussions the 
interviewers changed their style half way through. When those surveyed 
showed strong attachment to the firm’s downstage metaphors, after 
somewhat collaborative prompting and questioning at the beginning, 
we switched to a confrontational style. The individual or group was 
explicitly challenged with the (possible) discrepancy and asked to pro-
vide an explanation. Some of the discussion partners reacted defensively 
to this change in style, but in other situations the conversation shifted 
direction and participants provided accounts that no longer matched 
up with the display side presentations.
When using this methodological approach, the object is not to 
discredit the rational façades presented in the interviews through an 
alleged “actual reality.” Rather, working out the discrepancy between 
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organizational downstage and backstage is a necessary step for grasping 
the adaptation, construction, and further development of models as 
an autonomous process that is only loosely coupled with the reality of 
day-to-day operations. Only then does it become possible to elaborate 
how organizations adjust to models and further develop them.
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On the one hand, employees are supposed to compete with 
one another as “intrapreneurs,” on the other, cooperation 
among employees and abidance to rules is top priority. In 
consequence, the paradoxicel messaging employees are 
confronted with sounds like the following: We are all pulling 
together but only the best will prevail! Do the right thing,  
but be sure not to break any written or unwritten laws!  
Be unorthodox, but don’t interfere with the standardization 
process which is taking place in the name of efficiency!
This book explains why attempting to reconcile these  
contradictions is futile. The often praised Holy Grail, the  
perfectly functioning company, will never be found.  
Stefan Kühl elaborates the paradoxes of modern management 
with its strive to achieve optimal organizational cultures and 
points out its undesired side effects. This does not mean  
that management is arbitrary per se. On the contrary, the  
potential and limitations of managerial action can only be  
demonstrated through an understanding of organizations that 
goes beyond recipe books and PowerPoint-presentations. 
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